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6 Educational Adequacy and the Courts: The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm
Pages 175-208

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From page 175...
... Sugarman In 1989, the Kentucky Supreme Court declared the entire state system of public elementary and secondary education unconstitutional and held that all Kentucky schoolchildren had a constitutional right to an adequate education. The decision resulted in a dramatic overhaul of the state's entire public school system, and sparked what many scholars have called the "adequacy movement" in courts, state houses, and education policy circles around the country (Underwood, 1995; Clune, 1993~.
From page 176...
... After explaining how that failure turned into something of a success in cases brought in state courts under state constitutions, we explore various reasons why activists and analysts in the mid and late 1980s nonetheless began to look for a new legal approach one rooted not so much in comparing the poor education some children obtain with others, but rather in comparing the inadequate education many children receive as judged by some absolute standard. We then trace the rapid success of the new adequacy theory in courts, followed by a more sobering look at the mixed success of this approach in obtaining legislative compliance with judicial decrees.
From page 177...
... . Then, in Brown itself, the Court directly confronted the question of whether black elementary and high school students were unconstitutionally denied equal educational opportunities even though "the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible' factors." Noting first that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments," the Court then relied on psychological studies to support its conclusion that to separate the black school children "solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." On that basis the Court declared that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.
From page 178...
... Black advocates there faced a difficult legal battle to prove past illegal segregation within the urban center. Moreover, what if more and more whites simply moved to suburbs that were primarily white (assuming one could not prove, as the plaintiffs failed to prove in the Detroit case, that the creation of the suburban school districts was itself intentionally, racially discriminatory; see generally Milliken v.
From page 179...
... And what about the all-white, or mostly-white, schools within urban school districts in the North and West that weren't going to be ordered to desegregate? Was it legal for those schools to be "better" than the schools in the black neighborhoods?
From page 180...
... If one looked within school districts, sometimes spending per pupil also varied substantially from school to school. Since schools were not revenue raisers, these inequalities arose for other reasons.
From page 181...
... . The Coons team hoped that a successful constitutional theory could be created out of the Supreme Court's already-expressed concern about wealth discrimination in the provision of other fundamentally important matters like the right to vote, the right to obtain a divorce, or the right to mount a criminal appeal.
From page 182...
... Supreme Court, the wealth discrimination theory was rejected on a vote of 5 to 4 because the Court majority did not see it as a case of discrimination against poor people (San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
From page 183...
... Supreme Court majority in Rodriguez and interpreted their own constitutions in the same manner. The Shift Away from Wealth Discrimination Starting in 1989, a new legal theory generally called "educational adequacy" moved to center stage in school finance litigation.
From page 184...
... In an important sense, these advocates began to doubt whether even successful school finance litigation was doing enough for the pupils they cared most about. These concerns might be accommodated under the wealth discrimination theory.
From page 185...
... They can raise money to supplement local public schools through local, private, educational foundations that were emerging in many places. To those who continued to believe in the principle underlying the wealth discrimination theory, these examples were beside the point.
From page 186...
... Nonetheless, it has been argued in the scholarly literature that opposition to the remedy that was called for by the school finance litigation was what gave the initiative sponsors the key support they needed (Fischer, 1989~. The theory is that traditional supporters of public education in high-wealth districts turned against the system when they saw that they were no longer going to be able to use it to their advantage as they had in the past.
From page 187...
... These recent Supreme Court decisions essentially relaxed the standard that applied to school districts which had previously discriminated, had implemented a judicially approved remedy, and were now seeking to end federal court involvement in their affairs. But curtailing continuing federal court jurisdiction over a district that had once acted illegally opens the way for the district also to abandon some of the special efforts that had been imposed on it both programs aimed explicitly at achieving racially balanced student bodies and those aimed more at improving the educational opportunities offered in the often heavily minority schools.
From page 188...
... In other words, the high-minimum approach focuses on what would be needed to assure that all children have access to those educational opportunities that are necessary to gain a level of learning and skills that are now required, say, to obtain a good job in our increasingly technologically complex society and to participate effectively in our ever more complicated political process. In this respect, the adequacy approach decidedly reflects a shift of the sort we saw in the history of the race cases, where the Supreme Court became increasingly concerned with what the real educational opportunity was, and not merely the easily measured input factors.
From page 189...
... In any event, because the comparison to be made is with an absolute standard and not in relation to others, most adequacy theorists appear to agree that school districts that can afford to, and choose to do so, ought to be free to offer more than the high-minimum. In this respect as well "adequacy" differs from "equity." Adequacy as a Legal Requirement?
From page 190...
... That state system, in the most common language of state constitutions, must be "thorough and efficient," and those words are being interpreted by some courts to require what we've been calling "adequacy. " In general, the claimants in educational adequacy cases still tend to be those who live in low-spending districts, although recently many suits have included claims on behalf of larger urban centers that, while at or close to the state average in per-pupil spending, are burdened with educating large percentages and numbers of students living in or near poverty, having limited English proficiency, or otherwise requiring extra educational services.
From page 191...
