The National Academies Press

Currently Skimming:

Pages 32-35

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.

From page 32... ... However, several committee briefings explicitly addressed this question, and the speakers at these briefings did not view CIs as a primary source of research security threats. Arun Seraphin, deputy director at the National Defense Industrial Association's Emerging Technology Institute, noted on July 20, 2022, that "the 2019 Bipartisan Report led by Senators Portman and Carper found no evidence that CIs are a center for Chinese espionage efforts or any other illegal activity."3 Kevin Gamache, associate vice chancellor and chief research security officer for the Texas A&M University System, told the committee on July 20, 2022, that CIs "are not a major concern because we no longer have a Confucius Institute within the A&M System. Read the entire page →
From page 33... ... could not be used to support political programming dealing with Taiwan independence, Tibet independence, human rights, all of the sensitive issues" involving programming at U.S. host institutions. Read the entire page →
From page 34... ... 34 CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES AT U.S. INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION self-censor, regardless of contractual reform, because they know that they will eventually return to China" (Fan et al., 2022; Ruth and Xiao, 2019) Read the entire page →
From page 35... ... RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES AND DOD-FUNDED RESEARCH The committee acknowledges that CIs are one aspect of a suite of activities China pursues to engage and influence U.S. academic institutions, which are the bedrock of American education, national security talent, and research. Read the entire page →

From page 32...

... However, several committee briefings explicitly addressed this question, and the speakers at these briefings did not view CIs as a primary source of research security threats. Arun Seraphin, deputy director at the National Defense Industrial Association's Emerging Technology Institute, noted on July 20, 2022, that "the 2019 Bipartisan Report led by Senators Portman and Carper found no evidence that CIs are a center for Chinese espionage efforts or any other illegal activity."3 Kevin Gamache, associate vice chancellor and chief research security officer for the Texas A&M University System, told the committee on July 20, 2022, that CIs "are not a major concern because we no longer have a Confucius Institute within the A&M System.

Read the entire page →

From page 33...

... could not be used to support political programming dealing with Taiwan independence, Tibet independence, human rights, all of the sensitive issues" involving programming at U.S. host institutions.

Read the entire page →

From page 34...

... 34 CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES AT U.S. INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION self-censor, regardless of contractual reform, because they know that they will eventually return to China" (Fan et al., 2022; Ruth and Xiao, 2019)

Read the entire page →

From page 35...

... RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES AND DOD-FUNDED RESEARCH The committee acknowledges that CIs are one aspect of a suite of activities China pursues to engage and influence U.S. academic institutions, which are the bedrock of American education, national security talent, and research.

Read the entire page →

Key Terms

This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.