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4 Process and Culture
Pages 179-244

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From page 179...
... Although the military situation is different in major ways from that of the industrial sector, some useful guidance is available in the form of generally effective principles that have been learned from the revolutions currently under way in banking, retailing, the distribution industry, and a number of other commercial sectors. Six keys to success derived from a study of successful transformations in the commercial sector are the following: · A consistent and clear driving vision; · A set of supporting processes, drawing broadly on those affected by change and often using specific institutions, to refine and communicate the vision, to quantify and test its reality, and to translate it into implementable pieces; · A persistent and constant in-place leadership cadre, driving an ongoing sense of urgency; 179
From page 180...
... In short, the committee believes that the DOD has performed reasonably well in articulating a vision for the future. 4.1.2 Supporting Processes In the course of its work, the committee encountered a number of efforts aimed at refining and quantifying the vision of advanced C4I systems and at learning and capturing the creative energies of the services and numerous supporting industries; these efforts included some of the exercises and experiments of several services, and demonstrations such as the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstrations.
From page 181...
... · Information technology in computers, communication, and sensors is changing at an exceptionally rapid pace. · The military market for many commercial information technology products is comparatively small.
From page 182...
... To the best of the committee's knowledge no analogous transformation-driving institution exists within the military, particularly with respect to joint and/or combined operations. 4.1.3 Persistent Leadership Creating a Sense of Urgency In the civilian world, chief executive officers and other key personnel can remain in place for as long as necessary to guide a substantial organizational change (i.e., time periods long enough to convince lower levels of the organization that waiting until the focus of management changes is not a viable option)
From page 183...
... Because the DOD is a government organization, its senior leadership is expected to rotate on a regular basis. The average tenure of a secretary of defense is 18 months, and while senior military leaders are expected to remain somewhat longer, both tenures are short compared to the time needed to effect major cultural changes.5 Thus, sustaining attention to large issues such as interoperability requires the existence of an institutional process to facilitate such change, rather than relying on a strong personality.
From page 184...
... 4.1.4 Process Reengineering Experience in the private sector with the application of information technology suggests that modest improvements are possible when such technology is used to automate existing processes. Applying information technology for such purposes is relatively straightforward, and most organizations are capable of using information technology in such ways to achieve incrementally faster and more accurate information flows and more efficient business processes.
From page 185...
... Military doctrine can focus less on forward basing and more on rapid deployment. In short, reengineered technology-exploiting processes are likely to enable major competitive advantage for the DOD, just as they do on the civilian side.
From page 186...
... Indeed, because defense budget programming is undertaken incrementally, the trade-off is usually captured in terms of a question such as, Should an incremental dollar be spent on C4I or on weapons systems? This trade-off reflects a pervasive and very significant tension between the historical quest of military leadership for traditional weapons modernization and the call for investment in "force multipliers" such as modern C4I systems and applications.
From page 187...
... 4.2 SPECIAL NON-TECHNICAL CHALLENGES FACED BY THE MILITARY Realization of the full exploitation of C4I will require major changes in military operations and in the processes and culture of the military institutions themselves. Discussions with individuals from the top military and civilian leadership in DOD as well as with captains, corporals, and other operators in the field during exercises and experiments helped the committee to appreciate the enormity of the challenge.
From page 188...
... This set of differences is compounded by the major shift in command structure, from a service-based preparedness mode to a joint task force operational mode, which occurs upon deployment. 4.2.2 Organizational Challenges By law, the services have the responsibility to organize, train, and equip their forces.
From page 190...
... 190 REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF Cal: FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGES patibility.) Furthermore, even when a C4I program of one service is required to accommodate interoperability needs originating from another service, the new requirements for such functionality are often not accompanied by additional budget authority.
From page 191...
... One reason is that the simulations used to represent military operations are often incapable of directly interfacing with real-world operational C4I systems. Therefore surrogate systems are created to carry out the exercise.
