Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification A National Security Priority: Interim Report (2021) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix B: List of Findings and Recommendations
Appendix B: List of Findings and Recommendations
Pages 133-144
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From page 133... ...
The NSC should ensure that there is an enduring, interagency planning process with a consistent periodicity to characterize potential future MDV challenges, assess the adequacy of current MDV capabilities to address these challenges, develop strategic guidance for R&D planning, and advocate for funding. The process should involve the following: (a)
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From page 134... ...
(b) NNSA should better develop and communicate the vision and objec tives of the test beds, and assess opportunities for expanding access to all relevant parties including academic, commercial, and international partners.
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From page 135... ...
(b) NNSA/NPAC Office of Nuclear Verification plays a key role in the mid TRL development of arms control technologies.
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From page 136... ...
As the TRL progresses, the operators should provide increasingly specific technical and operational requirements. NNSA should broaden access to key facilities, processes, and materials via streamlined conduct of operations procedures, through the test beds or otherwise.
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From page 137... ...
(c) DNN R&D and other parts of the MDV R&D enterprise should use the best practices of other government agencies to optimize the use of prize challenges and solicit innovative ideas from researchers outside the traditional MDV mission space, including the use of surrogate datasets.
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From page 138... ...
New analytic approaches that concurrently consider results from multiple sampler locations coupled with atmospheric and aquatic transport models can improve the identification of potential source locations. Recommendation 8.
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From page 139... ...
(d) Developing integrated analytic processes to analyze environmental sam pling results from all relevant sampling locations as a network, coupling their temporally resolved results with atmospheric and aquatic transport models can improve plume source location capability.
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From page 140... ...
, characterizing increasing background radiation, filling the data gaps that occur when countries intentionally shut down their sensor network or stop reporting data, and developing an effective on-site inspection capability.3 Recommendation 11. The United States should continue to support CTBTO IMS construction, technology refreshment, and improved IMS capabilities because a fully functioning IMS is beneficial to the United States.
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From page 141... ...
experimental test bed for warhead veri fication that is accessible to the academic, laboratory, industrial, and international community to safely conduct experiments on real and surrogate materials; help mature technologies; and be subject to red team and white team testing for authentication, certification, managed access, and vulnerability analyses.
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From page 142... ...
Each organization in the MDV enterprise should consider open-source information/data as an important adjunct to NTM that can possibly corroborate or enhance NTM data sources, enable international information sharing at an unclassified level, and/or provide tipping and cue ing information for tasking of NTM assets.
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From page 143... ...
Advanced data analytics are rapidly emerging techniques with the potential to facilitate earlier proliferation detection and better decision making.
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From page 144... ...
Expansion and improvement of X X MDV test beds 3. Enhancement of university X X consortia 4.
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