Chemical Terrorism Assessment of U.S. Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition (2024) / Chapter Skim
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2 Chemical Threats and U.S. Governmental and Nongovernmental Institutions That Play a Role (The Threat and the Who's Who)
2 Chemical Threats and U.S. Governmental and Nongovernmental Institutions That Play a Role (The Threat and the Who's Who)
Pages 33-60
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From page 33... ...
, terrorist interest in, pursuit, and use of chemical weapons constitutes ~ 76 percent of all CBRN terrorism, with ~ 400 incidents of ideologically motivated actors (Binder et al., 2017) 1 pursuing chemical weapons (agent + delivery system)
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From page 34... ...
According to the POICN Database (see Table 2-1) , at least 90 of the roughly 200 uses of chemical agents by terrorists involved TICs or TIMS, whereas in the data FIGURE 2-1 Geographic distribution of actual or intended target countries of chemical terrorism events (where known)
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A 2006 Congressio TABLE 2-1 Agents Involved in Chemical Terrorism Incidents a # of Incidents of Interest, Pursuit # of Incidents Chemical Primary Use or Use of Use Hydrogen Cyanide TIC 47 14 Chlorine Military / TIC 41 27 Butyric Acid IC 24 24 Sodium Cyanide TIC 23 2 Sarin Military 20 4 Mustard Agent Military 15 6 Potassium Cyanide TIC 14 2 VX Military 14 9 Ammonia Compounds TIC 10 7 Unspecified Cyanide Salt TIC 10 1 Arsenic TIC 8 3 Hydrochloric Acid TIC 6 1 Lachrymatory Acid/Pepper Spray/Mace LE 6 5 CS Gas LE 5 4 Nitric Acid TIC 5 0 Sulfuric Acid TIC 5 1 a Primary use listed include toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) , military, law enforcement (LE)
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From page 36... ...
2.1.1 Incentives and Disincentives for Using a Chemical Agent or Weapon While a complete treatment of terrorist CBRN motivations is beyond the scope of this assessment, the reasons why some terrorists and not others pursue chemical weapons are essential to explore in at least some depth. At the outset, it is worth noting that to arrive at the decision to pursue a chemical weapon, in most cases a terrorist needs to make several specific choices (even if these are done implicitly)
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From page 37... ...
These factors are considered by the terrorist decision-maker, with only a relatively limited subset of pathways leading to the final decision to pursue a chemical weapon. Incentives that may attract terrorists to unconventional weapons in general, including chemical weapons, followed by examples: • Strategic or Operational Advantages -- causing massive numbers of casualties through punishment or revenge; exerting a disproportionate psychological impact on the target society; gaining extensive publicity; deterrence; provoking government backlash; or forcing increased spending on defenses.
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From page 38... ...
Within this relatively small subset of actors, there are a few factors that would push a terrorist particularly toward chemical weapons as opposed to other unconventional weapons. Chief among these is the perception that chemical weapons are easier to acquire and deploy than other weapon types, while still satisfying the terrorist's strategic, operational, tactical, or organizational objectives.
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. FIGURE 2-4 Interest in or pursuit of chemical weapons by general objective of perpetrator.
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. TABLE 2-5 Most Prolific Formal Terrorist Organization Perpetrators: Heightened Interest Chemical Incidents Only Group Name Number of Incidents ISIS 38 Aum Shinrikyo 21 Chechen Rebels 16 Taliban 16 al-Qa'ida 13 East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO)
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It is essential to understand the spectrum of means that may be employed by terrorists to deliver the chemical agent where it would result in maximum harm so that it can be incorporated into the strategy for prevention and deterrence. FIGURE 2-5 Flow chart illustrating pathway from chemical weapon plot to acquisition of chemical weapon.
