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7 Entering Wedges of Capability to Shape the Naval Forces of 2000 to 2035
Pages 52-100

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From page 52...
... The task is to bring these capabilities into a form and a level of operational competence within the naval forces that enables them to be exercised, used in action, proven, and become the basis for military success by forces in being and for force expansion should that become necessary. In keeping with this philosophical approach, this study has identified the following entering wedges of capability as the most important for future naval force evolution: 52
From page 53...
... Ensuring a focused, sustained research and development program to enable and support all of the other entering wedges of capability. All of these entering wedges of capability are deemed critically important to shaping future naval forces.
From page 54...
... INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS The Centrality of Information in Warfare The naval forces' environment includes U.S. military forces and others that may be allied, friendly, neutral, or antagonistic; military facilities with which the naval forces may have to interact in friendly or hostile fashion; surrounding and intermixed civilian activities and facilities; and factors in the physical environment, such as weather and ocean conditions, that can affect force operations.
From page 55...
... The exchange of information among sensors that is entailed in netting them, and transmission of the raw or processed information to users will require sturdy communications networks that have enormous capacity, in both bandwidth and data rate. Although it is difficult to specify the information transmission capacity needed, because requirements are growing exponentially, two facts about the evolution of future communications technology are essential for the military forces, including the naval forces, to comprehend in planning their communica
From page 56...
... communications when large segments of their networks are not under their control; survivability and restoration of service in wartime or after natural disasters; and other problems not yet foreseen. Doctrines will have to be devised, often ad hoc, for integrating coalition partners into our own naval force information communications and information networks.
From page 57...
... In time it will become large and complex beyond easy comprehension by any one individual, group, or agency, leading to the possibility of unanticipated dynamic command-and-control instabilities that will have to be guarded against, thus making information warfare defense even more critical to reliable system operation. Other dangers include the risk of selfjamming or of confusion if conflicting information arrives from different sources thought to be equally reliable.
From page 58...
... A balanced defense will include various steps to deny visibility into military and naval force use of the system; operation with concurrent backup always in place; preparation for degraded operations; and continuous monitoring, auditing, application of protective measures, and active defense against penetration. Perversely, there may be some safety in open use of multiple networks accessible to many users, some of whom will be opponents.
From page 59...
... Some of the information sensors and processing nodes, as well as support systems such as GPS, are outside the Navy and Marine Corps, in other Service, Defense Agency, and National systems, including space systems. In these cases, compatibility and interoperability of the naval force systems and other systems must be ensured, and the naval forces must be assured that they will receive the needed utility from the systems.
From page 60...
... survival, we will continue to have volunteer armed forces, the naval forces will have to compete with the civilian economy for personnel. Among the many factors in this competition are compensation, the need to provide work and living experiences that will encourage personnel to make Service-oriented career decisions, and different from most careers in the civilian world the fact that armed forces' personnel will, at uncertain times, be asked to risk their lives, and consequently the welfare of their families, as part of their jobs.
From page 61...
... Recruiting may have to tap people in the personnel pool, such as community college graduates or individuals in mid-career, who are not generally approached in recruiting today. Naval force personnel will thus become more expensive to recruit, train, and retain, with added expense for accommodating their outside responsibilities.
From page 62...
... Military careers must be competitive with careers in the civilian economy, and expectations for quality of life are now higher than they may have been in the past. The quality of life for naval force personnel depends not only on pay, which is a key factor, but also on the perception that the Services have policies that value and support their personnel, that the Services' leadership takes those policies seriously and implements them effectively, and that the public approves of and supports the missions and values of the people in the Services.
From page 63...
... Modern technology will allow naval force personnel to be embedded in advanced, technically aided support systems for enhanced survivability. Whether personnel are at home or deployed, in combat or noncombat conditions, more casualties can be expected from sickness and disease than from combat or high-risk operations.
From page 64...