From page 192...
... For example, despite an Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I directive making the Joint Technical Architecture mandatory for all C4I systems, a DOD Inspector General report found non-compliance in the plans of a large number of C4I programs.9 If such non-compliance is found in a program's written plans, it can only be assumed that some others that have compliance written into their plans will not in fact comply. On the security side, there are clear operational trade-offs of system assurance and security against connectivity, functionality, and convenience of operation.
From page 193...
... While all future U.S. military operations can reasonably be expected to employ the four military services, the coalition partners are generally unpredictable and subject to continuous change.
From page 194...
... 4.3 THE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 4.3.1 Overview Success in ensuring that competitive advantage is achieved in the C4I arena requires that the changes in the DOD environment extend to iiNote also that a large impediment to coalition command and control interoperability is the indiscriminate use of secret network communications. In many cases, neither the hardware and the software nor the data to be sent to coalition partners is classified, but for some reason (e.g., convenience at some earlier stage in the pipeline)
From page 195...
... An important management challenge to DOD leadership is to achieve timely provisioning of military capabilities that can produce a higher likelihood of success of military operations, over a more varied spectrum of tasks, with fewer resources. In the context of a smaller force structure, it is worth noting that even as the military strength of the nation, in terms of actual personnel strength, has shrunk by more than 40% over the past 8 years, the oversight of the acquisition process has not de
From page 196...
... The existing acquisition process was redesigned to (in principle) allow considerable flexibility in the program management, but that flexibility is seldom put to use by program managers.
From page 197...
... Conceptually, the requirements, definition, testing, and fielding steps of traditional acquisitions are executed over much shorter cycle times for each incremental deployment. Evolutionary acquisition permits incremental addition of capabilities to a system and the underlying technologies evolve without this being viewed as "requirements creep." A fundamental tenet of evolutionary acquisition is acceptance of the "80% solution." Insistence on a "100% solution" can radically increase costs and extensively delay system deployment.
From page 198...
... Since the pace at which information technology advances drives the rate at which it must be exploited, one must be willing and able to accept and manage the risks attendant with reduced oversight from the acquisition community. The Global Command and Control System evolutionary acquisition process was, nonetheless, loosely based on the traditional acquisition model; but it was more rapid and flexible.
From page 199...
... .~5 4.3.3 Exploiting Commercial Technology Military C4I systems depend on two very different classes of technology. One class of technology has historically been dominated by government needs (including those of the military)
From page 200...
... Since the power of emerging technology is no longer under government control, and the government cannot solve its firepower, interoperability, and other technology shortfalls through specification, mandate, or other historical leveraging methods, it must learn to behave like a consumer. For reasons of economy and speed of acquisition, DOD will have to take increasing advantage of commercial technology, with as little change thereto as possible, for all digital information, research, and operational needs.
From page 201...
... In the recent past, the services' Persian Gulf experiences and those of the defensewide Defense Management Review in the early 1990s combined to drive a new look at the possibility of exploiting commercial technology in C4I systems. The operators began calling for COTS technology in requirements statements for new information systems.
From page 202...
... While it must operate with the knowledge that, for many technologies, it is just one consumer in a vast market, there are a number of ways in which the DOD has some potential to influence the direction of commercial technology to better meet military requirements: · Participating in standards efforts. For example, TCP/IP was not designed for operation in a mobile environment a capability that would be very useful to DOD.DOD has participated in standards-developing forums to incorporate such desired features into future releases of the TCP/ IP standard.
From page 203...
... · Investing in DOD-unique changes and additions to commercial products without losing the benefits of using commercial technology. Since product features are increasingly a function of software, these modifications tend not to impose any additional physical constraints on the product.
From page 204...
... 4.3.4 Testing Much of the emphasis in acquisition for the last 10 to 15 years has been on separating users from the acquisition process except at very precisely defined points (e.g., the mission needs statement, the operational requirements document)
From page 205...
