Protecting U.S. Technological Advantage (2022) / Chapter Skim
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Pages 1-10
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From page 1... ...
The U.S. approach to risk and protection of its technological advantage has also rested on an assumption that the set of technologies driving military competitiveness, such as those employed in spy satellites, remains relatively distinct from the set driving commercial products and markets, allowing the nation's strategically sensitive technologies to be protected through limits or controls on information about them and on their production or use.
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From page 2... ...
Over the past few decades, moreover, military technologies have become increasingly dependent on technology development conducted in the commercial sector. In many strategically important technology fields, such as artificial intelligence, synthetic biology, and microelectronics, the pathway from basic research to application starts with private-sector investments aimed at addressing commercial markets.
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From page 3... ...
Other countries have been actively challenging the nation's longstanding leadership in fundamental research and technology innovation, most often by emulating the approach taken successfully by the United States: creating world-class R&D environments, developing and attracting talent, and investing in and supporting technology development. Given the strong R&D ecosystems of other countries, it is likely infeasible to prevent competitors from developing many technologies similar to those developed in the United States by restricting access to or the use of those technologies.
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From page 4... ...
That expansion, combined with the increasing array of government stakeholders exercising authority in this realm, has created a set of complex rules that differ markedly across federal agencies with respect to requirements, adoption, and implementation. These rules limit the exchange of ideas, participation by others, and international collaboration, slowing the pace of research and making research environments less attractive to talented people.
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From page 5... ...
In addition, the executive order should direct the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in coordination with federal agencies, to define criteria for open and restricted research environments within 120 days of issuance of the executive order. Furthermore, the executive order should direct federal agencies to designate the appropriate environment for work under a grant or contract prior to making the award, and to maximize the amount of sponsored work that can be performed in open research environments.
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From page 6... ...
Even in areas in which the United States still enjoys strong advantages, such as attracting top talent for U.S. graduate and postdoctoral training, it lacks coordinated efforts to ensure that those individuals can remain and work in the United States.
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From page 7... ...
For a very limited set of technologies, such as those used primarily for national security purposes, risk management may involve routine forms of protection currently employed by federal agencies or commercial enterprises. Recommendation 3: The National Security Council, the National Science and Technology Council, and the National Economic Council should develop and lead an interagency process for identifying and assessing threats or vulnerabilities of strategic significance to U.S.
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From page 8... ...
Certain components of risk management suitable for application to platforms do exist in various agencies, but no agency has overall responsibility for coordination of these efforts: Accordingly, the committee believes that the appropriate first steps in identifying strategically important platforms; defining the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies that pertain to those platforms; and developing coordinated risk management strategies covering their development, control, and use should be taken as part of a cabinet-level interagency process. Recommendation 4: The National Science and Technology Council, the National Security Council, and the National Economic Council
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From page 9... ...
In today's interdependent, global innovation system, the greatest threat is that the United States will inadvertently weaken its innovation ecosystem while other countries continue to emulate the actions that have historically yielded U.S. advantages in technology development and commercialization.
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