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INTRODUCTION
Pages 21-31

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From page 21...
... A primitive weapon requires considerably more than modern designs. The figures traditionally quoted for HEU assume greater than 90 percent U-235; quantities required for a weapon using lower enrichments are much larger.
From page 22...
... Steps to limit the international spread of selected items greatly complicate the task of nations and terrorist groups attempting to acquire such weapons. Although MPC&A and export control programs are intended to help prevent proliferation of advanced weapons and weapons systems, the characteristics of 2 In this report the term "facility" is used to denote a collection of buildings and/or structures that serve a common purpose.
From page 23...
... Central to this effort has been strong support for the establishment and operation of international control regimes directed to international sales and other types of transfers of various categories of weapons and delivery systems. These regimes are designed to stimulate and coordinate restraint when appropriate by the member nations so as to prevent states of proliferation concern or terrorist groups from obtaining access to materials, equipment, or technical data that could enhance their capabilities to develop or use new weapons systems.
From page 24...
... Related efforts have included reductions of direct-use material stockpiles through American purchases of substantial quantities of HEU from Russia and Kazakstan, investigations of alternative sources of energy to the Russian plutonium production reactors in Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk, support for cooperative projects that diversify production activities at weapons-oriented enterprises into the civilian sector, and development of economic incentives for FSU weapons scientists and engineers to redirect their efforts to peaceful pursuits rather than be tempted to look abroad for customers for their weapons know-how. The range of programs reflects the significance of the underlying nonproliferation objectives.
From page 25...
... These governments understand that reliable export control systems can help them gain reputations as acceptable trading partners, thereby enhancing access to western markets and technologies. In addition, Russia wants to be widely perceived as a world leader in the development and deployment of nuclear and aerospace technologies for peaceful purposes, and Ukraine seeks broad recognition for its achievements in developing technologies for applications in space programs.
From page 26...
... All such forms were considered, but the committee did not consider safeguards of spent reactor fuel elements or other irradiated material because DOE gives them lower priority relative to the abundant, more readily accessible stocks of direct-use material. Export Control Export controls are aimed at controlling international commerce in a wide range of materials, equipment, and technical information with military applications to end users and countries of concern.
From page 27...
... 27 ~ 4 ·= ~ X =~0 o Ct ~ no, ;> .F Ct ~ ~ Ct ~ E ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .= o .~ ~ .° ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ · ~ ~ k., s~ O~ Ct .4.= ~ .= _ in 0 ~ ~ be ~ ~ ~ ~ == U)
From page 28...
... Also, many types of nuclear equipment are included on international control lists. Export control activities are frequently divided into the control of weapons (or "munitions")
From page 29...
... Finally, there are no reliable data concerning legal transfers of sensitive items out of the region, let alone contraband goods which may not even be known to national authorities, complicating assessments of the impact of upgrades on proliferation. The committee thus relied on qualitative assessments of whether U.S.
From page 30...
... Also, a number of years are needed for the countries to have fully developed systems for containing sensitive material, equipment, and information. The committee therefore considered interim approaches that could help contain leakages in the immediate future.
From page 31...
... to assess U.S. cooperative activities that address potential transfers from the four successor states of a wide range of other sensitive materials and technologies and to recommend additional steps to address this proliferation problem.


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