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Cryptography and the Intelligence Community The Future of Encryption (2022) / Chapter Skim
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7 Findings
Pages 105-110

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From page 105...
... FINDINGS FROM CHAPTER 2 (INTRODUCTION TO ENCRYPTION) FINDING 2.1: Stateful digital signatures based on hash functions are practical today and will remain secure even if large-scale quantum computers are practical or if new number theoretic attacks are developed that affect other quantum-resistant signature algorithms.
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From page 106...
... export control regulations have historically discouraged talent from locating in the United States. FINDING 4.2: An improvement in asymmetric cryptanalysis algorithms could have a significant effect on the security of public key encryption algorithms that are in wide use today.
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From page 107...
... substantive communications content requirements enabled by technological distinctions at national levels, including, for example, banning or discouraging end-to-end encryption (so as to permit government surveillance) , or mandating a variety of governmental access to otherwise encrypted communications (perhaps through required turnover of encryption keys to authorities or insisting on the use of specified encryption schemes)
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From page 108...
... FINDING 4.14: A new classical cryptanalysis algorithm or quantum computing development could result in rushed and disorganized efforts to replace widely used public key algorithms or other cryptographic standards. Such a breakthrough would require mitigation efforts that would be more complex than fixing typical software bugs, such as the coordinated deployment of major protocol updates across implementations and services.
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From page 109...
... For this risk, it appears that the endpoints in the other two drivers are not irrelevant, but simply provide different details to a • Scenario 5 similar narrative: The Intelligence Community, and the United States, will need to invest resources into • Scenario 6 strengthening existing alliances and/or building new ones over the coming decades. With ever-shifting bilateral alliances it may be hard (slow)
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From page 110...
... . • Scenario 5 • Scenario 6 Limit/mitigate fragmentation, The Intelligence Community and the United States will need to consult with current allies and try to both in technologies and leverage purchasing power to push common standards and increase implementation maturity.
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Key Terms

  • encrypted information
  • digital signature
  • data security
  • security concerns
  • government surveillance

  • scientific advances
  • quantum computers
  • public key
  • common standards
  • opposite reactions

  • algorithms vulnerable
  • blockchain companies
  • implementation maturity
  • remain secure
  • extremely wide

  • increase implementation
  • key distribution
  • historically discouraged
  • trade policies
  • using conventional

  • facilitating criminal
  • executive order
  • leverage purchasing
  • operator inexperience
  • cryptographic research

  • disorganized efforts
  • governments weaken
  • efficient attacks
  • foreign manufacturer
  • push common


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