Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

1 Introduction
Pages 7-16

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 7...
... The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) , via the Chinese International Education Foundation (formerly Hanban)
From page 8...
... They do not offer in-depth courses on Confucianism or cultural criticism, nor do they engage in direct political indoctrination. The CI program's Chinese designers may know of American political and ideological concerns and may not want to threaten their primary language programs by defending, for example, China's claims in the South China Sea, its currency policies, or its human rights practices.
From page 9...
... . The number of CIs continued to expand from 2004 to 2019 as universities sought to catalyze lucrative relationships and collaborations with Beijing and as CIs, and as Confucius Classrooms in particular, met a growing demand for Chinese language instruction.
From page 10...
... campuses might attempt to stifle criticism of the Chinese government; augment China's growing ability to translate its wealth into influence on U.S. administrations, curricula, and public programs; and introduce potential mechanisms for espionage and intellectual property theft posed by the openness of American universities caused U.S.
From page 11...
... • The Thousand Talents program, along with other state-sponsored tal ent recruitment schemes, that sought to attract foreign science, technol ogy, engineering, and mathematics experts, particularly those of Chinese origin, to China to contribute to Chinese President Xi Jinping's national rejuvenation agenda (Weinstein, 2022)
From page 12...
... Other institutions without federally supported language programs also received significant pressure to close their CIs. The 2021 NDAA increased the penalty for universities that hosted CIs, as it prohibited them from receiving DOD funding for any purpose if their CIs remained open, unless DOD issued a waiver.
From page 13...
... Members of the committee unanimously support international partnerships, the core values of academic freedom and academic self-governance, and the openness and global character of the scientific and research enterprise. The committee also believes strongly that the study of critical languages is essential to national security.
From page 14...
... In cases where Institutes will continue, the committee will examine the policies and processes the academic institutions have in place to guard against any untoward foreign government influence that might distort the academic education and research environment. • Gathering information on other foreign-funded institutes at U.S.
From page 15...
... The National Academies and DOD agreed to conduct this study at the unclassified level to ensure maximum transparency and accessibility and to engender trust between institutions of higher education and the agency. Both parties felt that this was necessary for communicating the justification for best practices and protections and for the development and implementation of a fair and effective waiver process -- a waiver process that would enable institutions of higher education to understand what is being asked of them about academic freedom and
From page 16...
... academic values, research integrity, and security while allowing for expanded Chinese language study, which it believes is in the national interest. DOD can draw upon the recommended waiver criteria to create a process that will enable it to discern whether an institution of higher education has taken appropriate precautionary measures to receive a waiver.


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.