Proliferation Concerns Assessing U.S. Efforts to Help Contain Nuclear and Other Dangerous Materials and Technologies in the Former Soviet Union (1997) / Chapter Skim
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Pages 1-20
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bilateral programs initiated in the early 1990s to support the efforts of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus in strengthening two important mechanisms for controlling the diffusion of militarily sensitive items, namely: 1
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cooperative security efforts in the FSU in view of the past deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories. CHALLENGES IN CONTROLLING MILITARILY SENSITIVE ITEMS Containment of "Direct-Use" Material This study addresses efforts to upgrade the security of stocks of unirradiated uranium enriched to a level of 20 percent or greater (referred to herein as highly enriched uranium or HEU)
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Thus, if diffusion of sensitive items to countries of proliferation concern and terrorist groups is to be contained on a broad basis, the governments of Russia and the other successor states must be committed not only to establishing internationally acceptable export control machinery, but also to achieving nonproliferation goals in their national decisions on specific exports of militarily significant items. Of special note, Russia inherited a large storehouse of facilities, equipment, and technology related to biological and chemical warfare; and many of these
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RESPONSE FOR SECURING SENSITIVE ITEMS IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND KAZAKSTAN The U.S. Policy Context The International Export Control Regimes For a number of years the United States, in concert with its traditional allies, has taken a variety of steps to reduce the likelihood that militarily sensitive items would move freely in international commerce.
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Related efforts include programs directed at reducing nuclear material stockpiles through American purchases of stocks of HEU from Kazakstan and Russia, assessing the feasibility of terminating production of plutonium in nuclear reactors in Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26, supporting cooperative projects that encourage civilian production activities at weapons-oriented enterprises, and providing economic incentives for FSU weapons scientists and engineers to redirect their efforts to peaceful pursuits rather than be tempted to look abroad for customers for their weapons know-how. Bilateral Cooperation in Containment of Direct-Use Material and Export Control While some of the foregoing activities moved forward on a cooperative basis in the period from 1992 to 1994, the U.S.
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Computer automation of export control licensing procedures and provision of enforcement equipment (except Russia) Workshops on international nonproliferation export control regimes and associated control lists Seminars on government outreach to nongovernmental entities and manufacturing organizations on export control and nonproliferation Training and equipment for supporting enforcement activities Lab-to-lab programs, including technical exchanges, directed to nuclear-related exports Source: U.S.
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CONCERNING COOPERATION IN MPC&A The committee considered but did not use structured criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of the cooperative programs.
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Also, the optimum upgrade programs against which to judge the impacts of U.S. efforts cannot be easily framed, given the political and economic uncertainties in the four successor countries and our incomplete knowledge of the status of Russian facilities.
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The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy is using the MPC&A training center at Obninsk as the focal point for upgrading the skills of specialists from throughout the country. American specialists have successfully taken the first steps in initiating cooperative programs with Russian specialists from naval reactor fuel storage facilities and from highly sensitive nuclear weapons assembly and dismantlement facilities.
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· Drawing on cooperative efforts to date, the governments and institutions in the FSU should simplify the problem by reducing the direct-use material of concern and consolidating the remaining material at fewer sites and fewer locations within sites. · The cooperative programs should include more concerted efforts to minimize the possible routes to bypass the MPC&A systems.
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programs concerning purchase of HEU and alternative energy sources for the plutonium production reactors at Krasnoyarsk-26 and Tomsk-7 are directed to reducing the amount of direct-use material in the country. Very limited discussions have addressed the other large source of plutonium production the nuclear fuel rod reprocessing plant at the Mayak complex.
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Of special concern, large stocks of direct-use material are located at some Russian facilities that have not yet become active participants in the bilateral program. However, as facilities become involved in the program, there is uncertainty among both Russian and American specialists as to the precise amounts of directuse material present.
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Modest immediate enhancements at a large number of facilities may be more important than major investments at a limited number of storage locations. Another area of concern is the vulnerability of direct-use material during transport a topic that has not been a priority in past cooperative efforts.
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Belarus regulatory authorities and the customs service have used American computer hardware and software in establishing information systems that have greatly enhanced their capabilities to process and track export control cases. In Kazakstan, the insistence of American specialists that presidential decrees and regulations be codified into law has provided the country with a stable legal base for export control that should withstand political shocks.
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I Support Completion of the Legal, Organizational, and Manpower Infrastructure for Effective Export Control Specific Finding: A starting point for controlling exports of sensitive items is a legal and organizational structure that provides the capability for policy and regulatory development, licensing activities, and enforcement.
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Recommendation: Emphasize in bilateral discussions at all levels the importance of developing capabilities to meet international requirements for export control and to ensure adherence to all relevant aspects of the international control regimes. Recommendation: Negotiate an intergovernmental agreement with Russia to help ensure the long-term stability of bilateral cooperation in the field of export control.
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In this regard, an emphasis on layers of protection for the most sensitive items could help reduce the most serious concerns. In addition to national review procedures and checks at customs control points, control of items at the enterprises and institutes and improved capabilities for intercepting items en route to their final destinations, including during transit through neighboring countries, could both deter and complicate the efforts of parties intent on theft or diversion of controlled items.
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Recommendation: Encourage local officials involved in the Customs Union in the FSU to strengthen approaches for monitoring transshipments of controlled items. Recommendation: Participate in cooperative programs with countries of Central Asia that emphasize the importance of countering smuggling and inappropriate transshipments of sensitive items.
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bilateral relations with the successor states in both the short and the long terms, as has been the case with relations between the United States and its traditional allies. Recommendation: Promote bilateral discussions of the relationships between exports of sensitive items and proliferation concerns in many forums, at the governmental and nongovernmental levels.
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