The Use of Limited Access Privilege Programs in Mixed-Use Fisheries (2021) / Chapter Skim
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2 Individual Quota Systems and LAPPs
2 Individual Quota Systems and LAPPs
Pages 35-48
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From page 35... ...
In short, the economists' prediction was that by giving fishers individual quota shares, they would have greater incentive to invest more efficiently in fishing equipment and labor, to fish in a deliberate manner likely to improve quality and safety, and to support conservation measures that produced benefits over the long term. The next part of the chapter provides different perspectives on IFQs.
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From page 36... ...
For example, National Standard One is that "conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United States fishing industry." National Standard Five underscores the importance of efficiency, but also provides that it cannot be the sole objective of any management measure. National Standard Eight requires that the choice of management measures should, where possible, provide the sustained participation of fishing communities and minimize any adverse economic impacts (16 U.S.
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From page 37... ...
As a result, stock size increased and halibut fishing remained profitable; however, without controls on entry this provided incentives for further entry, and of boats designed to maximize profits under the conditions of this fishery (i.e., larger and more powerful boats that could catch fish faster)
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From page 38... ...
Transferability also creates opportunities to address catch and management uncertainty in multispecies fisheries in which vessels cannot perfectly target species under individual quota management and can use trading to quota balance (i.e., fill their individual allocations of species without exceeding regulated limits)
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From page 39... ...
Between 1999 and 2011, the West Coast and North Pacific saw a variety of programs with different structures, including cooperatives, permit stacking, and "rationalization," as well as the unique Western Alaska Community Development Quota Program (1992) .1 Finally, 1In the North Pacific region, some LAPPs are assigned to cooperatives; certain limited access fisheries allow permit holders to use more than one permit on a vessel, which is called permit stacking; and the word "rationalization" has been used to refer to particular cases of assigning individual quotas.
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From page 40... ...
include measures to assist, when necessary and appropriate, entry-level and small vessel owner-operators, captains, crew, and fishing communities through set-asides of harvesting allocations, including providing privileges, which may include set-asides or allocations of harvesting privileges, or economic assistance in the purchase of limited access privileges; … (7) TRANSFERABILITY. -- In establishing a limited access privilege program, a Council shall -- (A)
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From page 41... ...
. Social scientists studying the human dimensions of fisheries and fishing communities have critiqued conceptualizations of IFQ systems that center on the goal of efficiency as leaving out or minimizing considerations such as livelihood and community sustainability, social justice, and distributional equity, among other goals that fisheries management policy could explicitly address.
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From page 42... ...
. The IFQ program for crab in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands included a number of features to address distributional concerns and support fishing communities: including allocating some quota share to captains, vesting processing quota share in processors to preserve historic landings patterns (which required special legislation)
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From page 43... ...
For example, while the commercial sector, under the assumption of constant price, tries to minimize costs of catching fish to maximize profits, recreational fishers are seeking to maximize their net utility from the fishing experience. Because users value quota for different purposes, a transferable quota system that included both recreational and commercial fishers could lead to large shifts in holdings between traditional commercial versus recreational sectors, especially if less commonly measured and considered values (particularly in the long run)
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From page 44... ...
A more open definition of who is eligible to participate can disadvantage smaller operators and those supporting fishing communities as larger operations and outside investors compete to be shareholders. Initial Allocation In order for an individual quota system to work, the government must at the outset create shares and then distribute those to vessel owners or other stakeholders.
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From page 45... ...
fisheries management, the government bears the costs of science and enforcement. IFQ programs, specifically those in which shares are marketable, create private wealth by permitting costs to be rationalized.
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From page 46... ...
of fishers constituting more than 50 percent of the permit holders, or holding more than 50 percent of the allocation, in the fishery." The MSA creates special process requirements, in the form of referenda, for certain fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico and New England.6 The Gulf of Mexico provision requires a majority vote of those who "substantially fished" the species in question. The New England provisions require a twothirds vote among a stakeholder group that includes not just fishers who hold allocation or permits but also "crew members who derive a significant percentage of their total income from the fishery." Initial Allocation As noted, the initial allocation of shares in an individual quota fishery will often be hotly contested because the distribution of shares is the distribution of wealth (rent)
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From page 47... ...
requires the Councils to "include measures to assist, when necessary and appropriate, entry-level and small vessel owner-operators, captains, crews, and fishing communities through set-asides of harvesting allocations, including providing privileges, which may include set-asides or allocations of harvesting privileges, or economic assistance in the purchase of limited access privileges." Section 1853a(g) gives the Councils the option of creating a fund in order to facilitate entry: (1)
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From page 48... ...
(2) , for a program of fees paid by limited access privilege hold ers that will cover the costs of management, data collection and analysis, and enforcement activities.
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