Proliferation Concerns Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union (1997) / Chapter Skim
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THE ENVIRONMENT FOR CONTAINMENT OF ADVANCED WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
THE ENVIRONMENT FOR CONTAINMENT OF ADVANCED WEAPONS TECHNOLOGIES IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
Pages 32-51
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From page 32... ...
While long-term stability is the goal of each of the successor countries, such difficulties as economic decline, loss of social safety nets, growth of organized crime, increased ethnic conflicts, and widespread social anxieties currently characterize many of the fragmented parts of the former Soviet Union (FSU)
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From page 33... ...
Also of great importance are the substantial quantities of directuse nuclear material located at many sites in Russia and, to a lesser extent, in several other successor states. The combination of political uncertainty, economic depnvation, and availability of advanced weapons technologies has raised genuine concerns in many western countries over the determination and capability of a number of the successor states to maintain control over sensitive matenal, equipment, and technical information.]
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From page 34... ...
Against this background, the governments of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan are attempting to put into place new types of regulatory and security constraints for controlling militarily sensitive material and equipment. The systems and personnel they inherited from Soviet times provide the point of departure for introducing new approaches often patterned after western experiencethat are more appropriate for emerging market economies and that are capable of coping with the problems accompanying economic decline.
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From page 35... ...
Each ministry and organization responsible for production, services, or research activities (e.g., Ministry of Atomic Energy, Ministry of Health, Ministry of the Chemical Industry, Academy of Sciences) also had its own security personnel; and regional and local authorities were participants in a system that emphasized layers of both physical and organizational security procedures.
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From page 36... ...
These managers also have new responsibilities for financing their own facilities, including their security systems; with financial shortfalls, the security systems are not immune from budget cuts. Technical information related to advanced technologies has become a new type of commodity in the evolving market economies.
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From page 37... ...
Search for Industrial Conversion Opportunities At the same time, directors of enterprises and institutes engaged in activities involving sensitive material, equipment, and technical data search for new sources of financial support. They do not seem inhibited by export laws and regulations in their entrepreneurial efforts.7 While undermanned security staffs would like to minimize access to sensitive facilities, most enterprises and institutes that were part of the Soviet militaryindustrial complex have opened their doors to outsiders interested in applying Soviet military know-how to civilian activities.8 Relatively few paying customers from within the FSU or from abroad have been attracted to the products of industrial conversion efforts, but the new industrial entrepreneurs nevertheless continue their efforts to find previously untapped sources of income.
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From page 38... ...
As has been widely reported in the press and other publications, government officials who would be considered corrupt by western standards are frequently involved in efforts to divert the economic assets of their country to private hands, including assets of the former Soviet m~litary-industnal complex. Indeed, the susceptibility of government officials to schemes for diverting government assets is considered to be so pervasive, particularly in Russia, that interests in personal gain influence even the most sensitive decisions.9 One obvious route for cnm~nal groups to obtain access to sensitive and valuable commodities is for them to gain financial and management control of firms that possess the commodities and to sell the products abroad for quick financial returns.
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From page 39... ...
Thus, it is not surprising that the extent to which sensitive items have leaked through the porous borders unbeknownst to officials in the capital cities is not known, but officials have recognized that it probably has happened. 14 While there is no publicly available evidence that the governments of countries of proliferation concern or terrorists have allied themselves with criminal elements in Russia or other successor countries in an effort to obtain sensitive material, equipment, or technical data, such linkages in the future cannot be ruled out.
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From page 40... ...
group used chemical warfare agents to terrorize subway passengers in Tokyo in March 1995, thereby underscoring the reality of the interests of such terrorist organizations in some of the most deadly weapons. This cult claimed more than 30,000 members in Russia.
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From page 41... ...
Meanwhile, chemical explosives continued to be a standby of all armies; and the variety of biological and chemical warfare agents available for use increased. In the 1960s intercontinental ballistic missiles based on land and in submarines quickly supplemented the large inventories of long-range bombers in both the United States and the USSR.
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From page 42... ...
Throughout this chain of interrelated production modules, skilled people are essential. Thus, efforts to prevent the spread of weapons technology must be broadly based from containing destructive material, to controlling equipment that directly and indirectly produces the material, to safeguarding documentation that charts the course of weapons development, to discouraging a brain drain of knowledgeable personnel who could quickly reproduce well-honed approaches in countries seeking new weapons capabilities.
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From page 43... ...
However, Soviet leaders and now the Russian Government have been very interested in adapting military technologies for use in civilian markets. Of course, they must pay attention to the cost constraints imposed by the marketplace that were not considered in producing military hardware, particularly in the USSR, where cost control did not receive high priority.
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From page 44... ...
Ukraine and Kazakstan have considerable storehouses of know-how, including hands-on experience in using nuclear material and related equipment in ways that could be helpful to states seeking to make the transition to nuclear weapons status. Finally, in Ukraine, Kazakstan, Armenia, and Lithuania, as well as in Russia, there are nuclear power reactors where spent fuel rods are stored.
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From page 45... ...
See also Igor Khripunov, "The Human Element in Russia's Chemical Weapons Disposal Efforts," Arms Control Today, July/August 1995. 24 For the reporting and verification requirements for chemical plants not producing weapons, see Part IX of the Verification Annex (Regime for Other Chemical Production Facilities)
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From page 46... ...
Most of the missile manufacturing facilities that were the pride of the Soviet military complex remain largely intact as their directors search for new marketable products, and they retain a weapons capability that remains of concern from the viewpoint of proliferation.27 Conventional Weapons Systems Military Aircraft Production and testing facilities for military aircraft were centered in Russia and Ukraine. Military airplanes were made in other successor states as well, and component manufacturers could be found in almost every state.
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From page 47... ...
Even with the most optimistic projections of the recovery of the Russian economy and success in selling aviation products abroad, this capacity is far beyond the domestic and export needs of Russia and the other successor states. Most of the institutes and enterprises of the Soviet military-industrial complex are attempting to sell their old products, as well as new innovations, in previously untapped markets throughout the world.
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From page 48... ...
INTERESTS OF COUNTRIES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN The United States and other western countries have branded the current regimes of North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya as aggressive seekers of advanced weapons capabilities that would present threats to international security. All of these countries have long histories of cooperation with the Soviet Union.
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From page 49... ...
As for rocket technology, the Persian Gulf war centered attention on Scud missiles and other rudimentary delivery systems that could draw on early Soviet technologies. While such technologies have become widely available from China, continuing technical contributions from FSU states to countries seeking primitive or advanced missile capabilities could be very significant.
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From page 50... ...
As noted, the thefts of small amounts of direct-use nuclear material in Russia have been of major concern, given the critical importance of direct-use material in the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities. Finally, the rise in organized crime within and outside the FSU has sensitized the entire international community to the possibility of significant contraband activities.
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From page 51... ...
Indeed, the deeper the base of support for cooperation in the four successor countriessupport nurtured through working side by side the greater the survivability of the programs in the midst of rapidly evolving political forces in the countries.
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