Restoring and Improving Nuclear Forensics to Support Attribution and Deterrence Public Summary (2021) / Chapter Skim
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2 Assessing U.S. Nuclear Forensics: Findings, Recommendations, and Conclusion
2 Assessing U.S. Nuclear Forensics: Findings, Recommendations, and Conclusion
Pages 11-30
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From page 11... ...
This is due to the multiplicity of states with nuclear weapons, an increase in states with emerging or latent nuclear capabilities, interdictions of fissile materials outside of regulatory control that indicate the existence of a black market for such materials, the proliferation of terrorist organizations that might use nuclear weapons if they could, and the increased interest that some nations have shown in harboring terrorist organizations to execute attacks on their behalf. FINDING A.1: A robust NTNF capability is an important element of deterring, preventing, and responding to an unclaimed nuclear attack or smuggling incident, much as the nuclear weapons enterprise deters overt nuclear attacks and offers response options if that deterrence fails.
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From page 12... ...
There have been advances in both the technical and operational aspects of the U.S. NTNF program since 2010.
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From page 13... ...
Signed on January 19, 2021, NSPM-35 and the Implementation Plan transitions several of the DHS's NTNF roles to the NNSA and codifies existing interagency and National Security Council (NSC) entities to provide the primary oversight, guidance, and coordination for the NTNF program.
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From page 14... ...
2.c WAYS TO IMPROVE NTNF AND A VISION FOR ITS FUTURE A program benefits when its mission, objectives, and requirements are clear and flow through the program, guiding decisions about what work to undertake and what levels of effort are needed, with regular assessments of the program to identify where improvements are necessary to achieve the mission. If the NTNF program is given a high priority and equipped with a clear mission that establishes goals and strategies, NTNF entities will be better enabled to fulfill that mission.
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From page 15... ...
. As noted earlier in this report, in September 2020, federal program managers described plans for the transfer of NTNF program leadership and reestablishment of NTNF capabilities.
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From page 16... ...
However, there is no single, high-level requirements document for the entire NTNF program or even across use cases. Instead, NTNF program success is measured against a variety of metrics and goals linked to independently developed requirements from each department or agency involved in NTNF and attribution.
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From page 17... ...
RECOMMENDATION C.1: An NSC Interagency Policy Committee should coordinate issuance of a high-level requirements document for the NTNF program, covering the elements of a capable, reliable, sustainable, and improving program, taking into account its interfaces with the attribution process and the other programs that feed into it. The requirements should derive from both minimum needs and goals for the capabilities of the program, agreed to at the highest level of the interagency.
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From page 18... ...
7 While valuable, these joint interagency annual reports have not adequately described the state of the program or provided sufficient input from the people that do the work, which is to say run NTNF operations, conduct NTNF analyses, maintain the workforce and the infrastructure, and perform the R&D. For nuclear forensics assessments, it would be important to have input from the leaders of the organizations that play critical roles in the NTNF mission, as well as the customer for NTNF analysis.
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From page 19... ...
. Such assessments and reporting would help monitor nuclear forensics program effectiveness and signal a robust capability, thus improving the deterrent aspect of technical nuclear forensics.
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From page 20... ...
2.g OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY The committee found only a few people in the NTNF program who could articulate what an operational NTNF capability should look like and how the elements should fit together and interact. RECOMMENDATION F.1: The agencies involved in NTNF should work to strengthen an operational NTNF capability based on clear requirements, including the requirement to improve.
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From page 21... ...
2.g.i Data Sharing Virtually all phases of operations of the NTNF program rely upon a broad variety of databases and analyses at different levels and types of classification. 10 Consistent with the 2010 National Academies report, 11 it is imperative that long before an event occurs the nuclear forensics community establish the policies and infrastructure for sharing information that enables a timely and effective response.
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From page 22... ...
, the need to identify additional proliferation signatures and have a detailed knowledge of foreign-source nuclear materials is apparent. The committee recommends that the NTNF program consider strengthening this work through a Foreign Nuclear Materials Intelligence Initiative (FNMII)
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From page 23... ...
government, including the IC and law enforcement, and have tested increasingly complex scenarios. To enable more realistic exercises that test NTNF functions as intended, the NTNF program must be funded appropriately and seen by national leadership as a higher priority.
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2.g.iv Sample Collection Analyzing nuclear materials samples, whether pre-detonation interdicted materials or post detonation debris, is one of the central functions of nuclear forensics. The following two subsections emphasize the importance of samples and expert guidance to NTNF analysis and the tools to ensure that high-quality samples are collected and that in-the-field observations and data are communicated at the earliest possible time.
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From page 25... ...
DOE technical experts are available to guide the collection. RECOMMENDATION F.6: A DOE technical expert should always be included as a key member of the DoD ground-collection team as it collects samples in a post detonation debris field and should be responsible for choosing sample locations and amounts and for interpreting the in-field measurements of each sample to assess its adequacy.
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From page 26... ...
To better ensure that the products work in practical application, the R&D should be conducted in close cooperation with the intended users of the platforms developed. 2.g.v Mission-Driven R&D Research and development are essential components of an effective NTNF program and are not separable from operational capabilities.
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From page 27... ...
R&D is also needed to help attract and retain nuclear forensics personnel by providing work that keeps their skills sharp and keeps them available for the mission. R&D budgets should therefore be aligned with human resource needs to sustain an operational NTNF program.
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From page 28... ...
Although guidance on quality assurance/quality control standards and methods of communicating uncertainty already exists, it was not clear to the committee that the laboratories always assess and communicate uncertainty in a uniform manner. The 2010 National Academies report noted tension between collection efforts for technical nuclear forensics and the steps required for proper forensics science evidence collection and preservation to support criminal prosecution in court (see Box 2-1)
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From page 29... ...
CONCLUSION The conclusion of the 2010 National Academies report notes that a terrorist nuclear attack is "the most catastrophic threat the nation faces." Recent events indicate that the need to deter nuclear threats and attribute an attack in the event that deterrence fails has not abated and may be growing (Tilden and Boyd, 2021)
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From page 30... ...
Nuclear forensics capabilities are an essential element of U.S. national security.
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