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Executive Summary
Pages 1-19

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From page 1...
... Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 that result in the death or injury of large numbers of innocent victims. High-visibility terrorist incidents targeting innocent individuals have also led to considerable loss of life in bombing attacks on airplanes, cars, and buildings throughout the world (U.S.
From page 2...
... It is important that the Congress be kept well informed on changing patterns and trends in illegal use of explosives so that appropriate actions can be taken in accord with a planned national strategy. Clearly, a single national data bank for incidents involving stolen explosives and criminal bombings requiring uniform and detailed reporting from local, state, and federal investigators and organized so that interpretive correlations and trends in criminal activity could be readily extracted would be of much value in developing a rational, broad-based approach to containing illegal bombing attacks in the United States.
From page 3...
... In fact, the World Trade Center and Murrah Federal Building bombings were the precipitating events for this study. In addition, an assessment of bombing threat level must also reflect other considerations, including the public's perception of its vulnerability to bombings.
From page 4...
... Plastic and sheet explosives are usually manufactured with RDX3 or PETN4 as the primary energetic ingredient. Each of these materials has a very low vapor pressure and is difficult to detect with vapor detectors, but the addition of volatile chemical markers makes plastic and sheet explosives detectable by inexpensive commercial equipment.
From page 5...
... The potential presence in terrorist hands of unmarked explosives from a variety of noncommercial sources is a flaw in any marking approach where no provisions are made to detect the unmarked explosive as well. The addition of detection markers to any or all explosives would not address existing stocks of unmarked nonmilitary explosives diverted from the normal stream of commerce, unmarked military explosives, unmarked explosives provided by a state sponsor of terrorism, or unmarked improvised explosives.
From page 6...
... If technically feasible, the capability for marking these components of explosives should be ready for implementation in the event that the threat of illegal bombings escalates. Such research might be carried out jointly by the Department of Defense and commercial explosives manufacturers.
From page 7...
... This committee's assessment of identification taggants was aided considerably by discussions with appropriate officials in Switzerland.7 However, applications in Switzerland are different from those envisioned for the United States, and 6The related legislation includes the Federal Law on Explosive Materials (explosives law) of March 25, 1977, enacted by the Federal Assembly of the Confederation of Switzerland, and the Order concerning Explosive Materials (explosives regulation)
From page 8...
... These criteria are safety in manufacture and use, effect on the performance of explosives products, utility for law enforcement (including ease of countermeasures, cross-contamination problems, forensic and prosecutorial utility, and blast survivability) , environmental acceptability, immunity from contamination of the mined product, costs (of the taggant material, processing, and record keeping)
From page 9...
... A taggant program limited to cap-sensitive explosives would pose fewer concerns regarding costs, persistence in the environment, and product contamination than would a program for tagging blasting agents and bulk ammonium nitrate. Since ammonium nitrate cannot be detonated without a detonator and a cap-sensitive booster, tagging these components could offer forensic value comparable to that of tagging ammonium nitrate without disrupting the manufacture and handling of this high-volume chemical.
From page 10...
... RENDERING EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS INERT Many common chemicals could potentially be used as explosives in bombs, but a careful review by the committee showed that ammonium nitrate, used in the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, is by far the most commonly accessible explosive material. The committee therefore gave special attention to steps that might reduce the danger from large bombs with ammonium nitrate as the main component.
From page 11...
... Conclusions Although a number of common chemicals could be used in illegal bombings, the common explosive chemical likely to be of greatest threat is ammonium nitrate. The committee's qualitative ranking of common explosive chemicals, based on availability and accessibility, ease of bomb making, cost, and history of prior use, indicated that ammonium nitrate (AN)
From page 12...
... To date, methods proposed for inerting ammonium nitrate fertilizers have not received a thorough agronomic or economic analysis. Factors that should be examined include compatibility of any proposed inerting material with all crops grown in soil fertilized with bulk AN; any disruption of AN manufacturing and distribution processes caused by any proposed inerting material; cost increases to the end user caused by introducing any proposed inerting material; and potential environmental impacts of any proposed inerting material.
From page 13...
... LIMITING CRIMINAL ACCESS TO EXPLOSIVES AND PRECURSOR CHEMICALS In addition to the technical approaches considered by the committee for controlling the illegal use of explosives in the United States, regulatory initiatives might also be valuable. Enactment in Switzerland of the 1977 Federal Law on Explosive Materials and the 1980 Federal Act on Explosives for Civil Purposes, and subsequent implementation of a uniform set of federal regulations,l° coincide with a decrease in bombings there.ll However, the number of factors that may have contributed to this decline is too large to enable unambiguous identification of its principal cause.
From page 14...
... Other chemicals of concern are sodium nitrate, potassium nitrate, nitromethane, concentrated nitric acid, concentrated hydrogen peroxide, sodium chlorate, potassium chlorate, and potassium perchlorate. For the chemicals on this short list, the committee recommends controls at three bombing threat levels: the current threat, an increased threat, and a greatly increased threat.
From page 15...
... Efforts to control access should focus on the chemicals identified by the committee as current candidates for control in the United States. These chemicals are ammonium nitrate, sodium nitrate, potassium nitrate, nitromethane, concentrated nitric acid, concentrated hydrogen peroxide, sodium chlorate, potassium chlorate, and potassium perchlorate.
From page 16...
... 16. At an increased threat level, the committee recommends the following additional controls: · Purchasers of bulk nitrate-based fertilizers and large quantities of sodium nitrate, potassium nitrate, nitromethane, concentrated nitric acid, concentrated hydrogen peroxide, sodium chlorate, potassium chlorate, and potassium perchlorate should be required to produce positive identification.
From page 17...
... · Sellers of sodium nitrate, potassium nitrate, nitromethane, packaged concentrated nitric acid, concentrated hydrogen peroxide, sodium chlorate, potassium chlorate, and potassium perchlorate should be required to have licenses and purchasers should be required to obtain permits. Alternatively, sales of these chemicals in some markets should be banned.
From page 18...
... vapor marking to some commercial explosives, if technically feasible; · Implementing identification tagging of packaged, cap-sensitive explosives and/or initiators, providing that the taggants satisfy appropriate technical criteria; and · Requiring purchaser identification and record keeping for bulk sales of nitrate-based fertilizers and for large purchases of sodium nitrate, potassium nitrate, nitromethane, concentrated nitric acid, concentrated hydrogen peroxide, sodium chlorate, potassium chlorate, and potassium perchlorate. The list of chemical precursors to be controlled would have to be reevaluated periodically.
From page 19...
... Considering the use of coincident gamma-ray marking of detonators and/ or explosives: · Implementing an inerting technique for bulk fertilizer-grade ammonium nitrate if technically feasible, agriculturally suitable, and economically acceptable methods are found as a result of future research and development efforts; and · Requiring licenses for sellers and permits for purchasers of bulk and packaged detonable nitrate-based fertilizers, sodium nitrate, potassium nitrate, nitromethane, concentrated nitric acid, concentrated hydrogen peroxide, sodium chlorate, potassium chlorate, and potassium perchlorate. The alternative would be to ban sales of specific precursor chemicals in certain markets.


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