... Indeed, that problem may well explain why some state courts have rejected educational adequacy claims, finding, in effect, that the state constitution's education clause creates no judicially determinable and enforceable standard. But many other courts, at least so far, seem undaunted by this prospect at least not daunted enough to refrain from condemning the system as it stands.
From page 192...
... Instead, Duncombe and Yinger have developed very sophisticated analytical techniques to determine empirically how much extra money schools (or school districts) should be provided when they face high-cost problems that are beyond their control like needy pupils and high wage costs.
From page 193...
... EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY IN THE COURTS Adequacy notions first explicitly appeared in school finance litigation in 1976 when the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahill stated that its state constitution required an education system that allowed all students to become "citizens and competitors in the labor market." Similar language was next found in the Washington Supreme Court's 1978 ruling, which declared aspects of the state's school funding system unconstitutional (Seattle v.
From page 194...
... Because procedurally the case arrived in the West Virginia Supreme Court on an appeal from the lower court's dismissal of the action, the court remanded the case back to the trial court for further hearings. On remand, the lower court declared the state school funding scheme to be inequitable and inadequate, and ordered the legislature to develop a comprehensive plan to bring to the entire education system into constitutional compliance.
From page 195...
... This thinking was reinforced in subsequent litigation in New Jersey, where the court appeared to have turned back to a more traditional notion of equity. But, in 1989, the Kentucky Supreme Court explicitly established educational adequacy as a distinct theory in school finance litigation (Rose v.
From page 196...
... That trial court decision, however, was soon appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which, in a December 1997 ruling, again reversed the trial court and found that the state system of financing education was unconstitutional because it resulted in many school districts being unable to offer their children adequate educational opportunities. In that most recent decision, the court further elaborated on what a constitutionally adequate education must accomplish, adopting the seven factors established by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
From page 197...
... In 1993, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that the state constitution required the education system to provide districts with sufficient funds to permit the attainment of certain broadly defined educational outcomes: "The General Assembly shall maintain and support a system of free public schools that provides at least the opportunity to acquire general knowledge, develop the powers of reasoning and judgment, and generally prepare students intellectually for a mature life" (Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, Tenn.
From page 198...
... Events in Wyoming over the last decade and a half also have brought the issue of educational adequacy to the political and judicial forefront. In 1980, the Wyoming Supreme Court found that the state education funding system violated the state constitution's equity requirement, noting that "until the equality of financing is achieved, there is no practicable method of achieving the equality of quality" (Washakie v.
From page 199...
... Not every state's high court has been receptive to adequacy arguments. In Illinois, where the state constitution's education clause explicitly requires the state to "provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services," the Illinois Supreme Court rejected attempts by plaintiffs to evaluate whether the quality of education offered in many plaintiff districts met that constitutional standard.
From page 200...
... In response to the Kentucky Supreme Court' s decision, the Kentucky legislature enacted the most comprehensive statewide education reform package to date: the Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA) (Trimble and Forsaith, 1995; Heise, 1995~.
From page 201...
... In addition to the finance reforms, the law also establishes a statewide student assessment system to measure achievement progress in years to come. Based on a "rational" determination of what educational services are needed to provide students with adequate educational opportunities, this new funding scheme stands a fair chance of being upheld should it again be challenged in court.
From page 202...
... If the New Jersey experience is any guide, however, this is not likely the end of the involvement of the Alabama courts. In New Jersey, where the state supreme court pronouncements over years of school finance decisions have had both equity and adequacy overtones, plaintiff districts have continually returned to court complaining that the legislative response has been insufficient.
From page 203...
... May 1998~. The court noted that "this decision should be the last major judicial involvement in the long tortuous history of the State's extraordinary effort to bring a thorough and efficient education to the children in its poorest school districts." The recent decision approves a plan for funding and systemic education reform in the State of New Jersey put forward by the State Commissioner of Education after a long process of expert consultation and review.
From page 204...
... As the court said, "Success for all will come only when the roots of the educational system the local schools and districts, the teachers, the administrators, the parents, and the children themselves embrace the educational opportunity encompassed by these reforms." In Arizona, after the high court's 1994 ruling declaring that the state's system of funding capital facilities and costs was unconstitutional, the legislature and governor worked to pass a redesigned system in 1997. However, on October 24, 1997, the Supreme Court sent the legislature back to the drawing board.
From page 205...
... For one thing, courts imposing equity remedies on states in wealth discrimination cases have also not had smooth sailing. In Texas, for example, the Texas Supreme Court had to reinsert itself into the problem several times as the legislature continually failed to enact a reform that met the court's standard.
From page 206...
... But this appraisal of what is both politically and judicially possible under the adequacy approach may be too pessimistic. A few more litigation successes like that in Kentucky, and most recently in New Jersey, could generate considerable optimism and courage among state supreme courts.
From page 207...
... Yet, legislatures, school districts, and schools might well be moved to try out many of them in response to educational adequacy litigation and from that experience we might get a better idea about which, if any, really do work on a large scale. Whatever hopes there may be for the future, at present, alas, certainly in our large urban school districts, it is widely perceived that we are nowhere near having success for all.
From page 208...
... Heise, M 1995 State constitutions, school finance litigation, and the "third wave": From equity to adequacy.


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