Radioactive Sources Applications and Alternative Technologies (2021) / Chapter Skim
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2 Radioactive Source Uses, Risks, and Control
2 Radioactive Source Uses, Risks, and Control
Pages 25-54
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From page 25... ...
Since the previous National Academies review of the applications of radioactive sources (NRC, 2008) , no new applications of Category 1 and Category 2 radioactive sources have emerged.
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Generally, characteristics that affect safety risks related to radioactive sources also affect the security risks associated with these same sources. These characteristics follow: 1.
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The widespread use of sources creates more potential for accidents or diversion. In the scope of this study, the most common radioactive sources contain cobalt-60.
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From page 28... ...
Availability of safety and security protocols, their quality and effectiveness, and the level of adherence to them affect the likelihood of radiological events. Effectiveness of the protocols typically depends on the physical security of the location in which the radioactive source is used and stored as well as the level of training of the operating personnel.
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The event highlights the risks associated with inappropriate disposal of radioactive sources. 2.3.2 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident, Japan, 2011 On March 11, 2011, the 9.0 magnitude Great East Japan earthquake followed by an unexpected 15-m tsunami damaged the power supply and cooling system of the three operational reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.
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. Although the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident did not involve a radioactive source of the types addressed in this report, it demonstrated that an event that involves radiation can have large socioeconomic consequences even if it does not cause any immediate deaths due to radiation.
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NRC licenses and regulates civilian use of radioactive materials and provides safety and security requirements associated with their use.6 Regulations in 10 CFR Part 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation," Subpart I, "Storage and Control of Licensed Material" include security requirements for all radioactive materials except those that are specifically exempted by the regulations.7 The U.S. NRC issued Increased Control Orders in November 2005, which require licensees that possess Category 1 and Category 2 materials to provide for additional security for these materials.8 These Increased Control Orders were eventually replaced by the regulations in 10 CFR Part 37 titled "Physical Protection of Category 1 and 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material," that 4 Lance Garrison, NNSA, presentation to the committee on June 12, 2020.
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From page 32... ...
The specific licensee may distribute a generally licensed device to those who do not have a radioactive materials license, but the general licensee must comply with the regulatory requirements. The vast majority, approximately 80 percent of general license device holders, do not possess radioactive sources that are the topic of this report but instead possess sources such as road self-luminous exit signs (containing tritium)
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From page 33... ...
, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to support situational awareness.14 In 2020, NTI released its first Radioactive Source Security Assessment, which, without ranking or scoring countries, evaluated national policies and commitments in 175 countries and Taiwan to prevent the theft of high-risk radioactive materials. The NTI report raised concerns about the security of high-risk radioactive sources by noting, among other things, the absence of an active registry of radioactive sources in almost two-thirds of the countries examined.
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From page 34... ...
Other licensees who possess radioactive sources have regulations specific to their intended uses. However, as noted in the previous sections, security regulations and reporting requirements in 10 CFR Part 37 do not apply to Category 3 sources unless they are aggregated and meet or exceed the Category 2 thresholds.
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NRC on what contributes to the increase in the inventory. However, based on its own analysis of use of radioactive sources in the different applications and evaluation of trends for the past 10–15 years, the committee concludes that the biggest contributor to the increase in the radioactive source inventory is likely the use of cobalt60 in industrial sterilization and specifically in medical device sterilization.
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From page 36... ...
NRC, the materials licensees, state, local, and tribal governments, and other federal agencies to build on the existing regulatory requirements by providing voluntary security enhancements. Examples of these enhancements include voluntary security upgrades such as cesium chloride irradiator hardening and facility-specific security upgrades; specialized training of local law enforcement to better respond to alarms at facilities with nuclear and radioactive materials; and security, including a testbed and voluntary pilot demonstration of cargo hardening, alarm assessment, and shipment tracking.
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In addition, NNSA co-sponsors workshops and resulting publications on alternative technology–related topics. 2.4.3 Other Agencies Several other agencies within the United States have roles and responsibilities related to the use of radioactive sources for specific applications.
