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From page 463...
... PART V Social Processes 1
From page 464...
... Influence Strategies Dean G Pruitt, Jennifer Crocker, and Deborah Hanes State University of New York at Buffalo
From page 465...
... Arguments can be made for the efficacy of matching attitudes, making eye contact, role reversal (in which one feeds back to the other her perspective in a quarrel) , and the like Furthermore, there is a long tradition of research and practice on the efficacy of reciprocity, that is, matching benefit for benefit and harm for harm.
From page 466...
... Attitude Similarity Perceived similarity of attitudes appears to be a particularly important source of attraction. For example, in a field study, Newcomb (1961)
From page 467...
... 3 extent of attitude similarity predicted the degree to which people were attracted to each other after several months of association. Laboratory experiments involving the manipulation of perceived attitudes also provide consistent support for the hypothesis that people tend to like others whose attitudes seem similar to theirs (see Berscheid and Walster, 1969; 1978; Byrne, 1971; for reviews)
From page 468...
... . The effect of attitude similarity on attraction appears to be most important at the beginning of a relationship (Berscheid, 1985~.
From page 469...
... (Murstein and Christy, 1976~. In contrast to attitude similarity, this effect does not seem to be due to the impact of similarity on attraction.
From page 470...
... Berscheid (1985) notes that attitude similarity may have either positive or negative implications, although positive implications are probably more common.
From page 471...
... 7 Matching of attributes that define or create social categories, such as religion or ethnicity, may increase liking by creating a sense of shared group membership. According to Heider (1958)
From page 472...
... outgroup, or "unit relation," may be created by matching people on virtually any attribute, however trivial. In summary, many types of similarity, but especially attitude similarity, lead to increased attraction under most circumstances.
From page 473...
... 9 with the other and accept influence because of this identification. In other words, the individual may derive some satisfying part of his self-concept through his relationship with the other.
From page 474...
... 10 When does the attractiveness of a communicator matter and what are its effects relative to the effects of the quality of the arguments themselves? In their elaboration likelihood models Petty and Cacioppo (19811 1986)
From page 475...
... 11 requirement at their university (Petty et al., 1981~. For subjects in the high involvement condition, this policy would be put in place the following year, and therefore would affect the subjects themselves.
From page 476...
... 12 In summary, several theoretical perspectives suggest that attractive others are more influential than unattractive others. Furthermore, empirical evidence supports this hypothesis, at least under conditions of low involvement with the issue.
From page 477...
... Two types of similarity between communicator and recipient have been investigated in studies of the effects of source similarity on persuasion. One is similarity on the issue in question, that is, the extent to which the position advocated by the communicator;is similar to the position already held by the message recipient.
From page 478...
... 14 persuasive on some types of issues but less persuasive on others. Such communicators are likely to be more credible and consequently more persuasive on matters of objective fact, because they are more likely to know the facts.
From page 479...
... A moderate degree of mismatching, which avoids the recipient's latitude of rejection, is likely to maximize social influence. Research on the effects of message-recipient match of positions on attitude change suggests that attitude change tends to increase as the message becomes more discrepant from the recipient's position, but with a negatively accelerated function (Bochner and Insko, 1966; White, 1975~.
From page 480...
... Both the assimilation and contrast model of Sherif and Holland, and the finding that similarity of attitudes leacis to greater influence, may account for these effects. Summary and Conclusions The research reviewed in this section suggests that matching another's attitudes may be an effective strategy of social influence.
From page 481...
... The literature on nonverbal behavior indicates that matching may occur in three major areas; eye contact, interactional synchrony, and other nonverbal conversational behavior (e.g., duration of pauses, interruptions)
From page 482...
... They found that students of college professors who engaged in eye contact liked their professors more (and performed better) than students of professors who did not make eye contact.
From page 483...
... Exline (1963) has shown that in a competitive situation, those who are high in need.for affiliation engage in less eye contact than those who are low in need for affiliation.
From page 484...
... Although Patterson (1982; 1983) has suggested that eye contact is used
From page 485...
... has argued, on the basis of evidence, that this phenomenon does not occur at levels greater than expected by chance. Even if interactional synchrony does not occur over the entire course of a conversation, however, it may be associated with particular events during the conversation, such as attempts to indicate understanding, agreement, liking, etc.
