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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Pages 1-7

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From page 1...
... In response, the Space Studies Board established the Task Group on Issues in Sample Return to address the following concerns: · The potential for a living entity to be included in a sample to be returned from another solar system body, in particular Mars; · The scientific investigations that should be conducted to reduce uncertainty in the above assessment; · The potential for large-scale effects on the environment resulting from the release of any returned entity; · The status of technological measures that could be taken on a mission to prevent the unintended release of a returned sample into Earth's biosphere; and · Criteria for controlled distribution of sample material, taking note of the anticipated regulatory framework.
From page 2...
... Subcellular disease agents, such as viruses and priors, are biologically part of their host organisms, and so an extraterrestrial source is extremely unlikely. Conceivably, putative extraterrestrial organisms could be capable of opportunistic infections or toxicity, as are some terrestrial bacteria, but such a risk can be eliminated by standard laboratory control procedures.
From page 3...
... · Uncertainties with regard to the possibility of extant martian life can be reduced through a program of research and exploration that might include data acquisition from orbital platforms, robotic exploration of the surface of Mars, the study of martian meteorites, the study of Mars-like or other extreme environments on Earth, and the study of returned samples. However, each returned sample should be assumed to contain viable exogenous biological entities until proven otherwise.
From page 4...
... Samples returned from the martian surface, unless returned from sites specifically targeted as possible oases, are unlikely to harbor life as we know it, and there may be some pressure to reduce planetary protection requirements on subsequent sample-return missions if prior samples are found to be sterile. Presumably, however, subsequent missions will be directed toward locations on Mars where extant life is more plausible, based on data acquired from an integrated exploration program, including prior sample-return missions.
From page 5...
... To avoid similar problems during the initial investigation of returned martian samples and to provide sufficient time to develop and validate the requisite life detection, containment, and sterilization technologies, the receiving facility and its associated science team should be established well in advance of the launch of any sample-return mission. The facility should include appropriately stringent biological containment capability and be staffed by a broadly multidisciplinary team of scientists.
From page 6...
... The best-laid plans are only as effective as their implementation. An internal administrative structure, with clearly defined lines of authority, is required to verify and certify adherence to planetary protection requirements at each critical stage of a sample-return mission, including launch, reentry, and sample distribu tion.
From page 7...
... Acknowledging the public's legitimate interest in planetary protection issues, and thereby keeping the public fully informed throughout the decision-making process related to sample return and handling, will go a long way toward addressing the public's concerns.


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