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1 Introduction
Pages 6-15

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From page 7...
... . While these European public diplomacy initiatives serve as models, one significant difference is that these programs do not bear the stamp of any one British, German, or French political party.
From page 8...
... They do not offer in-depth courses on Confucianism or cultural criticism, nor do they engage in direct political indoctrination. The CI program's Chinese designers may know of American political and ideological concerns and may not want to threaten their primary language programs by defending, for example, China's claims in the South China Sea, its currency policies, or its human rights practices.
From page 9...
... . The number of CIs continued to expand from 2004 to 2019 as universities sought to catalyze lucrative relationships and collaborations with Beijing and as CIs, and as Confucius Classrooms in particular, met a growing demand for Chinese language instruction.
From page 10...
... campuses might attempt to stifle criticism of the Chinese government; augment China's growing ability to translate its wealth into influence on U.S. administrations, curricula, and public programs; and introduce potential mechanisms for espionage and intellectual property theft posed by the openness of American universities caused U.S.
From page 11...
... • Military-Civil Fusion policies, dating to the 1990s, that called on all Chi nese institutions to share relevant technologies with the People's Libera tion Army. • National Intelligence Laws6 requiring Chinese entities, including universi ties, to give the Chinese government any information or data it requested.
From page 12...
... Other institutions without federally supported language programs also received significant pressure to close their CIs. The 2021 NDAA increased the penalty for universities that hosted CIs, as it prohibited them from receiving DOD funding for any purpose if their CIs remained open, unless DOD issued a waiver.
From page 13...
... Members of the committee unanimously support international partnerships, the core values of academic freedom and academic self-governance, and the openness and global character of the scientific and research enterprise. The committee also believes strongly that the study of critical languages is essential to national security.
From page 14...
... In cases where Institutes will continue, the committee will examine the policies and processes the academic institutions have in place to guard against any untoward foreign government influence that might distort the academic education and research environment. • Gathering information on other foreign-funded institutes at U.S.
From page 15...
... As the Confucius Institute program evolves, these characteristics and features will allow academic institutions and DOD to identify programs that may not meet academic criteria for openness and independence in education and research. Additionally, the committee will identify best practices and principles regarding appropriate operations for U.S.


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