From page 486...
... However, there is as yet no empirical evidence on the effects of interactional synchrony on liking or influence. It is not clear whether participants in a conversation are aware of interactional synchrony when it occurs.
From page 487...
... As with interactional synchrony, they may produce increased rapport. Alternatively, as with eye contact, they may produce either increased liking or signals of dominance, depending on the situation in which they occur.
From page 488...
... Research has not investigated the effects of role reversal in noncompetitive
From page 489...
... 25 situations, but it seems likely that warm role reversal would lead to more influence than cold role reversal in such situations, because it results in increased attraction, which enhances influence in noncompetitive situations. Neurolinguistic Programming in Psychotherapy One domain in which the effects of matching in communication has received a great deal of attention recently is matching of therapist/client behaviors in psychotherapy.
From page 490...
... , as noted in our consideration of research on role reversal. Furthermore, trust in a counselor increases a counselor's influence over a client (Strong and Schmidt, 1970~.
From page 491...
... 27 found to be stable over a one week period in one study (Birholtz, 1981~. However, in this study all subjects were found to use the kinesthetic mode, which contradicts the theory's assumption that there are individual differences in PRS.
From page 492...
... Most important, research has not examined whether PRS matching is necessary or sufficient for successful therapy outcomes. Most studies to date have examined only a single session, involving experimenters and subjects rather than counselors and clients.
From page 493...
... 29 In light of the research that is still needed on the fundamental assumptions of NLP theory, it might seem premature to call for studies of whether therapists (and others) can be trained to detect and match their clients' PRS.
From page 494...
... Clearly, the possibilities for using matching or mismatching to increase a therapist's influence over a client have not been adequately explored. Conclusions Research and theory on substantive matching suggests that matching on a wide variety of dimensions and behavior may increase influence over another person.
From page 495...
... However, considerable attempts at social influence occur outside of direct persuasion contexts, and the likeability and credibility of the communicator may have more impact in these other contexts. Research on role playing in competitive (negotiation)
From page 496...
... These points will be discussed in the two main subsections of this section. The mechanisms by which reciprocity leads to influence are quite different from those by which substantive matching leads to influence.
From page 497...
... 33 studies of reactions to the other party's strategy in the prisoner's dilemma (PD)
From page 498...
... 34 of options are given to the left of the comma and the column player's outcomes to the right of the comma.1 For example, when row chooses D and column chooses C', row gets T (10) and column gets S' (-2)
From page 499...
... Most ethical principles, e.g., sharing norms, can be construed as producing mutual cooperation in what would otherwise be a troublesome PD. There is a link between the earlier section on substantive matching and work on the PD in that perceived attitude similarity has been found to predict cooperation (choice of C)
From page 500...
... 36 party (Deutsch, 1973; Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975; Oskamp, 1971; Pilisuk et al., 1968; Pruitt, 1981; Wilson, 1971; Wrightsman et al., 1972~. Explanations for the Success of Reciprocity There is considerable danger in trying to generalize across learning, negotiation and PD settings, because these settings differ on many dimensions.
From page 501...
... Another way to put this is that these expectations should lead people to cooperate whenever they regard mutual cooperation as more valuable than mutual noncooperation. If the participants are perceptive, the latter condition will obtain in the PD, because R > P for both parties.
From page 502...
... 38 cooperates when they cooperate)
From page 503...
... 39 to this argument, but it can be questioned on the grounds that the 0% strategy may have elicited a retaliatory reaction from the opponent which masked a conditioning effect that was indeed present. In a second study (McGillicuddy, Pruitt and Syna, 1984)
From page 504...
... 40 possible in traditional animal learning studies. Hence, one of the other explanations (e.g., automatic reinforcement or expectations tied to behavior)
From page 505...
... The unfamiliar shape, on the other hand, is more readily conditioned to the avoidance of electric shock than is the unfamiliar taste. A similar phenomenon has been described by anthropologists who have found that primitive remedies often resemble in some way the disease being treated (Nisbett and Ross, 1980~.
From page 506...
... Hence it should be especially clear to the other that he faces a choice between mutual cooperation and mutual noncooperation. An example would be the familiar case where a tenant (the other)
From page 507...