... Finally, even if an ACTD does not enter the mainstream acquisition process, funding streams are needed to ensure that useful leave-behinds from ACTDs are kept compatible.20 20It should be noted that successful advanced concept technology demonstrations in all areas, not just C4I, suffer from the problem of transitioning into production. But one of the major differences between C4I prototypes and weapons or platform prototypes is that the former are often inexpensive to replicate by comparison to the latter.
From page 207...
... This base of information systems comprises thousands of multigeneration electronic system elements and billions of dollars of capital investment, and is kept alive through the expenditure of many more billions in support costs. In the commercial world, such legacy systems are often kept operational based on a view their cost must be amortized before new capability can be economically justified.
From page 208...
... It is vitally necessary to attract, retain, and employ information technologists for the operation and effective use of military information systems and combat systems alike; yet the current operational leadership culture relegates such resources to the perceived status of second-class citizenry.22 There are marked limitations in promotion opportunities, education and training, and command and senior leadership opportunities for personnel in the military information systems and technology fields. And, DOD's efforts to retain qualified personnel in information technology are complicated by a general shortage of information technology workers 2iThese opportunities include offerings of the National Defense University (including its component colleges, among them the Armed Forces Staff College and the Information Resources Management College)
From page 209...
... Therefore, commitment to a vision of fully integrated and joint technical/combat forces, and the attendant opportunity to compete for and achieve command of combat units and promotion to the most senior positions of military responsibility, are necessities. With increased status also comes increased accountability for operational outcomes and greater commitment to careers in the armed forces.
From page 210...
... 4.5 EXERCISES, EXPERIMENTS, AND DOCTRINAL CHANGE Doctrine refers to the fundamental principles that guide the actions of military forces, i.e., how those forces fight. Doctrine is developed on the basis of the judgment and experience of senior military commanders and is promulgated throughout the services.25 Exercises and experiments are both intimately tied to doctrine, but they have fundamentally different purposes.
From page 211...
... Today, the benefits and advantages achievable through aggressive use of the latest C4I technology are neither well proven across the full spectrum of potential military operations nor well understood in terms of the reengineering of operations that this technology can potentially enable. Some indications of the benefits and advantages are known from experiments and modeling, but such experimentation is not sufficiently mature to be the sole or even the primary basis for decision making regarding doctrinal changes and major trade-offs in acquisition and force structure.
From page 212...
... People are keenly aware of what matters in terms of rewards, promotion, credit, and the like, and they behave in a manner consistent with their perceptions. Good management metrics help to drive organizational behavior that supports areas of operational significance.
From page 213...
... For example, promotion to general officer rank now requires that a person must have served in a "joint" assignment. At this writing, the DOD is attempting to formulate criteria to set a standard of information security practice that could be used to hold unit commanders responsible for such practices within their command.27 Nevertheless, it is almost certainly the case that there are additional opportunities to exploit responsiveness to management metrics in driving change.
From page 214...
... 214 REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF Cal: FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGES
From page 215...
... It reviewed all aspects of the U.S. defense strategy and program, including force structure, infrastructure, readiness, intelligence, modernization, and people.
From page 216...
... 4.6.2 Considerations in Assessment of C4I System Effectiveness Experience from the private sector suggests that the benchmark for evaluating the success or failure of an information technology application should be its contribution to the end user. In the DOD context, the analogous statement is that the benchmark for evaluating the success or failure of a C4I technology application should be its contribution to the combat operator.
From page 217...
... 4.6.3 Caveats Management metrics and measures of military effectiveness are important components of sustaining the revolution in military affairs and characterizing the impact of the use of advanced information technology on mission effectiveness. But it is important to note several caveats.
From page 218...
... Using a given set of widely accepted measures of military effectiveness to distinguish the particular contribution of C4I to military operations may result in a confounding and confusing analysis unless proper care is taken to understand the data. (The obvious solution to use measures of military effectiveness that are specifically tailored for evaluation of C4I runs the risk that these measures of military effectiveness are developed for the specific purpose of showcasing and defending a particular proposed C4I acquisition.)
