Chemical Terrorism Assessment of U.S. Strategies in the Era of Great Power Competition (2024) / Chapter Skim
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5 Adequacy of Strategies to Prevent and Counter Chemical Terrorism
5 Adequacy of Strategies to Prevent and Counter Chemical Terrorism
Pages 85-110
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From page 85... ...
RECOMMENDATION 5-1: The National Security Council (NSC) should give careful consideration to incorporating direct deterrence of chemical terrorism into existing countering weapons of mass destruction terrorism (CWMDT)
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From page 86... ...
CONCLUSION 5-4: The significant potential consequences of an insider at a chemical facility conducting or assisting an attack warrants explicit inclusion in existing strategies and comprehensive policies to counter insider threats at any facility containing significant quantities of toxic chemicals. RECOMMENDATION 5-4: Counter-insider-threat activities should be in corporated explicitly into broader counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
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From page 87... ...
5.1 ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES TO "PREVENT OR COUNTER" CHEMICAL TERRORISM THREATS Most of the strategy documents espoused a coherent strategy or set of strategy elements comprising a combination of a well-defined goal with a corresponding definition of success, as well as at least one policy, plan, and/or resource allocation designed to meet the goal. The exception to this assessment was a DoD Directive 2060.02, which did not provide clear definitions of success for its goals of "dissuade, deter, and defeat actors' concern and their network; [.
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From page 88... ...
5.1.1 Committee's Definition of Adequacy: Prevent or Counter The committee argues that a successful strategy to prevent or counter chemical terrorism focuses on the following elements: • Incorporates developments in the "Identify" area into practice for "Prevent and Counter." • Dissuades terrorists through deterrence by denial, deterrence by punishment, or through normative means. • Impedes acquisition of raw materials, production technology, delivery technology, or information for production or delivery.
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From page 89... ...
They conduct outreach through the Chemical Industry Outreach Workshop,1 Livewire Exercises,2 the Chemical Facility Outreach Program,3 WMD coordinators in field offices, and partnerships with other government agencies such as former CFATS and Flashpoint,4 implemented by the DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
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From page 90... ...
5.1.3 Deterrence or Reducing Motivation Upon reviewing existing strategy documents, the committee found references to deterrence by punishment in a nonspecific context. For example, the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (3)
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From page 91... ...
and that existing strategies do not mention direct deterrence of terrorists, the EOP replied that the classified documents provide what the White House needs from them -- mostly direction for internal policy and organization. The nuclear and biological threats are addressed in separate major strategy documents, the nuclear posture review and the biodefense strategy, for example.
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From page 92... ...
Bush and senior members of his administration -- that, unlike states, terror ists were undeterrable, both because many had no fixed addresses and because many were suicidal. There was subsequently considerable scholarly and analytic pushback against this notion, and mainstream as sessments today posit that deterrence is an important part of the counter terrorism toolkit, and therefore also the counterchemical terrorism toolkit.
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From page 93... ...
While there have been lively debates about whether terrorists are deterrable, there is a widespread consensus that potential state sponsors are deterrable. Relatedly, there have been debates about what some have termed "deterrence of negligence," with a focus on nuclear terror ism threats, though the same arguments are potentially applicable to chemical terrorism.
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From page 94... ...
CONCLUSION 5-1: Upon reviewing the unclassified strategies, considering USG efforts to dissuade adversaries from pursuing chemical terrorism, there are opportunities to enhance deterrence. RECOMMENDATION 5-1: The NSC should give careful consideration to incorporating direct deterrence of chemical terrorism into existing CWMDT strategies.
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From page 95... ...
For example, there is no explicit reference in public strategy documents to improving the robustness or lowering the vulnerability of civilian populations and targets in general to chemical attack, even though there are numerous programs that are doing just this. Such a strategic communications effort could be coordinated and implemented by CISA domestically and the State Department's Global Engagement Center and Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation abroad, working with the NSC.
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From page 96... ...
If the chemicals are used for peaceful/allowed purposes under the CWC, the pro duction is not so much restricted as it is monitored and verified to be used for the declared purpose. The CWC allow chemical warfare agents to be produced and possessed when they are being used for research purposes to counter chemical agents (e.g., analysis methods, personal protective equipment (PPE)
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From page 97... ...
specifically, WMDD investigates and Bureau of disrupts chemical terrorism threats, including Investigation the use of chemical weapons or agents.