... 43 Techniques for Making Reciprocity Work Learning theorists have developed a number of guidelines for the success fu] use of reciprocity (i.e., reinforcement)
From page 508...
... maximum effectiveness, the other should be rewarded or punished every time he makes the desired or the undesired response (Huise et al., 1980~. This effect has also been shown in research on negotiation.
From page 509...
... 45 followed by a reduced rate of responding to encourage resistance to extinction. One needs to praise a child every time he cleans up his room, at first; but after a while, periodic praise will suffice.
From page 510...
... 46 stronger the punishment, the larger are these side effects. Findings on humans by Lindskold (1976)
From page 511...
... 47 Prior Experience with a Reward Reward will often work better if the other has experienced it in the past and hence come to value it. In addition to the evidence in the conditioning literature (Kaz~in, 1975)
From page 512...
... 48 he should usually punish that response (and reward or fad] to punish its nonoccurrence)
From page 513...
... Hence, we must be careful about generalizing too readily from the conditioning literature. Defects in the Strategy of Reciprocity A major defect in the strategy of reciprocity is that it tends to produce and perpetuate mutual noncooperation.
From page 514...
... One is to adopt some variant of reciprocity that is less likely to produce a locked in state. The other is to employ a "starting mechanism" once mutual noncooperation has set in.
From page 515...
... 51 Gaebelein (1971) , this "slow-slow" strategy was defined as follows: The strategist retaliated 60% of the time after the other's first noncooperation, 80% after the second noncooperation, and 100% after the third noncooperation.
From page 516...
... 52 exploitation. This leads to low outcomes for the strategist, as pointed out by Axelrod (1984)
From page 517...
... If the parties can talk to each other, it may also be possible for them to coordinate mutual cooperation through negotiation, though this requires some element of trust. If trust is too low for genuine negotiation to take place, it
From page 518...
... Inducing Reciprocity by Taking Unilateral Initiatives If people are ready to reciprocate, one of the best ways to influence them is to provide them rewards. Reciprocity has been shown in a number of different types of behavior including helping (Depaulo et al., 1983; Greenberg, 1980; Greenberg and Frisch, 1972; Greenberg and Westcott, 1983; Stapleton et al., 1973)
From page 519...
... Such actions are sometimes called unilateral initiatives in the tradition of Osgood's (1962, 1966) GRIT proposals.
From page 520...
... 56 Why People Reciprocate Reciprocity is by no means inevitable. When it occurs, it can be explained by a number of mechanisms, including the following: Normative Pressures A norm of reciprocity is found in all cultures and is probably essential to the survival of the social system.
From page 521...
... Mobilizing Third-party Pressures Third parties who are trying to resolve a controversy tend to encourage reciprocity, because they believe it will move the controversy toward agreement and will encourage further concessions. Conditions Encouraging Reciprocity Reciprocity of unilateral initiatives is more likely and more extensive under some circumstances than others.
From page 522...
... Reciprocity is more likely if one is seen as genuinely trying to be helpful or conciliatory rather than seeking to induce indebtedness or create a good impression (Cialdini, 1985; Jones, 1964~. This proposition is supported by the finding that unilateral initiatives are most likely to be reciprocated when the strategist is more powerful (has more threat capacity)
From page 523...
... . Salience and Clarity of the Initiative It also seems reasonable to assume that more noticeable unilateral initiatives will be more fully reciprocated.
From page 524...
... They value our cooperation and/or believe that mutual cooperation is more valuable than mutual noncooperation.4 A unilateral initiative can be viewed as encouraging the first condition, the belief that further cooperation will be repaid. Hence, the model implies that the second
From page 525...
... 61 and third conditions will encourage reciprocity of unilateral initiatives. This may help explain why initiatives by more powerful parties tend to be more fully reciprocated (Lindskold and Bennett, 1973; Michener et al., 197S)
From page 526...
... Another way to put this is that unilateral initiatives are most effective when the target is experiencing a "hurting stalemate" (the term comes from Touval and Zartman, 1985) , unable to push us into
From page 527...