... In all these ways, advancing medical and related technology can lead to healthier naval force personnel and greater recovery rates among casualties. In the long run, the result is a "virtual increase" in force size, with a greater fraction of the precious personnel resource being on the job and productive rather than off the job due to sickness or injury.
From page 65...
... 36-39. 4 The land-attack capabilities of the missiles are emphasized here in keeping with the current power projection orientation of naval forces.
From page 66...
... Naval forces 5 It to 7 It 50 lb 100 km fire support 10-in. Interdiction 10 It 100 lb 240 km 21-in.
From page 67...
... 1996. The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., pp.
From page 68...
... and large-scale production of the resulting weapons (tens of thousands of missiles of all sizes, with many common components) .9 A New Generation of Navy Surface Combatants Advancing technology, and the need to accommodate weapon systems such as the above family of missiles, can be expected to lead to many design advances in the next generation of Navy surface ships and submarines.
From page 69...
... · Modular design of weapon systems, including plug-in data buses for actuation and compatible containers for the weapons themselves, allowing field flexibility in reprogramming for various weapon types without extensive ship modifications and crew retraining preceding each choice. · Integrated electric power systems and electric drive, including the introduction of high-temperature superconductivity when the technology evolves appropriately, will enhance volume flexibility in ship design, will improve overall system efficiency, and will help with active and passive signature reduction (although, as with any change of technology, new signatures may be created)
From page 70...
... This capability would enhance its flexibility as a combat ship oriented to prepare the battlefield for and to support operations of the land forces, and to operate in small surface combatant forces under some circumstances. New Directions for Naval Force Aviations Air-delivered weapons will continue to be important in situations where i0 Two types of aircraft are not treated in this discussion: armed helicopters, and maritime patrol
From page 71...
... also have the advantage of being a reusable platform in situations that do not present an unacceptable risk of attrition, giving them an economic advantage for extended campaigns after antiaircraft defenses have been defeated. Aviation is a major cost driver in naval force structure, warranting extensive attention to cost reduction both in acquiring aircraft and in the use of aviation in the combined arms context.
From page 72...
... Close support aircraft, which may in the future be manned or unmanned, together with armed helicopters, on air alert or operating from forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) in the immediate rear of the ground forces, will be able to turn around rapidly and fly many sorties per dayon the order of 5 to 10 to greatly increase the weight of fire that can be brought against moving or dug-in opposition forces at critical points and times in an ongoing battle.
From page 73...
... The UAVs may well be furnished by a joint agency, but they may be able to land and take off from carriers if carrier designs provide for such operation by aircraft with their very long wingspans. There would also be value in being able to refuel such craft from carrier-based tankers while they are airborne; this would turn them into a satellite analog, but one that is always available to the naval forces during an ongoing operation.
From page 74...
... There will also be value for the naval forces in acquiring a new-design heavy lift helicopter or functionally comparable vertical lift aircraft, tailored to carriage of containers as a replacement for the CH-53E when it reaches the end of its service life. The new helicopter would be tailored to handle logistic containers and the more rapid reloading at sea that containerization and other advances will bring.
From page 75...
... The submarine system will have to be designed to maintain electronic, i3 The ASW mission is discussed in the section below titled "New Approaches to Undersea Warfare." i4 It may be argued whether, in the interest of preserving stealth and passive defense, submarines in the land-attack mission will simply launch deep-strike missiles against fixed targets and leave interdiction and naval surface fire support (NSFS) missions against moving or relocatable targets to surface ships, or whether, because the surface fleet may become too vulnerable in the early stages of a conflict, submarines will have to undertake the entire spectrum of land-attack missions.
From page 76...
... This will affect the design of surface ships and submarines, it will influence how combat aviation is used by the fleet in strike, interdiction, and fire support, and it will influence how forces are configured to operate ashore. For the naval forces to understand how these influences will act and to gain confidence in the new systems, they will have to implement the capabilities and use them in a variety of operations over a period of time.
From page 77...
