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7: Conflict Management Training for Changing Missions
Pages 166-210

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From page 166...
... The relevant N's for the scaling analysis are the 16 missions by the 11 characteristics, not the three experts. 2 Although some variables were coded in terms of a three-step scale going from "much" to "little," others were coded in discrete categories such as whether the soldier's role was primary, mixed, or third party (see Table 6-1)
From page 167...
... NEW MILITARY MISSIONS 165 costs, analogous past experiences)
From page 168...
... We therefore propose a number of ways to improve conflict management training for particular missions. We also discuss factors that limit the effectiveness of this kind of training, interfere with the evaluation of the training, or limit mission effectiveness.
From page 169...
... In traditional peacekeeping operations, only senior officers could be expected to have direct interactions with the protagonists and thus require some contact skills.
From page 170...
... Following a general description of the program, the specific topics taught in courses or addressed in roundtable discussions are listed. For example, elective courses dealing with peace operations at the Army War College are listed as "collective security and peacekeeping," "peace operations exercise," and "conflict resolution and strategic negotiation." Examples of subject areas included in the training packages at the Army Command and General Staff College are "non-combatant evacuation," "humanitarian assistance/disaster relief," "combatting terrorism," and "arms control." This information was used to assess the extent to which the programs emphasized the training of contact and combat skills.
From page 171...
... military and foreign officers about whether traditional military skills are sufficient for most operations other than war. Nevertheless, it is evident that current training programs are skewed more in the direction of the view that combat skills are adequate for most personnel, regardless of mission.
From page 172...
... . She notes that although subject-matter expertise is important, it is insufficient without these communication skills.
From page 173...
... The preferred method of conflict management by the parties themselves becomes increasingly competitive, going from joint decision making in Stage 1 to outright attempts at destruction in Stage 4. Intervention activities also change in terms of goals and intervention strategies: assisting communication through negotiation in Stage 1, improving relationships through consultation in Stage 2, controlling hostility through muscled mediation in Stage 3, and controlling violence through peacekeeping in Stage 4.
From page 174...
... Of course, these skills have broad applicability, allowing us to draw on a large research literature for relevance to OOTW missions. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TRAINING Training in conflict management skills is recognized as an important part of preparation for peacekeeping and other OOTW missions.
From page 175...
... Specifically the simulations could move: • from conflicts over one issue to conflicts over multiple issues, • from conflicts with fixed outcome solutions to those with integrative solutions, • from conflicts with two parties to those with multiple parties,
From page 176...
... In addition to the combat skills needed for these missions, the soldier, in the role of primary or third party, is often faced with highly partisan disputes that require hard bargaining. The research literature suggests a number of bargaining tactics that can be used to encourage settlements of competitive disputes: • Concede first on small issues, using this to make the case for later reciprocation by the other on larger issues (Fisher, 1964; Deutsch et al., 1971)
From page 177...
... ignores the deeper sources of conflict that may overshadow the interests at stake, and (f) may leave parties feeling that they fell short of their goals or leave them with the uncomfortable feeling that they were manipulated or manipulated the other party into accepting their positions.
From page 178...
... Although accepting the distributive bargaining approach, these trainers largely ignore the insights from the research studies cited above. Integrative Processes The emphasis of this approach to training is on a search for high jointpayoff solutions that endure.
From page 179...
... Challenges include organizing the local population, coordinating with nongovernmental organizations, and knowing when to turn the operation over to the local population. The contact skills needed to meet these challenges are those discussed in the literature on integrative problem solving.
From page 180...
... . It is central to problem-solving approaches to conflict management and to the debate about participation in OOTW activities.
From page 181...
... Primary-Party Role Goal Setting In primary-party missions (e.g., disaster relief, collective enforcement) , the soldier must control or modify the other parties' (or group's)
From page 182...
... the relationship between them, (d) the interaction process, and (e)
From page 183...
... . Strategy With an initial goal and situation analysis in mind, the soldier develops or selects a strategy.
From page 184...
... Efforts to increase one's own strength include stockpiling resources, building adequate hard force, and building alliances. Efforts to decrease the other's strength include closing off the opponent's alternatives, preventing the opponent from forming alliances, and reducing his or her stockpile of resources.
From page 185...
... Third-Party Roles Here we need to reiterate a point made earlier: in some missions, the soldier acts more as a third party than as a primary party. In missions such as traditional peacekeeping, the soldier must, for the most part, control the relationship and interactions between two other groups.
From page 186...
... . Certain issue characteristics have been shown to generate conflict and thereby merit the third party's attention.
From page 187...
... One is setting up the interaction: often the soldier discovers that the parties are fighting but not talking; there might be a stalemate in which there is neither talking nor fighting; or there could be an absence of interaction because some other third party has separated the parties and prevented their interaction (as in the case of traditional peacekeeping)
From page 188...
... and include appearing neutral, not taking sides on important issues, letting the parties blow off steam, using humor to lighten the atmosphere, attempting to speak the parties' language, expressing pleasure at progress in the negotiation or conflict resolution, keeping the parties focused on the issues, offering new points of view, bringing in relevant information, and correcting one party's misperceptions.
