Laying the Foundation for New and Advanced Nuclear Reactors in the United States (2023) / Chapter Skim
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9 Ensuring Security and Promoting Safeguards
9 Ensuring Security and Promoting Safeguards
Pages 157-169
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From page 157... ...
This chapter describes the means that support the security of civilian nuclear power facilities and that ensure proper safeguarding of nuclear material and information within a nuclear facility.3 The committee highlights the challenges of ensuring security and safeguards at new and advanced reactors and their new deployment scenarios and provides recommendations. SECURITY Security in the United States is regulated by the NRC in 10 CFR Part 73 and in the case of power reactors is reflected in a series of plans: a Physical Security Plan, a Training and Qualification Plan, a Safeguards Contingency Plan, and a Cyber Security Plan.4 The committee focuses first on physical security.
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From page 158... ...
42 USC 2010d. The advanced reactor designs and deployment scenarios are far different from conventional nuclear power reactors.
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From page 159... ...
.11 The NRC has engaged with reactor vendors and other stakeholders with regard to the physical security requirements appropriate to advanced reactors and in 2018 the Commission approved the commencement of a limited scope rulemaking that, while retaining the current overall physical security framework, would provide specific alternative requirements that could be applied at advanced reactors (NRC 2018)
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From page 160... ...
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has proposed significant modifications to physi cal security requirements to accommodate designs and operations proposed by licensees of advanced reactors that differ from larger light water power reactors.
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From page 161... ...
Licensees should incorporate sufficient cybersecurity controls to ensure safety and guarantee asset protection and manufacturing facility protection across the product life cycle. Both the NRC and the vendors should work closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency's Small Modular Reactor and Instrumentation and Control Systems groups to develop international standards and determine whether new monitoring alternatives are needed.
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From page 162... ...
IAEA international safeguards aim to ensure that nuclear materials are not used in the development of weapons by State actors, in accordance with international non-proliferation treaties. 19 For example, pebble bed and liquid fueled reactors may require new sensors and instrumentation for material inventory control.
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From page 163... ...
2021) .22 Enhancing advanced reactor safeguards, especially for the particularly challenging case of continuous liquid fueled systems, requires addressing some key technology gaps.23 Pebble bed reactors will require measuring the final isotopic content when pebbles may have differing burnup histories or different initial enrichment levels, requiring the advancement of technologies such as radioisotope pebble tagging, predictive pebble tracking, burnup estimation, and NDA techniques.24 For continuous liquid fueled reactors, instrumentation capable of making the following measurements is needed:25 • Determining isotopic composition of the liquid fuel, considering potential inhomogeneity • Volume of salt in key areas: reactor core, pumps, processing tanks, storage tanks • Identification of volumetric changes (deliberate or unintentional)
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From page 164... ...
There is also a need for the vendors to engage early in their designs to fully understand IAEA safeguards requirements and implementation. Because the first vendors will bear the largest cost burden in developing and implementing safeguards for new advanced reactor designs that other vendors may incorporate, the IAEA and DOE should develop cost incentive-based programs to encourage early-adopter vendor participation in safeguards development.
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From page 165... ...
advanced reactor community to educate stakeholders on IAEA safeguards and promote timely incorporation of international safeguards by design (DOE-NNSA 2017, 2022)
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From page 166... ...
, where, upon request of the Member State, the IAEA helps identify and prioritize where a State may need to strengthen its national nuclear security regime, following the Nuclear Security Series Guidance, along with other relevant input, such as recommendations from International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) and International Nuclear Security Advisory Service missions.
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From page 167... ...
Finding and Recommendation Finding 9-5: The U.S. government has established a robust set of programs and organizations that will sup port advanced reactor developers across the spectrum of research, development, and deployment, including support for domestic and international safeguards and security research, international engagement, and licens ing assessment.
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From page 168... ...
2020. "Small Modular Reactors and Advanced Reactor Security: Regulatory Perspectives on Integrating Physical and Cyber Security by Design to Protect Against Malicious Acts and Evolving Threats." International Journal of Nuclear Security 7(1)
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From page 169... ...
2022. "Proposed Rule: Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors." SECY-22-0072.
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