Chemical Terrorism Assessment of U.S. Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition (2024) / Chapter Skim
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4 Adequacy of Strategies to Identify Chemical Threats
4 Adequacy of Strategies to Identify Chemical Threats
Pages 65-84
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From page 65... ...
and partner law enforcement and intelligence communities (IC) have been effective in identifying and interdicting the majority of domestic terrorist attacks involving chemical materials, which have typically employed conventional toxic industrial chemicals rather than traditional chemical warfare agents, such as sarin.
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From page 66... ...
For example, scholars of political psychology could work with chemical terrorism experts to create a holistic approach of identifying chemical terrorist groups or similar violent actors outside the traditional suspects. The threat assess ments should be improved by reflecting the current times and demographics.
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From page 67... ...
highlighted important gaps in the area of identifying, communicating, and responding to chemical threats that should be addressed to enable timely response to real-world weapons of mass destruction terrorism (WMDT) incidents involving chemical threats.
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From page 68... ...
. In terms of strategic communication, the tactical level focuses on direct information engagement between agencies and other entities; the operational level deals with commanders' and agency directors' communications strategies both for staff in their organizations and with external stakeholders; and the strategic level deals with national-level strategic communications.
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From page 69... ...
However, it is not clear that this level of coordination exists between these DoD entities and other research institutions (e.g., DOE laboratories, private institutions, or universities, where their expertise is relevant) or for preparing and equipping warfighters' civilian counterparts to identify, prevent, counter, or respond to WMDT attacks on the homeland involving chemicals.
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From page 70... ...
Like conducting an orchestra, successful communication across relevant agencies is essential for identifying chemical threats. All stakeholders involved should receive the intended message clearly and be able to cohesively relay the information to others.
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From page 71... ...
4.1 ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES TO "IDENTIFY" WMDT CHEMICAL THREATS As outlined in the description and analysis of the Baseline Threat in Chapter 2, while the number of terrorist incidents involving the use of WMD over the last two decades is low in comparison to terror attacks using conventional weapons, WMDinvolved terror attacks that employed chemicals make up the largest percentage of such attacks. Therefore, in assessing existing strategies' sufficiency to actionably identify chemical terrorism threats, it is important to consider the following two points: • The occurrence or nonoccurrence of terror attacks involving chemicals is not a direct indication that the United States was or was not successful in identifying a particular threat.
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From page 72... ...
. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism.
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From page 73... ...
In the committee's discussion with DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (DHS CWMD)
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FINDING 4-1: Most federal agencies surveyed by the committee acknowledge that overall, terrorists seeking to perpetrate chemical attacks tend to opportunistically misuse traditional classes of chemicals, primarily toxic industrial chemicals and toxic industrial materials.
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From page 75... ...
4.1.5 Cross-Agency Communication The "identify" function is potentially problematic to the countering of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism (CWMDT) endeavor because there are multiple agencies involved, in terms of chemicals that could be used as agents (whether current or emerging chemical weapons agents (CWAs)
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From page 76... ...
4.1.5a Protecting Sensitive Information and Ensuring Adequate Identification of Chemical Terror Threats DHS strategy clearly emphasizes communication, stating that the agency will collaborate with SLTT, the private sector, and others for prioritizing and sharing timely accurate and actionable information (DHS, 2019)
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From page 77... ...
. Table 4-1 lists and describes other agencies and programs outside of DoD that have key roles in addressing chemical terrorism.
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From page 78... ...
. The discussion above highlights the complexity of information-sharing within and across various agencies involved in identifying chemical terrorism threats.
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From page 79... ...
However, in cases of domestic chemical terror, perpetrators often work alone and do not have a significant footprint either in their communities or online. The availability of information online pertinent to synthesizing and dispersing chemical agents makes exhaustive tracking of all potential perpetrators unlikely.
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From page 80... ...
Overall, the majority of publicly reported domestic plots did not come to fruition between the 1970s through the mid-2010s for a number of reasons. CONCLUSION 4-4b: FBI, partner LE, and ICs have been effective in identifying and interdicting the majority of domestic terrorist attacks involving chemical materials, which have typically employed conventional toxic industrial chemicals rather than traditional chemical warfare agents, such as sarin.
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From page 81... ...
RECOMMENDATION 4-5: The NCTC, DoD, DHS, and State Department should review current identification approaches to determine whether shifts in emphasis are required as a result of expanded and augmented VEOs and ter rorist capability resulting from the potential migration of chemical agents, other materials, technology, and expertise from state actors to VEOs. One of the biggest risks from the shift to GPC is compromising the USG's ability to adequately identify chemical threats.
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From page 82... ...
Constrained budgetary resources would hinder tactical readiness for implementing the reviewed strategies in response to chemical terrorism. The committee concluded that the USG should include the identification of chemical terrorism threats in ongoing and future strategies, considering them distinct from other nonNBC terrorism threats.
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From page 83... ...
2017. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism.
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