Proliferation Concerns Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union (1997) / Chapter Skim
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SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING EXPORTS OF MILITARILY SENSITIVE ITEMS
SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING EXPORTS OF MILITARILY SENSITIVE ITEMS
Pages 85-117
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From page 85... ...
" in Judith Sedaitis, ea., Commercializing High Technology: East and West, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, Calif., January 1996, p.
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From page 86... ...
However, these items are usually located in separate areas that are distant from stockpiles of less sensitive items. Of special concern is the limited attention of the governments of the successor states to controlling technical data.4 Such data might describe in detail, for example, the technologies embodied in weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated conventional weapons systems.
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From page 87... ...
.6 However, many enterprises and research and development institutes, with their sights on both international and domestic civilian markets, are now seeking to use more advanced capabilities to produce high-technology items. As they attempt to convert sophisticated military technologies to civilian applications, they inevitably become involved with many items that are included on international dual-use export control lists.7 Matenals and equipment associated with the production of biological and chemical warfare agents present particularly difficult control problems because some of the same technologies have applications in pharmaceutical, agncultural, and other civilian areas.8 As in the case of commodities produced solely for weapons purposes, much of the technology underlying dual-use goods is reflected in design documents and operating manuals.
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From page 88... ...
Hundreds of facilities in the four countries particularly Russian enterprises and institutes from the former Soviet m~litary-industnal complex are attempting to market items embodying sensitive technologies.9 Most of the manufacturing enterprises and research institutes involved in design and production of weapons and dual-use items are owned or controlled directly by governments, with only a limited number of smaller private firms and individual entrepreneurs gradually obtaining the capability to manufacture some dual-use items. 10 Despite controls that the governments can exert over state enterpnses, few firms appear to give sufficient attention to export control.
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From page 89... ...
In 1995, 80 percent of Russia's m~litary sales were to China and India.l3 For dual-use technologies, additional countnes in Asia, such as South Korea, and nations throughout Europe also are considered as high-pnonty marketing arenas by enterprise directors. Both Russia and Ukraine are having some success in reaching western markets with aerospace technologies,l4 and a number of Russian enterprises are developing western markets for dual-use items that are on control lists.
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From page 90... ...
Nevertheless, it must be assumed that transfers of sensitive items will be a very real possibility on a sizeable scale in the years ahead. The international export control regimes provide important guidance as to the design and operation of national mechanisms for regulating exports of many items.
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From page 91... ...
Changing Times As Russia and the other successor states increasingly embrace industrial partnerships with many countries, even in sensitive technological areas, the former security barriers for containing items of military significance are now giving way to western-style export control systems. Such systems are intended to prevent uncontrolled diffusion of military technologies while still permitting responsible trade involving sensitive items, often at the initiative of individual enterprises, with approval by the government.
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From page 92... ...
Adopting Internationally Acceptable Export Control Systems Many of the countries of the FSU, particularly the four countries of principal interest for this study, have started down the path of adopting export control systems that conform to the approaches developed in the West. Table 1.5 in the Executive Summary sets forth the key elements of such systems that had been identified by the members of the former Consultative Group and Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM)
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From page 93... ...
At the same time, all four countries are attempting to promulgate lists of controlled items consistent with the lists of the international regimes. In summary, each of the four countries has established or is establishing an interagency regulatory mechanism for reviewing and approving export licenses, and they are installing computerized systems for tracking applications for and action on licenses.
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From page 94... ...
In Russia, export and import customs fees which include taxes on exports of natural resources and imports of industrial goods represent 20 to 25 percent of the national budget, and customs officials understandably give priority to the collection of sorely needed revenues.25 In Kazakstan, all exports are subject to taxes, with sensitive exports being a very small part of the broader export control agenda.26 Exports of militarily sensitive items may at times appear so complex that such matters are pushed aside in favor of more familiar activities. Another difficulty that will not be easily overcome is susceptibility of enforcement personnel to corruption throughout the region.
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From page 95... ...
They added that improving the databases for end-user verification is an important need.31 Measuring Progress in Containing Sensitive Items An important step in the development of an export control system is adherence to the requirements of one or more of the international control regimes. For example, Russia has agreed to internationally adopted limitations and reporting requirements on transfers of nuclear materials, nuclear dual-use items, and missile technology-related commodities.
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From page 96... ...
Smuggling of guns and drugs is believed to be widespread, suggesting that if criminal elements should become interested in items relevant to weapons of mass destruction they might be able to use their experience with guns and drugs as a point of departure in making smuggling plans with even more ominous consequences. Surrogate indicators of progress in controlling sensitive items are functioning regulatory systems, well-developed licensing procedures, and effective use of enforcement and interdiction capabilities.
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From page 97... ...
Such cooperation is in its early stages; Russia is initially providing Russian-language versions of the international control lists, which are not otherwise readily available, and its own regulations. Expanded cooperation directed toward exports of sensitive items seems clearly in the interest of all of the governments.
