Roots and Trajectories of Violent Extremism and Terrorism A Cooperative Program of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences (1995-2020) (2022) / Chapter Skim
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3 Radiological Challenges: Security, Sources, Waste Sites, and Disposal
3 Radiological Challenges: Security, Sources, Waste Sites, and Disposal
Pages 49-66
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From page 49... ...
Then in the Russian Far East in 2003, thieves stripped off the metal casings of radioactive thermal generators at three lighthouses. – NAS report, 20071 The world has not yet given adequate attention to the dangers of mis use of radioactive sources, spent nuclear fuel, and radioactive waste to make radiological devices.
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From page 50... ...
BOX 3-1 Radiological Security Activities 1997: NAS report on nuclear proliferation concerns in the former Soviet Union. 1999: NAS report Protecting Nuclear Weapons Material in Rus sia, with visits to facilities in Moscow, Obninsk, Dubna, Podolsk, Dmitrovgrad, Los Alamos, Albuquerque, Oak Ridge, and Livermore.
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From page 51... ...
They were concerned that although intergovernmental programs were having some effect on upgrading the security at many Russian facilities, the gravity of the threat involving nuclear material was actually increasing. The continuing decline in the Russian economy had severely affected the economic well-being of Russian government officials, nuclear specialists, and workers who had access to direct-use material.
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From page 52... ...
In response to such reports, the Russian government required many facilities to tighten their control of nuclear material; and the number of attempted thefts during subsequent years dropped significantly.6 Also in 1999, the NAS advised the DOE that although the priorities in the MPC&A programs being supported were generally consistent with the most urgent needs in protecting nuclear material, the following issues required prompt attention: • There was very slow progress in installing and putting into operation material accountancy systems at Russian sites -- including even the basic step of ensuring complete and accurate inventories of nuclear material. • With several important exceptions, only limited progress had been made in efforts to consolidate direct-use material at a variety of sites into fewer buildings to reduce the number of locations that required the highest level of security.
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From page 53... ...
In general, these findings, supplemented with statements by many Russian security officials, indicated that security enhancements installed through the DOE program probably played an important role in significantly reducing the number of attempted thefts of dangerous nuclear material from Russian facilities. But additional efforts were in order.
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From page 54... ...
TENS OF THOUSANDS OF POTENT IONIZING RADIATION SOURCES IN USE AND OUT OF USE IN RUSSIA While DOE was making good progress in upgrading its programs to improve security of weapons-usable material at many Russian facilities, the NAS began to consider other aspects of radiological security in response to new requests from DOE. Of special concern was the handling of ionizing radiation sources (IRSs)
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From page 55... ...
• Encourage the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute to attract students to participate in MPC&A training activities by also offering them broader industrial security training that would increase their employment opportunities at a later stage in their careers. • Give greater attention to developing personal commitments of Russian managers, specialists, and guard forces for ensuring installation and operation of high-quality MPC&A systems.
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From page 56... ...
The most common uses of IRSs included the applications set forth in Box 3-3. During the early 2000s, NAS specialists learned many details about the problems Russia had inherited from the former Soviet Union in controlling a very large number of potent IRSs throughout the country.
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From page 57... ...
Russian and American participants in an NAS-RAS project during 2006 visited a variety of Russian facilities to improve their understanding of the state of security surrounding the possession of IRSs. Their reports on visits to five facilities included the following observations: • Four cesium-137 sources of about 5,000 curies each were maintained in an unprotected room of a poorly guarded facility adjacent to a forest.
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From page 58... ...
• The DOE should develop a comprehensive plan for working with Russian counterparts to reduce the overall risk and consequences of radiological terrorism. • Cooperation should be developed within the context of the overall Russian program for ensuring adequate life-cycle management of IRSs throughout the country and should take into account activities of other external partners.12 Adding to the urgency of reducing the likelihood of successful terrorist activities, which included dissemination of IRSs, were the observations of a team of collaborating Russian experts.
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From page 59... ...
The NAS played an important role in inviting carefully chosen American experts to attend the conference and also in identifying appropriate participants for follow-up studies that continued for decades.16 The many movies and books highlighting deterioration of wooded areas and elimination of animals and insects that had inhabited the forests soon encouraged greater international attention to ecological impacts. The early NAS emphasis on ecological impacts helped facilitate NAS-RAS cooperation involving a variety of colleagues from Moscow and Obninsk.17 In more recent years, the NAS and the RAS sponsored a series of workshops on radiological challenges, commissioning preparation of reports on the disposal of radioactive wastes resulting from the growth of the nuclear industry in Russia.
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From page 60... ...
Eight industrial reservoirs for liquid radioactive wastes were established to support defense program operations, and these reservoirs had many long-term impacts. Also in 1957, a leak at a liquid radioactive holding tank in the area resulted in the creation of the well-known East Urals Radioactive Trace, with two reservoirs used to store medium-level wastes.
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From page 61... ...
Of continuing interest to the international participants were the environmental conditions at or near the Mayak complex described in many abstracts.23 In parallel with the focus on upgrading activities at Russian waste sites were two NAS-RAS assessments of the feasibility of establishing an international waste site in Russia for receiving and storing international spent nuclear fuel elements from many countries. The first NAS-promoted assessment of this proposal in 2003 addressed the following issues: • Legal issues, including liability during shipment and reception in Russia of fuel in accordance with international liability conventions.
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From page 62... ...
• Utilization of high-level waste.25 While the concept of an international spent nuclear fuel storage facility in Russia was realized, the inter-academy reports probably have saved the Russian, U.S., and other governments considerable time and financial expenses in avoiding blind alleys when issues concerning reprocessing, storage, and waste disposal have been raised. Looking to the future, spent nuclear fuel probably will continue to be transported across borders, including the Russian border, for reprocessing, storage, and/or disposal.
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From page 63... ...
After the pause in cooperation, the workshops discussed in this section address recent developments within both Russia and the United States as well as global trends. The American participants were no longer part-time mentors for Russian colleagues, as the Russians became well aware of many developments abroad concerning the topics on the agendas.
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From page 64... ...
• The Lepse floating storage facility near Murmansk had been devel oped and deployed for operations. Very quickly, the first parcel of nuclear material was sent to Mayak for reprocessing in 2019.
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From page 65... ...
2005. An International Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility: Exploring a Russian Site as a Prototype: Proceedings of an International Workshop.
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From page 66... ...
Source: Presentation by Mikhail Diordiy on spent radiation sources storage in con tainers to prevent terrorism and extremism, December 12, 2018. Equipment for monitoring submerged radiological equipment.
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