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6 Risk Mitigation
Pages 42-50

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From page 42...
... Developers of orbiter attitude time lines take into consideration the possibility of critical damage, damage that would force early termination of a mission, and damage to orbiter windows, and balance the potential for damage against the need to accomplish mission objectives. Shuttle Flight Rule A2.1.3-32 states that the preferred attitude for orbiter 42
From page 43...
... Extravehicular Activity Operational procedures planned to reduce the risk to astronauts performing EVAs include avoiding EVAs when meteor storms or showers or conjunctions with cataloged debris are predicted. Whenever possible, EVAs are performed in locations that are shaded by the orbiter or (in the future)
From page 44...
... velocity Shuttle Orientation hi Average FIGURE 6-2 Cntical penetration risk vs. shuttle orientation (BUMPER prediction for 10-day mission, 400 km altitude, 51.6 degree inclination, 1996 environment)
From page 45...
... . Hardware Modifications To date, the only authorized hardware modifications to the orbiter specifically designed to mitigate the risk from meteoroid and orbital debris are modifications to the radiators in the payload bay doors and the insulation inside the leading edge of the wing.
From page 46...
... as more important than more serious hazards that have not yet damaged the orbiter. When ISS operations begin, NASA plans to constrain shuttle attitudes to satisfy ISS power, thermal, and attitude control requirements, rather than to minimize risks from meteoroids and orbital debris (Reeves, 1997~.
From page 47...
... Hardware Modifications The planned modifications to the payload bay door radiators and to the wing leading edge insulation appear to be positive steps that will have minimal negative effects on the overall program. NASA estimates that the modification to the
From page 48...
... The proposed solution appears to be fairly simple to implement and can be accomplished in a relatively short time. The design modification to prevent melting or overheating of critical structural components inside the leading edge of a wing that has been perforated by a meteoroid or orbital debris should reduce the probability of critical failure and require only a minor increase in vehicle mass.
From page 49...
... wing locations that contain multiple hydraulic and electrical lines vital for eleven motion and flight control additional modifications inside the leading edges of wings and wing areas payload bay pressurized modules, such as the Spacehab and Spacelab modules pressure vessels in the payload bay, including those on the extended dura tion module a replacement for the current payload bay liner and multilayer insulation that would provide better protection of the multiple components and pres sure vessels in the orbiter mid-body design options to replace existing insulation blankets with materials that provide better protection from meteoroids and orbital debris reinforcement materials on the aft bulkhead of the cabin to provide more robust protection from meteoroids and orbital debris relocation of redundant systems that may be vulnerable to the impact of meteoroids and debris RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendation 8. NASA should assess the effect of plans for the ISS era that will render the shuttle unable to use some current operational techniques to protect the vehicle from meteoroids and orbital debris.
From page 50...
... 1997b. Personal Communication to Committee on Space Shuttle MeteoroidlDebris Risk Management from Joseph Loftus, Jr., Assistant Director (Plans)


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