Nuclear Wastes Technologies for Separations and Transmutation (1996) / Chapter Skim
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H NUCLEAR PROIFERATION ISSUES
H NUCLEAR PROIFERATION ISSUES
Pages 355-382
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From page 355... ...
The section discusses the impact of the two situations on nonproliferation policy and reviews suggestions for strengthening TAEA safeguards. The final section of the appendix, Assessment of Proliferatio'' Is~suesfor S&T~Systems, provides detail on the nuclear proliferation issues that are raised by S&T systems, emphasizing the ways in which an S&T deployment could either increase or minimize the risk of nuclear weapon proliferation compared with the once-throu~h EWR filet cycle assuming both are ~ A implemented under safeguards O ~ , ~ ~ O ~ _ .
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From page 356... ...
.3 Over 140 nations are parties to the NET as nonnuclear-weapon nations, which agree not to acquire nuclear weapons or the means to produce them and to place all nuclear facilities and stores of fissionable materials under IAEA safeguards. Parties as nuclear weapon nations agree to share the technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to regain from helping nonnuclear-weapon nations to acquire nuclear weapons.
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From page 357... ...
substantial (see Chapter 34. When the EWR was being introduced commercially, spent-fuel reprocessing was confined to the nuclear weapon nations.
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From page 358... ...
It is compared with the varied and much less comprehensive safeguards basis under Information Circular 66, which was developed in the ~ 960s and applies to IAEA member nations that are not yet NPT signatories. The objective of the IAEA safeguards system is ".
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From page 359... ...
To meet the objective, the IAEA safeguards system emphasizes materials accountancy augmented by containment and sa~rveiliance as the key verification measures. The materials accountancy concept, historically the primary emphasis of IAEA safeguards, focuses on the quantification of any material u''accountedivr.
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From page 360... ...
The resulting IAEA safeguards basis was codified under Information Circular 153 and the related subsidiary agreements and facilities agreements.6 The Information Circular 153 implementation is better defined and more uniformly applied than In earlier bilateral sateguarcis agreements under Information Circular 66 that are still In effect with non-NPT nations, such as Tnclia, Israel, and Pakistan. In particular, the safeguards agreements under Information Circular 153 have strengthened and unified provisions for recor~keeping and reporting requirements and for implementing materials accountancy and containment and surveillance technologies and practices.
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From page 361... ...
However, several nations with sizable nuclear programs remain outside the NPT framework, although all of them agreed to IAEA safeguards for some of their facilities as a price for the ability to import nuclear technology and systems Tom the major nuclear suppliers. Such facilities that have not been included in the IAEA safeguards regime have been the basis for several nations to attain de facto but undeclared nuclear weapon capability, as discussed below.
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From page 362... ...
Stability proved to be elusive as a series of public exposures dunng the 198Os revealed that three additional non-NPT nations -- Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa -- had attained de facto but undeclared nuclear weapon capability (Spector, 1988~. Like India, the three nations used nuclear facilities not under IAEA safeguards and drew heavily on their civil nuclear programs to attain such capability (Spector and Smith, 1990~.
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From page 363... ...
The shin of emphasis was accentuated by the recent events in Iraq and North Korea, discussed below. The Crisis in Safeguards Credibility A_ THE COVERT IRAQI NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRO GRAM After the Persian Gulf War, the IAEA conducted a series of special inspections of facilities and records in Iraq, a APT signatory since the ~ 970s.
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From page 364... ...
These sites were suspected to be undeclared nuclear waste storage depots holding reprocessing waste from a covert effort to obtain plutonium for nuclear weapons. The IAEA had acquired satellite photographs of the two sites and cited evidence from its earlier inspections that -North Korea had reprocessed more spent fifes than had been reported to the agency.
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From page 365... ...
Such a development could help stabilize relations throughout Northeast Asia and reinforce nonproliferation efforts elsewhere. Conversely, a nuclear weapon capability in North Korea would put pressure on South Korea and Japan to take steps that could destabilize the region and greatly weaken nonproliferation efforts generally.
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From page 366... ...
to strengthen the capability of IAEA safeguards to detect undeclared nuclear facilities and nuclear activities and (2) to codify measures to deal with such facilities and activities when discovered (Blix, ~ 992; lennekens et al., 1992; Naito and Run~quist, 1992; Nye, 1992; Fainberg, 1993~.
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From page 367... ...
However, the commitment of the nuclear weapon nations to work toward a Complete Test Ban Treaty, an obligation contained in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of ~963, was a sore point at the review conference in ~ 990. The recent U
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From page 368... ...
The plutonium policy discourages any S&T undertaking with LWR spent fuel in the United States in the foreseeable future. ASSESSMENT OF PROLIFERATION ISSUES FOR S&T SYSTEMS This section assesses proliferation issues for S&T systems vis-a-vis the LWR once-through fuel cycle.
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From page 369... ...
Thus, 3 days production is enough for one to two nuclear weapons. The UPS and THORP commercial aqueous reprocessing plants in Europe have a working capacity of 900 Mg/yr each -- Case 3 of this appendix uses a reprocessing facility ofthat type and capacity.
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From page 370... ...
. Although it is possible to conceive a variety of ways to remove and purify plutonium Mom the TFR fuel recycle process with the intention of using it in nuclear weapons, the removal scenarios require o~-normal equipment operation or equipment modification and are, for the most part, readily detectable.
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From page 371... ...
feed material per month or 240 Mg/yr, which could serve the needs of about eight EWRs of nominal i,000 MWe capacity. Alternatively, the same plant reconfigured for HEU production -- reconnecting units to configure more stages in series -- could produce about 350 kg of HEU per month or enough nominally for about a dozen nuclear weapons per month.
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From page 372... ...
For start-up on HEU, the reactors presumably could draw clown existing HEU stocks, which could be augmented if necessary by a special campaign conducted in commercia1-scale enrichment plants that exist to support the current once-through fuel cycle. Then those enrichment plants could be shut down or mothballed.
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From page 373... ...
Safeguards inspectors install these devices as the fuel rods are placed in the reactor. The tags are checked when the spent fuel is removed from the reactor for placement in the storage pool, and they are checked again in the pool on each inspection.
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From page 374... ...
(see Chapter 34. Finally, there is another class of proliferation scenarios beyond diversion scenarios addressed by TAEA and other safeguards, namely abrogation scenarios, which involve seizure of facilities and stores that are under safeguards by a nation after treaty withdrawal or abrogation, followed by the rapid production of nuclear weapons (see Chapter 6~.
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From page 375... ...
They are replaced by ALMRs operating as breeders to provide the additional make-up for the waste-burner ALMRs. As accumulated LWR spent fire]
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From page 376... ...
(b) For start-up on HEU, ATW could draw from existing supplies, augmented as necessary by a special campaign in existing enrichment facilities under safeguards.
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From page 377... ...
(b) For stan-up on HEU, ATW could draw from existing supplies, augmented as necessary by a special campaign in existing enrichment facilities under safeguards.
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From page 378... ...
1989. India, Pakistan's nuclear weapons: all the pieces in place.
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From page 379... ...
Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol.
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From page 380... ...
1993. Strengthening :IAEA Safeguards: Lessons Tom Iraq.
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From page 381... ...
1990. Are IAEA Safeguards on Plutonium Bulk-Handling Facilities Effective?
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From page 382... ...
~ 968. The treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: nuclear technology confronts world politics.
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