From page 189...
... Maneuvers When operating as a third party, the soldier's options for maneuvering are the same as in the primary-party role: increasing his or her own strength, reducing that of the parties, or leveraging them. If the soldier attempts to weaken either or both parties, perhaps by closing off some of their options or by preventing them from forming coalitions, he or she risks generating resentment.
From page 190...
... • Ends control strategy: the third party influences the outcomes. • Full control strategy: the third party influences both.
From page 191...
... Likewise, when a third party uses various sets of techniques is quite important. Implementation We propose a simple contingency strategy for third-party soldiers, based on two observations: (1)
From page 192...
... The soldier may experience culture shock not only from dealing with a new locale and the surrounding population, but also from interacting with soldiers from other countries whenever the mission force or command is multinational. The reverse is also true: soldiers will have to deal with the effects of the culture shock experienced by the local population and multinational soldiers who themselves will be interacting with soldiers of different races, cultures, and approaches.
From page 193...
... Although he also identifies a similar Stage II as the most important period, he disagrees with Grove and Torbiorn on the relative value of predeparture training versus field experience for facilitating adjustment.) It may also be necessary to include some soldiers in OOTW units who already have appropriate foreign language capability or a quick capacity for acquiring key phrases and elements of the local language, so as to minimize communication difficulties that exacerbate culture shock (Eyre, 1994)
From page 194...
... showed that gender, race, and military occupational specialty influenced U.S. soldiers' attitudes toward the conflict and attributions made by them about the plight of the local population.
From page 195...
... Given this tradition, the soldier must understand he or she is going to be perceived as an outsider and, when acting as a third party, as an unwanted intervener. In such a culture, the soldier will find it difficult to obtain an agreement between the conflicting parties, let alone one that is fair (by Western standards)
From page 196...
... In addition, the third party should not rely on reciprocity for moving the opponents off their positions and nudging each toward the other. Rather, in the nonreciprocity culture, the soldier should build his or her own strength and rely more on hard force to move the parties.
From page 197...
... Conflict management is defined through cultural experience, values, and assumptions. The approach contrasts with the idea that techniques can be used in virtually any setting or that they can be adapted to particular settings.
From page 198...
... Another is that it may actually overstate the role played by cultural differences and understate the importance of cultural similarities; cultures are treated as being homogeneous and unique. Its emphasis on "communities of practice" is shared with a more general approach to education referred to as situated learning.
From page 199...
... If training in conflict resolution skills consists of packaging "social know-how," whose knowledge is being packaged and how do we know that it will be useful? What changes in military culture, if any, are needed to allow soldiers to work with civilian agencies toward a conflict resolution goal?
From page 200...
... For example, traditional peacekeeping operations usually entail rules of engagement that permit a soldier to fire a weapon only in self-defense, something that is counter to conventional military strategy. Although there appears to be some erosion of combat skills for soldiers serving in peacekeeping roles, conventional wisdom in the military is that combat skills can be reacquired quickly with a small amount of additional training (Moskos, 1995)
From page 201...
... if extant training regimens are inappropriate to new duties. Although training in conflict management is desirable, it is less clear whether such training will be fully useful in practice, given the uncertainties associated with the compatibility of different conflict resolution approaches and the wide variety of missions that fall under OOTW.
From page 202...
... Although some of these techniques will perhaps not be applicable to OOTW skills development, we suggest that they all be considered for implementation. Finally, competence in OOTW missions, like that of leadership, is based to a large extent on organizational conditions.
From page 203...
... Effectiveness of Training The value of predeparture training turns on an answer to the question: Has the training prepared soldiers to deal effectively with the challenges posed by the missions? This question is rarely addressed in discussions of training or preparation; for example, Fetherston (1994)
From page 204...
... Deutsch and Brickman's (1994) list of skills needed for effective third-party conflict resolution is also relevant.
From page 205...
... . Nevertheless, the neutrality of a military force may be critical in the success of those missions that require a more integrative approach to conflict resolution.
From page 206...
... Nevertheless, some operations other than war will not even require neutrality, and traditional military training or experience may be sufficient (for example, the coercive missions in the taxonomy)
From page 207...
... Whenever mediation and conflict resolution are a part of training, it must be remembered that such a process is interactive and therefore one must always take into account the other parties involved in the process. Another factor, beyond the contextual ones noted above, that is an intervening variable between training and mission effectiveness is the behavior of other parties in the situation.
From page 208...
... In studies of peacekeeping missions, analysts and United Nations officials have tended to either ignore a global assessment of mission effectiveness or rely on unspecified face validity criteria (for a general treatment of evaluation problems vis-à-vis the United Nations, see Stiles and MacDonald, 1992)
From page 209...
... For traditional peacekeeping operations, Diehl (1994; see also Wiseman, 1991; Skjelsbaek, 1991) argues that all operations should be judged on their ability to deter or prevent violent conflict in the area of deployment.
From page 210...
... CONCLUSIONS The committee draws the following key conclusions from its discussion of the Army's changing missions and conflict management: 1. Traditional peacekeeping is only one of several types of missions that characterize operations other than war.


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