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From page 98... ...
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) , launched by the United States in 2003, is a cooperative international effort "to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern." One hundred and six countries have signed on to PSI and its Statement of Interdiction Principles, committing to "interdict transfers to and from states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern to the extent of their capabilities and legal authorities." They also commit to exchange information and "take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts" (DOS, 2003)
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From page 99... ...
5.1.4b Chemical Substitution Another key avenue by which the risk of chemical terrorism threats can be reduced is to replace existing processes and materials with less toxic alternatives, often referred to as inherently safer technology (IST)
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From page 100... ...
program did implicitly encourage chemical substitution and lowering inventories of toxic chemicals since facilities with less toxic chemicals have lower reporting and security requirements. Even though the chemical industry has vigorously opposed any mandatory IST as part of the CFATS program,16 a productive partnership was developed between CFATS and industry regarding voluntary chemical substitution efforts, with substantial reductions in the usage of hazardous chemicals (Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, 2018)
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From page 101... ...
The committee leaves the precise contours of a policy for the appropriate parties to develop, preferably in a collaborative fashion, but merely recommends that there should exist a strategy related to chemical substitution, with defined goals and stakeholders. FINDING 5-3: Despite ongoing industry practice and some initiatives that previously operated under DHS's CFATS program, the strategy documents that were made avail able to the Committee do not cite chemical substitution as a key part of an overall chemical security strategy.
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From page 102... ...
. Yet, despite the sizable number of facilities housing dangerous chemicals, there is no explicit reference in any of the strategy documents surveyed to addressing the insider threat in the chemical terrorism context.
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From page 103... ...
The National Insider Threat Task Force under the ODNI does not have any programs that specifically apply to the chemical sector, nor was the committee able to find evidence of similar efforts to the former CFATS activities directed towards government facilities or within academic research institutions. The complexity of the chemical industry and chemical facilities in other sectors is likely to increase as the industry grows and the integration of cyberphysical systems in chemical manufacturing and transportation introduce additional vulnerabilities.
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From page 104... ...
FINDING 5-4b: While CFATS included some practical efforts to counter insider threats within the chemical industry, the scope of these efforts appears to be limited and they have been discontinued, and the committee did not find evidence of a similar systematic program, either directed towards government facilities or within academic research institutions. CONCLUSION 5-4: The significant potential consequences of an insider at a chemical facility conducting or assisting an attack warrants explicit inclusion in existing strategies and comprehensive policies to counter insider threats at any facility containing significant quantities of toxic chemicals.
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From page 105... ...
which directed the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to promulgate "in terim final regulations establishing risk-based performance standards for security of chemical facilities" within six months of the enactment of the Act. This Act also mandated the development of vulnerabil ity assessments, as well as the development and implementation of site security plans for high-risk chemical facilities.
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From page 106... ...
govern ment is appropriately undertaking were surprisingly absent from the strategy docu ments reviewed, including military capabilities to provide early warning of chemical terrorism plots; law enforcement capabilities to counter chemical threats tactically; integration with broader counterterrorism and countersmuggling efforts; and involve ment with other multilateral activities beyond the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. CONCLUSION 5-5: The committee concludes certain key activities that are undertaken in practice to prevent and counter chemical terrorism are sufficiently important to merit inclusion in strategy documents.
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From page 107... ...
A strategic communications effort that leverages preventive and mitigating measures against chemical terrorism as part of a policy of deterrence by denial was lacking in the evaluated documents. Chemical substitution, also, was not included in the overall chemical security strategy, despite ongoing industry practices and some initiatives under DHS's CFATS.
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From page 108... ...
This absence necessitates explicit inclusion in existing strategies and comprehensive policies. Finally, key activities -- such as military capabilities for early warning, LE to counter chemical threats, and involvement in multilateral activities -- were minimally discussed in the reviewed documents, even though they do occur in the USG based on briefings presented to the committee.
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From page 109... ...
2023. FACT SHEET: President Biden Signs National Security Memorandum to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and Advance Nuclear and Radioactive Mate rial Security.
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