Proliferation Concerns Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union (1997) / Chapter Skim
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PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL
PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF DIRECT-USE MATERIAL
Pages 52-84
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From page 52... ...
Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States," GAO/NSLAD/RCED-96-89 (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, March 1996)
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From page 53... ...
6 "Unified US-Russian Plan for Cooperation on Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Between the Department of Energy Laboratories and the Institutes and Enterprises of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM)
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4. Matenal at civilian research facilities outside MINATOM, such as the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, the Dubna Joint Institute of Nuclear Research, and the Moscow Engineenng Physics Institute.
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Holdren, Chairman, Panel on U.S.-FSU Cooperation to Protect, Control, and Account for Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials, testimony to a joint hearing of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and Subcommittee on Europe, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 23, 1995. 14 David Osias, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, "Security of Nuclear Weapons and Weapons-Usable Material in FSU," testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 22, 1995.
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facilities in Russia or other newly independent states had adequate safeguards or security measures by international standards for weapons-usable material.... The chilling reality is that nuclear materials and technologies are more accessible now than at any other time in history due primarily to the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the region's worsening economic conditions.l8 By most accounts, the nuclear weapons in the MOD system remain under good control, although concern for their security is growing among western governments.
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From page 57... ...
2. Material control systems are designed to "prevent unauthorized movement of special nuclear materials and to detect promptly the theft or diversion of the material should it occur."23 These systems may include portal monitors and other devices to control egress from storage sites; authorized flow paths, storage locations, and secure containers for material; and seals and identification codes that make it possible to readily verify the location and condition of material.
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27 "Set up under Soviet rule for a strictly regimented closed society worried only about external threats, the security often amounts to little more than barbed wire fences and armed guards, providing scant protection against insiders and their accomplices who hope to get rich by smuggling out nuclear materials for sale on the black market .
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From page 59... ...
Control and accounting systems for direct-use material tend to be more generic and less affected by specific threat scenarios, although some material control equipment may also serve specific physical protection roles and the systems certainly contribute to the overall physical protection of the material. All nations in possession of nuclear materials have some form of national MPC&A system, although national programs and standards vary significantly.
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Unlike material control and accountability systems that are required for NNWSs by international agreements and that are aimed at detecting diversions of nuclear material by governments, the responsibility for physical protection of nuclear materials "rests entirely with the government of the State."30 Recognizing, however, that "it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility [for national physical protection] is being fulfilled,''31 the IAEA periodically issues updated guidelines for countries to follow in implementing their internal MPC&A programs.
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But DOD recognized the need for MPC&A upgrades as well and in 1993 finally signed an agreement with MINATOM on developing national MPC&A systems and improving controls over civilian nuclear material. In 1994, prompted by its success in scientific collaborations with Russian institutes in other areas, DOE initiated additional efforts to expand collaboration to MPC&A.
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Government, and to adapt DOD financial regulations and procurement procedures to these unique bilateral programs. "Buy America" requirements, and the attendant lengthy procurement process, also delayed the program.
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and Russian laboratories, institutes, and enterprises to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, a problem that is vital to the national security of both countries."34 The technical approaches in the various Russian institutions participating in the government-to-government and lab-to-lab programs are generally the same, with each activity modified as necessary to take into account the state of the concerned facility, the available funds from both sides, and the seriousness of the threat of leakage. The immediate objective is "to enhance, through U.S.-Russian technical cooperation, the effectiveness of MPC&A in Russian nuclear facilities that process or store highly enriched uranium and plutonium."35 34 loins US-Russian MPC&A Steering Group, "Unified U.S.-Russian Plan for Cooperation on Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A)
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From page 64... ...
national laboratories involved in the programs, as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, have undertaken a wide variety of projects staffed by multilaboratory teams to implement these goals. For example, Sandia National Laboratories, which has principal responsibility for physical protection technology for the United States, has provided training in basic physical protection system design that covers the technical aspects of detection, delay, and response.39 At the Machine Building Plant in Electrostal, the cooperative program is providing new portal monitors, metal detectors, cages, and other physical protection equipment.
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From page 65... ...
Ukraine A small but significant portion of the Soviet nuclear program was located on Ukrainian territory. While Ukraine transferred the last of its nuclear weapons to Russia in June 1996, its nuclear power plants and research facilities continue to store spent fuel and direct-use material.
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From page 66... ...
