Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification A National Security Priority: Interim Report (2021) / Chapter Skim
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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
Pages 5-34
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. Section 3136 of the FY2020 NDAA specified that the review and assessment include • an evaluation of the current national research enterprise for detection, verification, and monitoring of nuclear weapons and fissile material; • an evaluation of the integration of roles, responsibilities, and plan ning for such detection, verification, and monitoring within the federal government; • opportunities to leverage the national research enterprise to further prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissile material, including with respect to policy, research and development, and testing and evaluation; • opportunities for international engagement for building cooperation and transparency, including bilateral and multilateral efforts, to improve in spections, detection, and monitoring of nuclear weapons and fissile mate rial, and to create incentives for such cooperation and transparency; • opportunities for new or expanded research and development efforts to improve detection and monitoring of, and in-field inspection and analysis capabilities with respect to, nuclear weapons and fissile materials; 5
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.1 The 2014 DSB report included an assessment of the technical needs to support nuclear proliferation monitoring within both cooperative and unilateral constructs. A summary of the conclusions of the DSB Task Force is presented in Appendix C
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. The MDV mission space is often broken into the two distinct spheres of proliferation detection and arms control.
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In addition, the committee has considered the contributions to this mission space made by the two most relevant international organizations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)
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MDV R&D enterprise to strengthen and transparency, including bilateral and coordination with the IAEA. multilateral efforts, to improve inspections, Section 3.4 identifies opportunities to detection, and monitoring of nuclear weapons and improve arms control monitoring capabilities fissile material, and to create incentives for such through strengthened international cooperation and transparency.
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. Although its arsenal has been significantly reduced through a series of negotiated bilateral nuclear arms control agreements, Russia maintains a large nuclear arsenal.
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China has never been party to any bilateral arms control agreement with the United States and has indicated little willingness to participate in cooperative nuclear arms control. Although China has participated in the P5 process with the other NPT nuclear weapon states,6 a bilateral or trilateral (with Russia)
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Reports indicate that North Korea continues to produce fissile material for its nuclear arsenal and may be developing smaller nuclear warheads and longerrange missiles capable of carrying multiple warheads to every part of the United States (Hecker et al., 2020)
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In its FY2020–2024 Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats,8 NNSA notes concerns about nuclear proliferation if energy needs promote a resurgence in civilian nuclear power in states "whose commitment to nonproliferation is uncertain" (NNSA, 2019)
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The past few years have seen a significant increase in the amount of public data that may be relevant to monitoring nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear programs (e.g., commercial satellite images, open-source seismic sensor networks)
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The MDV mission space has not been consistently prioritized over the years, and Box 1‑2 gives two examples of how the lack of BOX 1-2 Examples of MDV Challenges Consistent support and attention to the MDV mission space is key to ensuring that the enterprise has the capabilities necessary to meet future needs. Without support and attention, there is a risk that new technologies will not be available or mature enough to replace out-dated technologies that may be ill-equipped for future challenges.
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. While MDV capabilities have advanced since the 2014 DSB report, the priority and level of R&D effort has not increased commensurate with the expanding, multipolar nuclear threat.
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. DoS leads policy development and analysis, and DoD plays a critical operational role, in particular through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
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from the president and the National Security Council (NSC) .17 The NSC staff typically lead an interagency process to develop these policies and prepare instructions for arms control and nonproliferation negotiators.
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DoS is also the primary funder of the United States Support Program (USSP) to IAEA 18 The scope of "nuclear defense" includes MDV.
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. 21 DoS/ISN communicated to the committee that FY2020 Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund funding supported weapons of mass destruction threat reduction in Syria, Egyptian counter-smuggling, nuclear safety and security in Latin America, expanded counter-smuggling efforts, global chemical and biological weapons prevention, and continued readiness to support the administration's efforts to eliminate North Korea's ballistic missile systems and nuclear weapons (DoS/ISN, communication to committee, November 18, 2020)
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The committee did not focus on either of these offices in this interim study, since they are more indirectly involved in the MDV enterprise and do not exercise a significant role in fuel cycle monitoring, nuclear test explosion monitoring, or arms control monitoring, the technical areas that the committee focused on in this interim report. 23 DNN R&D supports some higher TRL work (TRL 5 through TRL 9)
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. The Office of Proliferation Detection carries out R&D to improve a broad range of nuclear-related MDV capabilities through three teams: Material Production Detection and Monitoring, Nuclear Weapons Development Detection and Material Security, and Nonproliferation Enabling Capabilities.
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In addition, NPAC conducts RDT&E at higher TRLs than DNN R&D. NPAC comprises four sub-offices: the Office of International Nuclear Safeguards, the Office of Nuclear Export Controls, the Office of Nuclear Verification, and the Office of Nonproliferation Policy.
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, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification,29 and the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership.30 The Office of Nuclear Verification's total technology 26 The other NPAC offices contribute more indirectly to the MDV mission and were not covered in detail in this study. The Office of Nuclear Export Controls "builds U.S.
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The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff play important roles, through interagency coordination, in setting verification and compliance policies, which affect MDV requirements and limits in the context of negotiating and implementing international agreements. Defense Threat Reduction Agency DTRA plays a role in the MDV mission space in terms of both RDT&E and operations.
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DTRA also plays an operational role in the MDV mission space. DTRA/OB operates all aspects of monitoring for the New START arms control treaty including training inspectors, maintaining the data exchanges, escorting the Russian inspectors in the United States, and conducting the on-site inspections in Russia.
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The committee will assess this role in more detail in the final report. Office of the Director of National Intelligence National Counterproliferation Center The National Counterproliferation Center was established in 2005 to serve as a focal point in the IC for intelligence on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissile material.
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International Atomic Energy Agency The IAEA is responsible for verifying states' compliance with the NPT by confirming that nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon states are exclusively peaceful through, among other things, implementation of Comprehensive 36 The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office subsumed the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office in 2017. While the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office is part of the broader MDV enterprise, the office does not exercise a significant role in fuel cycle monitoring, nuclear test monitoring, or arms control monitoring, the technical areas that the committee focused on in this interim report.
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Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization The CTBTO was established to facilitate entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, deploy a global monitoring system, and prepare to conduct on-site inspections as detailed in the treaty once the treaty enters into force. The monitoring regime established by the CTBTO includes the International Monitoring System, a world-wide network of monitoring stations and laboratories around the world,38 and the International Data Centre, which processes and analyzes data collected at the monitoring stations.
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The amount of open-source MDV data available to such organizations has grown significantly, enabling them to conduct MDV analyses that can complement government efforts.40 Professional societies such as the Institute of Nuclear Material Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association serve as venues for information-sharing, international cooperation to promote the development of MDV technical expertise, and the development of relevant standards. REFERENCES Allison, G
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2018a. Nuclear nonproliferation: The administration's 2015 plan and 2017 update for nuclear proliferation verification and monitoring generally did not address reporting requirements.
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Washington, DC: Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration. NVCITF (Nuclear Verification Capabilities Independent Task Force)
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2015. The IAEA and nuclear disarmament verification: A primer.
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