... A detailed economic comparison among the systems was beyond the scope of this study. However, such an analysis, informed by the early operational experience described, will be essential for the Navy Department to ascertain the overall mix of weapon types that will maximize the naval forces' power projection capability within the budgets that will be available.
From page 78...
... Along with the evolving Operational Maneuver From the Sea concept that calls for logistic support of land operations from the sea with a much smaller or, in some cases, nonexistent land base, these factors raise the risk that an opponent could seriously interfere with a U.S. naval force expeditionary warfare campa~gn.
From page 79...
... The combat ships, helicopters, carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft, and MPA are also able to deliver antisubmarine torpedoes. Submarine quieting degrades this vast array of capability to the point that the ASW force is capable of placing only small-diameter detection circles in the water, around sensors (fixed and mobile)
From page 80...
... Finally, networking technology like that used in creating the cooperative engagement capability defense of the surface fleet will permit connecting all the sources of sensing and signal processing in a cooperative system that combines passive, active, and nonacoustic ASW. Like its electromagnetic counterpart that helps in detection of low-observable missiles and aircraft attacking the fleet and shore targets, a networked ASW cooperative engagement system will greatly advance the ability to find and attack hostile submarines beyond the capability of the individual means listed above.
From page 81...
... Countermine Warfare The other potential undersea expeditionary warfare "showstopper" for naval forces is mine warfare. All opponents trying to protect a shore against amphibious landings, or trying to deny free passage of warships and logistic ships through waters approaching their coasts, will use mines.
From page 82...
... naval forces generally deferred to other NATO navies for MCM in forward areas) , this study, as did the Naval Studies Board's 1992 study,l8 has focused on the use of available assets and technology to create a major capability to deal with the area.
From page 83...
... being developed by the Navy and Marine Corps will find use on beaches having no obstacles, and in neutralizing minefields on land. Additional "brute force" methods would greatly strengthen the naval forces' capability for rapidly clearing the SZ and CLZ immediately in the path of an amphibious landing, and shortly before the landing.
From page 84...
... . The AMCM helicopters cannot operate at night because they lack artificial horizons and night vision equipment, and the surface ships do not operate out of concern for floating mines.
From page 85...
... Such attacks, which can be made by appropriately armed land-attack missiles if not by aircraft with the proper weapons, need not destroy the facilities completely; they need only incapacitate them severely by attacking their most exposed and vulnerable elements. In addition, the target area will be vulnerable to information warfare using diverse media, to confuse the leadership and to render their popular support ineffectual.
From page 86...
... Although intelligence resources may be limited overall, the cost for building area expertise, even if some of the effort pertains to areas where it is ultimately not needed, is small relative to the payoff for having it or to the loss incurred if it is not available when it is needed. The task must be joint, because joint forces will inevitably be involved, so that the naval forces will not have to absorb the expenses all on their own.
From page 87...
... The naval forces will need all of these advanced information and technical capabilities, ranging from means of disabling infrastructure and obtaining deep local knowledge to ways of capturing hostile areas with minimal friendly and local casualties, as an essential part of their "kit of tools" for expeditionary warfare and operations other than war. REENGINEERING THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM Logistics is usually considered as an "annex" to military operational plans.
From page 88...
... (Logistic communications to and from forward forces in a "supply as needed" combat situation are tactical communications, not the pipeline-filling transmissions that have characterized logistic communications loads in the past.) 2{ For a detailed discussion of the impact of OMFTS on naval force expeditionary warfare logistics, see Naval Studies Board, 1996, The Navy and Marine Corps in Regional Conflict in the 21st Century, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., pp.
From page 89...
... This concept constitutes a major application of the enterprise process technologies discussed earlier. It implies concurrent incorporation of logistic support with operations as part of an end-to-end simulation-based system design process for all military systems.
From page 90...
... Ammunition resupply requirements will also change as the means of land attack and fire support change. Shifting strike and fire support from "dumb" bombs and shells to greater use of guided weaponry, and using large numbers of tube-launched weapons for strike and naval surface fire support, will radically affect those requirements in currently unpredictable ways, leading to many changes in logistic support loads and how they are delivered.