DOE and the Ukrainian State Committee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety signed an agreement for cooperation in MPC&A in December 1993, and shortly thereafter the two sides agreed to begin cooperative projects at the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant and the Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research. Subsequent agreements in 1995 with the Ukrainian Ministry for Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety (which absorbed the State Committee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety)
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From page 67... ...
In 1994, the United States joined Sweden and Japan in an international effort organized by the IAEA to upgrade the MPC&A system at the facility. Under that international effort, DOE, together with the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, assumed the lead responsibility for upgrading facility-level protection of nuclear materials.
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From page 68... ...
While neither the Kazakstani Government nor directors of nuclear facilities consider MPC&A as important a priority as developing future nuclear power sources and ensuring the safety of existing reactors, Kazakstan is clearly prepared to participate energetically in upgrading its MPC&A programs as a step toward gaining the confidence of the West in the reliability of its civilian nuclear power and in its ability to protect its remaining stocks of direct-use material. Kazakstan has accepted the general standards for control and accountability of nuclear material developed under IAEA' s international safeguards program and is attempting to ensure that its facilities comply with those guidelines.
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GENERAL FINDINGS CONCERNING U.S. COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS After initial delays of more than two years, primarily because of a lack of interest in Moscow in cooperative arrangements that the United States considered equitable and essential, progress attributable to the joint efforts of U.S.
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Presidential Decision Directive 41, September 28, 1995. 44 For example, in July 1996, at the seventh meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, the two sides signed a Joint Statement on Control, Accounting, and Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and a Joint Statement on Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting During Transportation.
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One assessment underlies the committee's general findings: Given the environment in which the cooperative programs must operate, the committee doubts that much more progress could have been made during the first few years even had significantly more U.S. funding been available.
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Petersburg Joint Institute of Nuclear Research, Dubna Moscow Engineering Physics Institute Naval Nuclear Fuel Sector 29. Northern Fleet 30.
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U.S. specialists are in a 45 The committee notes that multiyear funding for the bilateral programs would increase the stability and continuity of the cooperative efforts but acknowledges that U.S.
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Another limitation on the size of the program in Russia, of course, is the readiness of MINATOM to expand efforts. If previously closed facilities unexpectedly become open for cooperative efforts, DOE should request additional funds.
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At the Kiev Institute for Nuclear Research, for example, the main interest of the staff is to restart the reactor, which they hope to do in 1997. But the dire financial situation of the institute suggests that computers and some other equipment provided by the United States for MPC&A could be diverted to support the reactor research program.
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Recommendation: Reward those institutes that are making good progress in upgrading MPC&A systems by giving them preference for participation in other U.S.-financed cooperative programs. DOE and other U.S.
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This practice should be expanded to the extent that appropriate equipment is available. Officials in Ukraine expressed concern to the committee that they have not been consulted on equipment purchases and that equipment comparable to that purchased from U.S.
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purchase of 500 tons of HEU and the earlier purchase of almost 600 kilo 46 Material balance areas are separate parts of a facility in whose boundaries reliable inventories of nuclear materials can be established and material flows in or out can be monitored (Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency, U.S. GPO, Washington, D.C., 1995, p.
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U.S. policy has long favored conversion of research reactors using HEU to reactors using LEU as a nonproliferation measure.
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In addition, scrap and off-specification materials from weapons production, some of which is direct-use, are not yet included in cooperative MPC&A programs. Recommendation: Encourage rapid development of a comprehensive national material control and accounting system in Russia and the prompt incorporation of all existing direct-use material into that system.
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The U.S. cooperative program should continue to stress such non-technical aspects of MPC&A.
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The benefits of increased communication were evident at the week-long Conference on Non-Proliferation and Safeguards of Nuclear Material held at the Kurchatov Institute in May 1996 and cosponsored by DOE, where officials from numerous Russian institutes and U.S. laboratories discussed MPC&A strategies and results.
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From page 83... ...
In a few cases the cooperative programs have taken advantage of opportunities at individual facilities where cooperation could be established, but this piecemeal approach is not sufficient. In Russia, the success of the cooperation with MINATOM and other independent institutes suggests that, provided financial incentives are available, senior officers from the Ministry of Interior might be willing to participate more actively in efforts to improve physical protection.
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The feasibility of terrorists acquiring radioactive material (e.g., spent fuel rods) and disseminating it through high-explosive weaponry or other means is of increasing concern.
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