Pesticide Resistance Strategies and Tactics for Management (1986) / Chapter Skim
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Economic Issues in Public and Private Approaches to Perserving Pest Susceptibility
Economic Issues in Public and Private Approaches to Perserving Pest Susceptibility
Pages 436-448
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From page 436... ...
Pesticide manufacturer incentives in attempting to prolong the electiveness of pesticides are influenced by the level of competition and likely new pesticide discoveries. There is little evidence in pesticide prices that pesticide companies expect rapid increases in pesticide scarcity due to resistance.
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From page 437... ...
Actions by pesticide manufacturers, government agencies, or groups of farmers may not slow resistance development sufficiently to pay these additional costs, or the added benefits may not justify the added costs. We plan to show how the presence of mobile, resistant pests and pesticide market structure influences pesticide companies and farmers; how one can gauge current and future scarcity of pesticides; and how to determine what factors favor various groups in managing pesticide resistance.
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From page 438... ...
Pest susceptibility then becomes a nonrenewable stock resource that is depleted with repeated applications of a particular pesticide or pesticide group (Hueth and Regev, 19741. Susceptibility is a common property resource of varying degree.
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From page 439... ...
If each producer has sole ownership rights in the pest susceptibility on his farm and pests are immobile, then the producer's profit-maximizing behavior in allocating susceptibility between periods to and t2 will parallel the social decision sought by society. No government intervention to slow the spread of pesticide resistance can be rationalized.
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From page 440... ...
Because the marginal revenue curve lies below the demand curve, the optimal quantity of pesticide marketed would be less and the price would be higher than for perfect competition. This combination would tend to retard resistance development to the particular pesticide being considered.
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From page 441... ...
But if some monopoly advantage persists and this pesticide is marketed at a higher price than would prevail in a more competitive market situation, resistance development for the monopoly product may be retarded and hastened for the close substitutes, which are competitively marketed. RESISTANCE MANAGEMENT: INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS The only economic justification of public resistance management is that the intertemporal added social benefits outweigh the added social costs.
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From page 442... ...
Additionally, the price increases that did occur for pesticides may have been more related to current market features, such as higher energy prices, more stringent environmental regulations, and general inflation as opposed to the increasing future pesticide scarcity. Thus, based on expectations of future pesticide scarcity, the aggregate market evidence does not indicate the need for overwhelming concern over future pesticide availability and pest susceptibility.
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From page 443... ...
Integrated pest management (IPM) activities, community pest-control organizations, and other attempts to regulate entire pest populations could have major impacts on pesticide resistance development.
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From page 444... ...
The extra resources expended for maintaining susceptible pest populations may be considerable. Monitoring resistance development, switching compounds, rotating compounds, changing sales efforts, and other actions call for high levels of scientific and managerial manpower.
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From page 445... ...
· Coordination of selective pressure on a pest population can be achieved by joint action such as rotation of compounds over time and space. 1 Conditions Favoring Use of Government Pest Control, Regulatory Agency, or Laws for Resistance Management · Free-ridership by one chemical firm or a few farmers can jeopardize a regional coordination effort, typically characterized by a highly competitive pesticide market and a highly mobile pest.
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From page 446... ...
If there were few substitutes and few firms competing in the marketplace to control a particular pest, industry pesticide resistance management would be more viable given the lower transaction costs involved. But oligopoly theory would imply that an equilibrium management strategy may be difficult to achieve in a dynamic market situation.
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From page 447... ...
DDT resistance development in the 1960s and early 1970s may be a good illustration of such competitive market consequences. CONCLUSION In summary the development of pesticide resistance is not an argument for resistance management in and of itself.
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From page 448... ...
448 MANAGEMENT OF RESISTANCE TO PESTICIDES U.S. Department of Agriculture.
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