From page 219...
... Similarly, the success of the Revolution in Military Affairs will depend on the sound judgment of visionary and experienced military leaders who are open to evidence provided in exercises, experiments, studies, and simulations. 4.6.4 Ways of Generating and Developing Data Once metrics and measures of military effectiveness are developed, a question arises as to how relevant data may be obtained.
From page 220...
... 220 REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF C4~: FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGES · The models underlying a simulation are usually based on an accepted understanding of current doctrine and tactics. Thus, they are illsuited to demonstrate how a radically new doctrine enabled by C4I technology can lead to dramatically new results.
From page 221...
... Delay in the acquisition process results in a continually expanding delay factor in bringing the power of commercial technology to bear on military C4I requirements. Indeed, the present acquisition cycle virtually guarantees obsolescence upon fielding of military systems when technologies key to their success improve at the rate of an order of magnitude every 5 years.
From page 222...
... Finally, personnel in the acquisition process have not been well trained to manage C4I acquisitions or socialized into an information technology culture. For example, program managers receive education and training oriented primarily toward the acquisition of weapons systems rather than C4I systems.
From page 223...
... In order to select processes that are both likely to show substantial improvement from reengineering and also be of high operational military significance, decision makers must draw on individuals with considerable expertise in two areas: the military operational art of war (i.e., doctrine, strategy, and tactics for employment of forces and weapons) and the capabilities made possible by advanced information technologies and C4I systems.
From page 224...
... Rather, they are regarded as implementers of high-level strategy decisions that are made without their input, and the status and prestige of C4I specialists are not comparable to those of individuals in traditional combat arms specialties. The role of "implementer" was once played by chief information officers of major corporations, but today chief information officers are regarded as part of the senior management and strategy teams in successful corporations.
From page 225...
... Furthermore, input from the end users the field commanders is particularly important in the design and development of C4I systems, because it is more difficult to specify requirements for C4I systems in a form that they can be handed "over the transom" than it is for most weapons systems. In practice, the loose coupling between the acquisition process and warfighter input has a number of weaknesses.
From page 226...
... By contrast, lower-level personnel have control of a smaller span of C4I systems and are more reliant on a few of them. For example, during Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (TWID)
From page 227...
... But the committee believes that such interoperability successes happen because they are managed by particularly dedicated individuals with broad (joint) perspectives themselves, rather than because the acquisition process is optimized to support such outcomes.
From page 228...
... Given the unavoidable fact that the senior DOD leadership turns over on a time scale short compared to the time that it takes for major cultural change to occur, DOD must rely on the creation of an enduring process to promote its C4I goals, especially interoperability, rather than on the services of any particular set of individuals. Moreover, because oversight is
From page 229...
... The effectiveness and efficiency with which joint military operations can be conducted will depend heavily on how well the services can collaborate and sustain that collaboration over time before the battle. Such peace-time collaboration, among fiercely independent groups like the services, however cannot be dictated, legislated, or simply announced.
From page 230...
... should be regarded as provisional, and DOD may well decide that a different action office is more appropriate given its organizational structure. Recommendation P-1: The Secretary of Defense, working with the service Secretaries and the Chairman of the loins Chiefs of Staff, should establish in each of the services a specialization in combat information operations, provide better professional career paths for C4I specialists, and emphasize the importance of information technology in the professional military education of DOD leadership.
From page 231...
... While it is true that military service is a privilege, the fact remains that for disciplines in which the private sector competes with I ~' I J ~ I 1 the military for talent, the higher rates of compensation found in the private sector are a powerful draw for many of those with talent. Additional compensation for C4I specialists that partially makes up for the privatemilitary pay gap would help to reduce the outflow of talent from the military, especially at the lower levels.34 33In this regard, the combat information specialists of the future are likely to share certain characteristics of good intelligence analysts today.