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From page 98... ...
However, a related, though less explicit, U.S. objective was to encourage responsible decision making on proposed exports of sensitive items, whether or not such exports are permissible under the international control regimes.
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From page 99... ...
Figure 5.1 portrays the funding situation through FY 1996; Table 5.1 outlines the general topics of U.S. government cooperative programs; and Table 5.2 identifies many of the specific activities undertaken using funds from these two sources as well as the limited funds that the concerned agencies were able to obtain through other channels.42 Meanwhile, the activities of other western countries in the development of export control systems in the successor states have been limited.
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From page 101... ...
Cooperative Efforts U.S. programs have stimulated considerable interest and action at the policy and technical levels in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus in developing effective export control systems consistent with the requirements of the international control regimes.
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From page 102... ...
. Harmonization of national and regime control lists for munitions and dual-use technologies.
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From page 103... ...
. Incorporating international control lists into Kazak export control list.
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From page 104... ...
Table 5.3 sets forth the key elements of such compliance programs, which are being carefully reviewed by a number of key Russian enterprise managers. · Russian customs officials are beginning to draw on the extensive experience of several U.S.
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From page 105... ...
· In all of the countries the U.S. programs have played a pivotal role in acquainting local officials with the requirements of the international control re
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From page 106... ...
Also, the cadres of well-trained specialists in key positions would be significantly smaller, particularly in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan.43 Achieving U.S. Export Control Objectives The United States has on occasion urged restraint by the Russian Government with regard to proposed sales of sensitive nuclear and missile-related items and advanced fighter aircraft to countries of concern, even though the sales were to be carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements of the international control regimes.
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From page 107... ...
Thus, U.S. specialists have an unusual opportunity to adapt familiar organizational and technical approaches to realities in the region and to set priorities for establishing those aspects of export control systems that are most likely to have near-term impact in containing sensitive items.
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From page 108... ...
The need for high levels of integrity in resisting economic pressures for personal financial gain should not be placed in competition with personal survival. There is no easy solution to the massive economic shortfalls throughout the former Soviet military-industrial complex, and programs to protect sensitive items should take into account the unstable situation in these institutions.
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From page 109... ...
GOVERNMENT CONCERNING FUTURE COOPERATION IN EXPORT CONTROL 1. Support Completion of the Legal, Organizational, and Manpower Infrastructure Specific Finding: A starting point for controlling exports of sensitive items is a legal and organizational framework that provides the capability for policy and regulatory development, licensing activities, and enforcement.
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From page 110... ...
if the budget of the State Department continues to be a vehicle for financing activities of other agencies, Congress should protect through earmarking the amount to be directed to export control activities in the FSU, and the State Department should strengthen its staff so that more serious planning and evaluation efforts associated with the funds can be carried out. Recommendation: Emphasize in bilateral discussions at all levels the importance of developing capabilities to meet international requirements for export control and to ensure adherence to all relevant aspects of the international control regimes.
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From page 111... ...
The U.S. Government should draw on the resources of these organizations to help strengthen local capabilities in the successor states.
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From page 112... ...
Recommendation: Encourage high-visibility prosecutions of export control violators in the four countries so that local exporters become aware of the consequences of violations of export control laws and regulations. Attracting the attention of exporters of sensitive items through high-visibility prosecutions of violations should be particularly important in countries where in the past crimes were often overlooked if the perpetrators had strong political connections.
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From page 113... ...
Recommendation: Emphasize control of the most sensitive items by targeting educational and enforcement efforts on the organizations most likely to handle such items. Concentrating on the most sensitive items as defined in the international control lists could be an important interim step before comprehensive control systems are operating effectively.
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From page 114... ...
An important step in limiting contraband, which could include sensitive items, is a commitment by all successor states to establish programs to intercept smuggled goods as quickly as is feasible. The regional training programs supported by the United States should emphasize the threats from smuggling while giving less attention to the development of elaborate export control systems in countries that produce few controlled items.
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From page 115... ...
American specialists should repeatedly point out that, while the establishment of governmental machinery for export control is very important, the goal is prevention of diffusion of sensitive items that could cause international security problems. Therefore, each sensitive export must be considered not only from the point of view of the international "legality" of the transaction but also from the viewpoint of the national security "desirability" of the transaction.
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From page 116... ...
Many enterprises and institutes that have control over sensitive items in the four countries of concern have been in very difficult financial situations for several years. At the same time, a number of American programs are supporting projects at a large number of those institutions.
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From page 117... ...
While there currently are no known links between the activities of organized crime syndicates and the smuggling of militarily sensitive commodities or information, the possibility of such links should be of considerable concern. Studies of organized crime activities in regions of the FSU where sensitive items are concentrated (e.g., Moscow region, St.
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