Chemical Terrorism Assessment of U.S. Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition (2024) / Chapter Skim
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7 Chemical Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition: Cross-Cutting Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations
7 Chemical Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition: Cross-Cutting Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations
Pages 137-158
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From page 137... ...
, while acknowl edging the national strategic shift to great power competition in the 2021 China Strategic Action Plan, has not published a strategy that both acknowledges the shift and also addresses chemical terrorism. RECOMMENDATION 7-2: The DHS should develop strategies, including an updated chemical defense strategy, that consider the implications of the strategic shift to GPC, including potential resourcing shifts, on reduc continued 137
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From page 138... ...
CONCLUSION 7-5: The shift in strategic focus to GPC will likely lead to reduced resources for countering weapons of mass destruction terrorism broadly, although the mechanisms, magnitude, and timing of those changes are currently poorly understood. How these changes are made is important; sudden changes with out thoughtful preservation of functions could impede tactical readiness against chemical terrorist threats and increase risk in unforeseen or undesirable ways.
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From page 139... ...
CONCLUSION 7-11: Revised risk assessments are needed to reprioritize risks guided by recently issued strategies, so that strategy-aligned budgets can be cre ated. To ensure a balance among efforts initiated by revised assessments, a dis tinction between countering chemical and countering biological efforts is needed.
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From page 140... ...
Changes in strategy lead to changes in funding priorities, and while operational changes are anticipated from this major strategic shift, neither their mechanism, magnitude, nor timing is currently understood. RECOMMENDATION 7-1: The shift in the global threat landscape has led to a corresponding shift in countering WMD to a focus on GPC, but care should be taken to ensure that existing capabilities focused on countering terrorism are maintained.
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From page 141... ...
More specific to chemical terrorism is the DHS Chemical Defense Strategy of December 2019, which the committee evaluated in detail. As of June 2023, the DHS Chemical Defense strategy has not been updated after the release of the DHS 20–24 strategic plan nor since national strategies have shifted their focus to GPC (DHS, 2022)
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However, a key question remains: With a shift to GPC-focused strategies by the nation, are DHS strategies against chemical terrorism threats (and terrorism threats more broadly) appropriately prioritized and resourced?
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Such strategies, whether public or not, should lead to specific, actionable plans and detail expected outcomes for counterterrorism activities, in the context of current national strategic priorities. The committee acknowledges that such documents may be in progress.
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Therefore, it remains to be seen if the Joint Publications will need to be revised specifically in response to the strategic shift to GPC. 7.3 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STRATEGY The committee also heard from key counterterrorism program managers from the IC in a public information-gathering meeting.
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How these changes are made is important; sudden changes without thoughtful preservation of functions could impede tactical readiness against chemical terrorist threats and increase risk in unforeseen or undesirable ways. RECOMMENDATION 7-5: The DoD should conduct risk and threat assess ments to understand how best to direct resources to address risks of chemical terrorism events in an era of GPC-focused strategies.
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From page 146... ...
For example, the surveillance-like use of zebra fish by DEVCOM CBC could also be applied to screening for toxicity when identifying chemical agents. Some agencies already perform counterterrorism activities and strategies that are similarly broad in their applicability, and which will be important to retain.
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Respond BARDA's practices of using existing chemical medical countermeasures (MCMs) for prioritized toxidromes and to promote decontamination as a first step whenever possible are likely to facilitate time-relevant response in the aftermath of an attack and to make sure first responders are aware of, and equipped to treat, the most likely toxidromes.
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. 7.6 THREAT-AGNOSTIC APPROACHES TO MCMS AGAINST CHEMICAL THREATS If resources for counterterrorism decrease due to the shift toward GPC, then a burden will be placed on existing programs to use their resources more efficiently in countering chemical threats.
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FINDING 7-7: Current broadly extensible strategies could support effective identi fication, prevention, and response to the widest range of anticipated and yet-to-be recognized chemical agents. CONCLUSION 7-7: Further adoption of approaches with broad extensibility can partially mitigate the loss of focus on chemical terrorism due to the shift to GPC.
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7.7 SIMILARITIES AND CROSSOVER IN EFFORTS TO COUNTER THREATS FROM BIOTERRORISM AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM Addressing biological and chemical threats requires inter- and multidisciplinary approaches that bridge the life, data, medical, physical, and social sciences, along with engineering, skill sets, and expertise. This includes the importance of data integration when information is coming in from different areas.
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Aligning to the national strategic shift to GPC may compromise efforts to counter chemical terrorism in this agency. Regardless, the national strategies have evolved significantly; new budgets should follow suit.
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several hundred million dollars per year for cooperative threat reduction programs at the Departments of Defense and State) that has, because of its notwithstanding authority, supported an array of efforts from removal and destruction of the last of Libya's legacy chemical weapons program to removal of highly enriched uranium from a civilian facility in Serbia.
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From page 153... ...
be performed in the context of the latest strategies to align budget priorities with strategic priorities and most clearly understand where and why the United States is accepting risk. Table 7-1 shows the budget functions and resources the committee believes should be considered under budgetary constraints that may result from the national strategic shift to GPC.
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Fund initiatives that work with Strengthens alliances and builds stronger international partners to enhance chemical communication networks among relevant international security and identify, prevent/counter, and agencies. respond to chemical threats worldwide.
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A recommendation that DHS develop an updated chemical defense strategy that considers the implications of the GPC shift on reducing the risk of chemical threats and terrorism was made. Similarly, the committee observed that DoD's counterterrorism programs would adapt better to the shifting national-level priorities if the department closely monitors terrorism risks.
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2023. The Third Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.
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2022. National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing.
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