From page 232...
... Program managers must understand the intrinsic differences between C4I and weapons technologies, and they must be able to argue the significance of those differences in front of acquisition boards and oversight councils that are more accustomed to dealing with weapons systems. Today, conservative "by the book" approaches that are better suited to long-lived weapons systems are regularly applied to C4I systems, even though the existing acquisition process allows considerable flexibility in the management of a C4I program.
From page 233...
... Such information, especially if it is visionary, can influence markedly the commander's view of what will be possible in military operations. The operators pro
From page 234...
... It is expected that the institute would connect closely with a variety of different institutions and activities: · Training and doctrine commands and the Joint Battle Center, through which the institute could facilitate a close coupling between service-based strategy and analysis and joint C4I experimentation; · Service and defense agency research and development efforts in information technology, and the service development laboratories, through which the institute could keep abreast of current C4I developments; · The Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstrations, through which the institute could demonstrate in-house work of its own and/or facilitate appropriate work originating in other DOD or contractor bodies; · The Joint Staff (especially the Directorate for C4 Systems and the Directorate for Operations) , through which the institute could couple to operational concerns; and · The various war colleges, through which the institute could help to
From page 235...
... For these reasons, an "80% solution" an evolutionary acquisitionto the functional requirement, followed by effective preplanned product improvements is not unreasonable as the initial statement of requirements. Such a formulation would encourage commercial technology application and dramatically reduce the cycle time for developing new C4I systems.
From page 236...
... As a general rule today, requirements are initially specified by the service programmatically responsible for a system to be acquired; other stakeholders such as the CINCs or the Joint Chiefs of Staff have opportunities for input, but primarily in later stages of program review when the system has been largely defined. Furthermore, while the requirements for some programs are vetted through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Defense Acquisition Board, or the Major Automated Information Systems Review Council, these bodies deal only with programs exceeding some (relatively large)
From page 237...
... The reason is that the normal planning and budget process programs funds years in advance. Thus, some "offline" funding mechanism is required to cover unanticipated needs.37 Furthermore, even if an ACTD does not enter the mainstream acquisition process, funding streams are 37Today, mechanisms available to cover unanticipated needs include reprogramming authority (which, up to a certain limit, can be exercised without congressional approval)
From page 238...
... Some believe that the fraction of the DOD budget devoted to C4I should increase significantly in the future; others believe that the amounts should decrease, and still others say it should remain about the same. The committee is explicitly silent on whether the budget is appropriately balanced today among readiness, weapons, force structure, and other types of military spending, but it does note that an increase in the fraction of the budget devoted to C4I necessarily entails trade-offs against these categories.
From page 239...
... Input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides an opportunity to take a more integrated perspective, but without knowing what is being spent by all of the services on C4I in any given year, it is obviously difficult to take a defense-wide perspective on the level of overall spending. It is true that the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (1997)
From page 240...
... . Furthermore, quantitative measures can also help to inform the judgment of senior military leaders about how the capabilities offered by C4I can best be exploited in conducting military operations (i.e., in the formulation of military doctrine)
From page 241...
... Experimentation within the DOD context is analogous to business process reengineering in the private sector. Both seek radically new ways of doing things that create value and advance the ability of the organization to conduct military operations or to make money.
From page 242...
... Atlantic Command as the leader in joint experimentation, with a new organization in the Joint Chiefs of Staff for experimentation consisting of approximately 400 staff. The Army's Advanced Warfighting Experiment has been strongly supported by the DOD and the Congress.
From page 243...
... The committee is aware of some areas where DOD is attempting to apply management metrics to drive cultural change within the department.39 390ne example would be DOD's formulation of criteria (still in process) for holding unit commanders responsible for information security practices in their commands, as discussed in footnote 27.
From page 244...
... Box 4.3 provides some examples of management metrics for gauging progress toward C4I implementation goals.


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