Research Required to Support Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Monitoring (1997) / Chapter Skim
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1 Introduction: The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
1 Introduction: The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Pages 7-22
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From page 7... ...
However, given that testing could take place underground, these monitoring efforts were limited in scope. At the same time, it was recognized that seismological monitoring of underground nuclear testing in other countries provided a means by which to monitor advances in weapons technologies reflected in their underground testing practices.
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From page 8... ...
addressed ways in which the CTBT seismic monitoring effort can contribute to independent areas of national concern, such as earthquake monitoring and basic research on the Earth system. IMS data from other monitoring technologies similarly have potential multiple use for research and Earth system monitoring, and ensuring that these data are generally available is important.
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From page 9... ...
1.3 ROLE OF SCIENCE IN NUCLEAR TEST TREATY MONITORING Throughout the past four decades the United States has monitored foreign nuclear testing in
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nuclear explosion signals are absent. Even more so than in the past, solid technical grounds are imperative for CTBT monitoring, because the lower signal-to-noise ratios inherent in low-yield monitoring and the plethora of nonnuclear events with signals similar to nuclear explosions make it far more difficult to monitor this treaty than previous test bans.
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From page 11... ...
Decoupling and other evasion scenarios appear to be limited geographically by geological conditions, but in areas of concern (typically involving states with advanced technological capabilities and prior nuclear testing experience) , high-confidence detection and identification of events down to seismic magnitudes of about 2.5 is required to monitor fully decoupled 1 kt explosions.
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From page 12... ...
Ideally, the national treaty monitoring capability built on this scientific infrastructure should be established prior to a political agreement; however, the political forces driving treaty negotiations are generally not coupled with treaty monitoring capabilities. Although the lag of a monitoring capability may not preclude signing a treaty, it can be a reason for delay in ratification, as in the case of the 1974 TTBT, which was not ratified by the United States until 1990, in part because confidence-building measures that would have calibrated monitoring systems were not set in place until the late 1980s.
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From page 13... ...
There is an intrinsic need to attain an understanding of the source and propagation effects for all monitoring technologies for all significant source types and specific regions of the world. Awareness of the complex range of scientific issues associated with nuclear test monitoring has led to the establishment of broadly defined research efforts in the past, addressing issues from fundamental source and propagation theory to the calibration of specific paths.
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From page 14... ...
national objective of monitoring the CTBT to a level of a few kilotons evasively tested in key areas of the world, it is possible to estimate the operational requirements of the monitoring network based on historical experience with nuclear explosions of known yields. For each monitoring technology a theoretical monitoring threshold can be established, which is defined in terms of a high confidence level (often defined as 90 per cent confidence of recognizing a violation if one is attempted)
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From page 15... ...
The magnitudes given above typically correspond to the central point of the distribution for a given yield, and somewhat lower values (by about 0.2 magnitude units) are needed to provide a 90 per cent confidence level at 1 kt.~° Thus, the above values suggest that teleseismically detecting and identifying 90 per cent of the 1 kt nuclear explosions near the Chinese test site would require a seismic monitoring system with capabilities to detect and identify all events above mb(ISC)
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From page 16... ...
NDC provides international IMS data to DoD and DOE supported CTBT researchers as needed for individual projects. DoD has indicated that this policy will continue in the future.
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In the panel's view, the most effective strategies for improving U.S. monitoring capabilities will facilitate research contributions from the broadest segments of the scientific community by allowing open access and multiuse of IMS data streams.
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Figure l.lA makes it clear that the political or technical process of CTBT negotiations brought about a relatively uniform global distribution of seismic stations, but even then, there are large regions of the continents and oceans that have few seismic stations. The complementary monitoring capabilities provided by different sensors and NTM must be assessed in these areas, and if adequate monitoring thresholds to meet U.S.
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The monitoring efforts are furler supported by the nuclear testing experience of the United States, as well as by a great variety of intelligence assets that serve to define monitoring capabilities in different regions of the world. Although He filll scope of U.S.
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From page 21... ...
The latter include large internal research programs on seismological and hydroacoustic monitoring, satellite systems development, On-Site Inspection methodologies, and modeling of nuclear explosion signals in all media. In FY 1995, DOE was assigned an expanded responsibility for research and development for monitoring and/or verifying compliance with the CTBT, which encompassed all anticipated monitoring technologies and systems.
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From page 22... ...
Consolidation of the DoD CTBT research and development program constitutes a major restructuring of the research community's support and has prompted widespread concern about future support for basic research in the field of seismology. There have been significant turmoil in the seismological research program over the past 15 years and philosophical disagreements over the balance and nature of the research program that will best service the CTBT monitoring effort.
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