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To examine capability factors a little more closely, we can draw on the Chemical and Biological Weapons NonState Adversary Database (CABNSAD, Ackerman and Binder, 2017b) , which focuses on the perpetrators themselves and includes both terrorist and nonterrorist violent nonstate actors.4 The database contains information on 398 individuals involved with chemical weapons incidents of one type or another, with at least 110 incidents perpetrated by non-terrorist actors beyond the 423 incidents recorded in the POICN Database.
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SOURCE: CABNSAD Database (Ackerman and Binder 2017b)
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derived several quantitative results from the CABNSAD database. While the CABNSAD Database includes perpetrators of both chemical and biological events, the majority of perpetrators in the database pursued chemical weapons.
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, the nonstate actors who have inflicted the greatest amount of lethal harm using chemical agents have been apocalyptic millenarian cults, in particular, the People's Temple of Jim Jones which killed over 900 people (see BBC News) and the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments which killed over 20 (see Borzello, 2000)
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From page 46... ...
https://www.who.int/tools/ compendium-on-health-and-environment/chemicals. 7 As stated in Chapter 1, chemical terrorism threats considered include agents identified as chemical weapons as well as existing, emerging, and potential agents of concern.
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FIGURE 2-8 Chemical warfare agents are broadly categorized according to their effect: the less toxic a chemical, the higher the lethal dose or concentration. SOURCE: Fischer et al., 2017.
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A previous analysis of an accidental poisoning of livestock FIGURE 2-9 Geographic distribution showing target countries of chemical terrorism attacks recorded from 1990 to 2020. SOURCE: POICN Database (Binder and Ackerman, 2020)
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From page 49... ...
limited access to chemical precursors needed for synthesis. Additionally, large language models have modest safeguards against creating recipes for chemical weapons, and if those are circumvented, the poor quality of information on the web makes it unclear that these models will increase the risks of effective chemical terrorism.
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"SynBio") to chemical terrorism threats, three important concepts must be acknowledged (Kosal, 2021)
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Almost all the equipment and materials needed to develop dangerous or offensive agents, particularly biological and chemical agents, have legitimate uses in a wide range of scientific research and industrial activity, including defensive military uses. Advances in synthetic biology and gene editing not only potentially pose security and proliferation concerns, but they also may enable new capabilities for defense, detection, and verification of chemical and biological agents.
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From page 52... ...
For example, on the offensive side, it might enable the rapid synthesis and testing of novel chemical weapons agents or covert, on-demand production of threat agents. Defensively, it is already enabling more effective sensing devices and so-called organ-on-a-chip devices that facilitate research and development of new medical therapeutics.
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From page 53... ...
If threat actors evolve significantly, this is likely to occur because of perceived changes in the perceived tactical and/or strategic benefits of using chemical agents, changes in ideology, or changes in various idiosyncratic factors related to motivation. Changes in the perceived benefits of chemical agents might also be related to the perceived lack of efficacy of other attack modes; in other words, chemical weapons might be so-called "weapons of the weak" to which actors who lack other alternatives turn.
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From page 54... ...
. LTTE happens to be the first confirmed case of nonstate actors using chemical weapons in warfare; see "The First NonState Use of a Chemical Weapon in Warfare: The Tamil Tigers' Assault on East Kiran." Small Wars & Insurgencies: (20)
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From page 55... ...
It is also striking that IS mostly used chemical agents in combat operations, rather than against civilian targets. Further, while IS publicly celebrated various forms of hyperviolence -- like the burning to death of a captured Jordanian pilot -- it continued to deny its own possession and use of chemical weapons.
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2020. "Engineering Nature for Gaseous Hydrocarbon Production." Microbial Cell Factories 19(1)
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"Special Issue: Emerging Chemical Terrorism Threats." Toxicol Mech Methods.
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2022. "Vapor Pressure and Toxicity Prediction for Novichok Agent Candidates Using Machine Learning Model: Preparation for Unascertained Nerve Agents after Chemical Weapons Convention Schedule 1 Update." Chemical Research in Toxicology 35(5)
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2022. Global Terrorism Database 1970–2020 [Data File]
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