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3 Governance
Pages 78-92

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From page 78...
... requires both a command structure and decision structure. Command structure determines organization hierarchy and interrelationships across organizations, whereas decision structure focuses on decision-making and execution.
From page 79...
... The Chief Architect will: • Codify ABMS technical requirements derived from the Air Force and Space Force Service Chief-approved requirements documents and on-ramp results; • Facilitate an integrating enterprise digital architecture and standards across the DAF, Combatant Commands, partnering Services, agencies, and other mission partners; • Chair the ABMS ARB between on-ramps; • Provide inputs to the ABMS acquisition strategy; • Engage with both DAF senior stakeholders and external senior stakeholders to ensure unity of effort and division of engagement responsibilities; and 3  W Roper, 2020, "Advanced Battle Management System Management Construct," Memorandum for Record, https://insidedefense.com/sites/insidedefense.com/files/documents/2020/nov/11242020_ abms.pdf, November 24.
From page 80...
... The Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) will: • Retain decision authority for all aspects of ABMS to include approving both the ABMS technical architecture and acquisition strategy and all subsequent changes; and • Resolve differences between the Chief Architect, ABMS PEO, and related PEOs.4 The committee supports this governance structure and considers it a positive progression consistent with the evolving nature of a complex system like ABMS.
From page 81...
... These issues are further complicated when multi-national partners are factored into the decision-making space.6 Another issue of concern is that each military Service is developing and selecting C2 solutions outside their domain of control with the intent of resolving joint mission requirements. Already, Army leaders have expressed concerns that ground troops cannot adopt an air-centric command system for future all-domain operations.
From page 82...
... ORGANIZATION INTEGRATION Beyond the technical challenges of establishing a joint C2 environment, in tegrating the wide-ranging ABMS ecosystem within JADC2 will require both organizational and human considerations. From an organizational perspective, ABMS requires the ability to work across military Services, defense agencies, and multi-national partners, each with its own distinct culture and operating norms.
From page 83...
... Effective horizontal integration requires leaders to "connect the [organization's] knowledge bases, build social relationships among people and shape a shared sense of identity, all supported by a standardized technological infrastructure."10 This may be accomplished through four areas of action: • Operational integration through standardization of the technological infrastructure; • Intellectual integration through the development of a shared knowledge base; • Social integration through collective bonds for performance; and • Emotional integration through the creation of a common identity and purpose.11 Figure 3.1 provides a framework for considering organizational integration.
From page 84...
... Shift mindsets and behavior with training.12 For ABMS and other contributors to JADC2, the shared mission to sustain the Joint Force's military advantages by helping decision makers to act on infor mation well inside the adversaries' OODA loop provides a unifying vision upon which to act. Leaders across all of DoD are fully supportive of JADC2 and have worked jointly to advance the concept through inter-Service agreements and ex 12  I
From page 85...
... to establish integrated approaches between ABMS and Project Overmatch.14 The J6's leadership on JADC2 and the participation of various stakeholders in the CFT encourages even greater collaboration and shared accountabilities. What is missing, however, are shifting individual mindsets and behavior with training and incentives to forego entrenched organizational cultures and control for the wider good of the joint and multi-national defense ecosystem.
From page 86...
... The extent of the changes in just one of these dimensions -- let alone on both dimensions concurrently -- will require increased and expanded levels of trust and verification. Examples of broadened activities requiring expanded levels of trust include sensors and shooter access and prioritized use of scarce commu nications, spectrum, and computing resources.
From page 87...
... ensure overall human performance possesses the necessary knowledge and competencies to support mission tasking.21 As a management framework, HSI facilitates trade-offs among its seven domains and other systems engineering domains, but does not replace individual domain activities, responsibilities, or reporting channels.22 More importantly, HSI enables the collection of quantifiable and measurable impacts to overall system design.23 Within ABMS, the complexities of integrating almost 30 different product lines with operators, engineers, developers, testers, trainers, and others is a daunting challenge. "There's so many people in between information, moving between different nodes in the decision chain … the idea with ABMS is that the people are no longer the glue.
From page 88...
... The DoD in troduced in 2020 five guiding principles for ethical development of AI capabilities: • Responsible: DoD personnel will exercise appropriate levels of judgment and care while remaining responsible for the development, deployment, and use of AI capabilities; • Equitable: The department will take deliberate steps to minimize unin tended biases in AI capabilities; • Traceable: The department's AI capabilities will be developed and deployed such that relevant personnel possess an appropriate understanding of the technology, development, processes, and operational methods applicable to AI capabilities, including with transparent and auditable methodologies, data sources, and design procedures and documentation; • Reliable: The department's AI capabilities will have explicit, well-defined uses, and the safety, security, and effectiveness of such capabilities will be subject to testing and assurance within those defined uses across their entire life cycles; and • Governable: The department will design and engineer AI capabilities to fulfill their intended functions while possessing the ability to detect and
From page 89...
... 2–3, https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/ issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf, November 21. This directive states, "It is DoD policy that … autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.… Persons who authorize the use of, direct the use of, or operate autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems must do so with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement (ROE)
From page 90...
... • MBSE: As mentioned in the section on MBSE in Chapter 2, MBSE provides a robust framework for reducing development risk, improving system per formance, institutionalizing rigor and precision into the design process, and enhancing knowledge transfer. This is particularly true for key cross-cutting capabilities, such as operational performance and cybersecurity.
From page 91...
... Training experts who are knowledgeable in cutting-edge cyber defense software and technologies is thus critical to protecting ABMS from malicious attacks and intrusion. • Intelligence: The threat environment is changing rapidly with the influx of inexpensive and advanced commercial technologies that enable adversaries to adapt quickly to erode the United States' decision superiority.
From page 92...
... design, operation, staffing, and training, as dictated by policy and the law of war. RECOMMENDATION 25: The Air Education Training Command should establish a curriculum that would train or recruit highly qualified experts in artificial intelligence/machine learning, model-based systems engineering, cybersecurity, intelligence assessment, and test and evaluation for infor mation technology, software, and hardware who can work with experts in military operations and culture.


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