Protecting the Space Station from Meteoroids and Orbital Debris (1997) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
2: INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
2: INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Pages 7-17
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 7... ...
. The ISS risk management process is managed by integrated product teams (IPTs)
|
From page 8... ...
8 is E _ , ~ cat ~ E ._ _ ~.
|
From page 9... ...
The ISS program created an AIT to be responsible for meteoroid and orbital debris risk management. The meteoroid and orbital debris AIT members are responsible for all aspects of the problem, including modeling the environment, calculating the likelihood that debris or meteoroids will penetrate modules, performing hypervelocity impact tests, and designing and evaluating shields.
|
From page 10... ...
Some tests have been performed to verify whether items should be designated as critical. For example, hypervelocity impact tests of batteries and ammonia accumulators showed that gradual pressure decay, rather than an explosion, occurred after penetration; thus, these items are considered noncritical (Winfield, 1996~.
|
From page 11... ...
When the Russian modules were added to the ISS, the AIT proposed that the Russian segment of the ISS should also have a PNP of 0.90, thus reducing the overall combined PNP for the ISS to 0.81 (see Box 2-2~. The overall 0.81 PNP requirement was approved by NASA management, and it has been apportioned, by area, to the critical modules and equipment.
|
From page 12... ...
The environment model from 1991 is still used to assess whether critical items meet their PNP requirements, while the 1996 model is used for most other applications. Although noncritical items are not included in the PNP calculations, contractors must meet requirements that ISS components have a low risk of failure; thus
|
From page 13... ...
Hab Critical Item S.Area Duration PNP m2 of Req.
|
From page 14... ...
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The overall risk management approach employed by the ISS program is valid. It follows the risk management strategies that have been applied successfully to the space shuttle and to Department of Defense (DoD)
|
From page 15... ...
The ISS approach to risk management appears to be valid, but the unique nature of the meteoroid and orbital debris hazard makes it difficult for the top-level ISS risk management schemes to properly weigh this hazard against other risks to determine whether urgent action is needed. The plan to use shielding to protect the ISS against smaller particles and collision warning to avoid larger objects makes sense.
|
From page 16... ...
Sustained NASA pressure is required to negotiate Russian compliance with meteoroid and orbital debris requirements. Having a Russian engineering representative on site at the Johnson Space Center might be helpful, and continued technical exchanges and video conferences will be necessary.
|
From page 17... ...
1996. Briefing presented to the NRC Committee on International Space Station Meteoroid/Debris Risk Management, Houston, Texas, April 3, 1996.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.