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on incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, which includes lost or stolen radioactive sources. Member States voluntarily participate in its reporting system and set their own standards for what to disclose to the agency.
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The database contains records of events involving licensed radioactive materials including lost, abandoned, or stolen radioactive sources or other material reported to the U.S. NRC by licensees or Agreement States.
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. In 2018, five cases of intentional trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials were recorded: • Ukrainian security services arrested six individuals believed to be part of an international radioactive materials smuggling ring.
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2.6 PHYSICAL RADIOACTIVE SOURCE TRACKING As noted in previous sections, radioactive sources that are portable and often in transit are vulnerable to theft or diversion. Portable sources include radiography cameras and oil well logging devices, which are often in transit due to their applications in shipyards, power plants, and oil and gas fields.
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Another physical radioactive source tracking device is the NucTrack Solution tracking system deployed in France. This system has features similar to those of the RADLOT and MSTS systems.
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NRC that it • Consider socioeconomic consequences and fatalities from evacuations when determining requirements for security measures for radioactive materials that could be used in an RDD. • Implement additional security requirements for smaller quantities of high-risk material.
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In addition, the peer review could result in a set of best practices for conducing such economic analyses following hypothetical RDD scenarios that involve radioactive sources. 2.8 END-OF-LIFE MANAGEMENT OF DISUSED RADIOACTIVE SOURCES Disused sources are either excess, unwanted, or spent sources that can pose safety and security problems if not properly dispositioned.
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and Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources (IAEA, 2018a,b) -- provide advice on end-of-life management options for disused sources.
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29 Special-form radioactive sources are sources in which the radioactivity is sealed inside a capsule so that it is much less likely to cause contamination. Sealed sources are examples of special-form material.
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reports that there are few countries that have full access to waste disposal facilities for disused radioactive sources. For radioactive sources with half-lives less than 30 years, most can be disposed of in near-surface facilities, and these are primarily located in countries with a nuclear power industry.
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For example, • Texas has implemented a 2-year time limit for storage of disused sealed sources and collects fees from licensees to cover the cost of orphaned and abandoned source recovery;33 • Illinois has implemented financial assurance requirement for most sources;34 and 32 Sarah Norris and John Zarling, NNSA, presentation to the committee on September 9, 2020. 33 Texas' financial provisions for orphan sources (Health & Safety Code, Subtitle D, Nuclear and Radioactive Materials, Chapter 401, Radioactive Materials and Other Sources of Radiation, Subchapter H, Financial Provisions)
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From page 49... ...
The licensee's total liability for sealed source use is calculated according to a formula that yields a total liability proportional to the costs for the safe disposal of radioactive sources at the end of their useful life. Currently, annual premiums range from $25 to approximately $4,500 (CNSC, 2020)
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Internationally, several other programs exist to identify viable waste disposal options for disused sources and to ensure that all countries have access to dispose of disused radioactive sources. Some countries currently dispose of disused sources along with other radioactive waste.
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Under a multiyear IAEA Technical Cooperation interregional project, Cradle-to-Grave Management of Radioactive Sources, the IAEA provides training and assistance for management of disused radioactive sources to participating countries. The IAEA strongly encourages countries to establish end-of-life management options prior to purchasing a new source and has developed programs to help countries understand the available waste disposal options and determine what option is best for their inventory of disused sources (Yusuf, 2020)
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A safety system that is based solely on deterministic effects of radioactive sources may provide an inadequate level of protection to society.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commis sion, and other organizations should make changes to their security and source tracking guidance and regulations based on the outcome of the reframing in Recommendation A Following the reframing of the radioactive source categorization system as indicated in Recommendation A, the IAEA, the U.S.
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The U.S. NRC should expand its existing financial assurance requirements to ensure that licensees who consider purchasing new sources commit sufficient financial resources to dispose of radioactive sources at the end of their useful life.
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