From page 91...
... For example, the regional conflict study estimated that the logistic load to support a light battalion-sized force ashore would be reduced from 37 to 7 tons per day if all the battalion's fire support were delivered from the sea.24 Land combat units with less heavy equipment, as visualized under the evolving doctrine, will also require less fuel. Remaining logistic requirements for the ground forces in combat will have to be supplied routinely (for food and other consumables)
From page 92...
... Three basic kinds of simulation that are used by the military forces reinforce and interact with each other: (1) so-called constructive simulation of systems and combat performed wholly on computers; (2)
From page 93...
... They affect all aspects of naval force planning, acquisition, and operation: designing systems and optimizing their operation; choosing among systems and forces for specific military tasks; developing and testing operational concepts with real or postulated force designs; mission planning and rehearsal, and evaluating alternative courses of action in carrying out missions; evaluating mission outcomes and the results of operational test and evaluation; and training forces and commanders at all command levels. Such a pervasive technology requires a new "corporate" management approach if the naval forces are to capitalize fully on the benefits that modeling and simulation can offer.
From page 94...
... changing the technical basis of M&S to incorporate and capitalize on modern computing and M&S technology. The needs for these advances apply initially in the area of constructive simulation but also will have an important influence on the way virtual simulations and field exercises are planned and on the way their results are interpreted and used.
From page 95...
... Within the family of models and simulations, it will be necessary to provide the capability for easy and inexpensive exploratory analyses and tests with different scenarios, databases, and concepts of operation, to learn which approaches are most likely to give robust solutions before specific plans and force designs are "cast in concrete." These advances in the M&S field to support naval forces will not be made effectively without focused technical support. As in any other important technical area, an ongoing research effort is needed to provide that support.
From page 96...
... The environment in which future naval forces will exist and in which they will have to function effectively will be characterized by continuing budget stringency, barring the emergence of some future mortal threat to the United States and its allies. Regardless of the level of resources that will be allocated to support the creation of the entering wedges of capability that this study foresees as essential to future naval force viability, and however they are found, the R&D part of those resources will have to be spent as efficiently and effectively as possible, and in a timely manner.
From page 97...
... R&D expenditures by the Navy Department in these areas, and in the adaptation of civilian technology to naval force purposes, must be focused in two areas: development of unique naval force capabilities needed to support ongoing force improvement and creation of future capability; and development, by work-sharing arrangements in the joint environment, of capabilities that all the Services will be able to use. Deciding the allocation of resources between these two areas of effort will obviously be the responsibility of the Department of the Navy working with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other military departments, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
From page 98...
... 3. Surface and air systems: Rocket-propelled missile system design: staging and advanced, insensitive propellants for range extension, tailored warheads, terminal guidance, cold launch, at-sea reload, and cost reduction; Target sensing, target recognition, and target location using unmanned platforms; Continued work in stealth and counterstealth for all platforms, with special emphasis on the IR regime for aircraft signature reduction; Continuation of ATBM systems development; Laser weapons for ship defense against missiles, in the cooperative engagement capability (CEC)
From page 99...
... 4. Undersea systems: Matched-field coherent processing technologies for extending passive ASW detection and tracking capability; Multistatic active ASW; Multispectrum active and passive nonacoustic sensors for both ASW and mine detection; Mobile underwater synoptic sensor networks; Ocean science and related technology developments; Secure tactical communications between undersea and surface, air, and space systems; Advanced explosives, undersea weapon warheads, and mine fusing and warheads; Ship defense against torpedoes; Advanced countermine warfare rapid location and tagging, parallel neutralization, defeating "smart" minefields, explosive blasting of channels to the beach from the air with precision bomb emplacement and timing.
From page 100...
... NAVY AND MARINE CORPS · VOLUME 1 6. Logistics: Design for readiness and minimal field maintenance; *


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