... Sadat's trip to Jerusalem followed a war between Egypt and Israel which must have created a sense that continued conflict was both futile and dangerous. Likewise, a successful series of unilateral initiatives aimed at the Soviet Union by President Kennedy in 1963 came soon after the Cuban Missile Crisis.5 Conclusions: How to Encouraging Reciprocity The points made above suggest several guidelines for encouraging another party to reciprocate one's conciliatory initiatives.
From page 528...
... Take a series of unilateral initiatives over a period of time without requiring reciprocity from the other party. This makes the conciliatory message more credible and gives the other time to rethink his approach.
From page 529...
... A way out of this circle is to take positive unilateral initiatives with the hope that the others will reciprocate
From page 530...
... 66 (Lindekold, 1986; Osgood, 1962, 1966)
From page 531...
... Both contribute to influence but by very different intervening processes: substantive matching by its effect on attraction and communicator credibility, reciprocity by its effect on expectations and attributions. At some later time, it may be possible to state a relationship between these intervening processes and hence between our two topics (see point 6 below for some initial thoughts along these lines)
From page 532...
... (2) Research is needed on the conditions under which eye contact leads to influence through a mechanism of liking vs.
From page 533...
... 69 (6) Liking, respect and trust are all possible mediators of the effect of substantive matching on influence.
From page 534...
... 7 o (9) There have been many studies in instrumental learning settings of the importance of immediacy, consistency and size of reinforcement (reciprocity)
From page 535...
... likely in intimate relations. But is this also true for long-term balancing of accounts?
From page 536...
... Aronson (Eds.) , The handbook of social psychology (3rd ea., vol.
From page 537...
... . Neurolinguistic programming: Testing some basic assumptions.
From page 538...
... Social Psychology Quarterly, _, 9-14.
From page 539...
... Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13, 23-40. Crocker, J., Thompson, L., McGraw, K
From page 540...
... Receiving competence-relevant help: Effects-on reciprocity, affect, and sensitivity to the helper's nonverbally expressed needs. Journal of Personality Social Psychology' 45' 1045-1060.
From page 541...
... (1980~. Effect of eye contact and distance on the verbal reinforcement of attitude.
From page 542...
... Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 8, 99-111. Greenberg, M
From page 543...
... . Role reversal: A summary and review of the research.
From page 544...
... . The effectiveness of role reversal: The actor or the listener.
From page 545...
... (1986~. Gaze and eye contact: A research review.
From page 546...
... Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 28, 180-186. Lindskold, S., Bennett, R., and Wayner, M
From page 547...
... Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 10, 402-409.
From page 548...
... Journal of Personality and Social cooperation from the two sexes in a conflict Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, (1968)
From page 549...
... Journal of Social Psychology, 75, 209215. Tornatzky, L., and Geiwitz, P
From page 550...
... 86 FOOTNOTES 1The letters in the matrix on the right stand for the following words (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965~: R = reward, S = sucker's payoff, T = temptation, P = penalty. 2More precisely, reciprocity is a sensible strategy for a party to adopt in the PD because-of the following four features of the game (party is viewed as the column player and other as the row player in this analysis)
From page 551...
... 5It is interesting to note that both actor and target were in the same hurting stalemate in these periods. Hence, it can be argued that a hurting stalemate encourages resort to unilateral initiatives as well as reciprocity to these initiatives.
From page 552...
... Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 14, 227-238. Pruitt, D
From page 553...
... Culture and Group Cohesion Boa z Tamir and Gideon Kunda Massachusetts Institute of Technology
From page 555...
... , how to most effectively do so becomes a question of considerable significance for the outcome of military engagements. Whether articulated or not, this question has been addressed by military organizations in a variety of ways.
From page 556...
... diverse as the USSR, North Vietnam, Israel, and the United States. Perhaps the most common variable used to explain performance, with appeal to both students and practitioners of military organization, is "cohesion." Grounded in the literature on smallgroup behavior, cohesion refers to the quality of the relationships between members of the small group.
From page 557...
... The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of cultural variables in explaining cohesion more systematically, by applying Schein~s (1985) model of organizational culture to the question of cohesion.
From page 558...
... : Artifacts, Values, and Basic Assumptions. Artifacts -- the constructed physical and social environment -- are the most visible level of a culture.
From page 559...
... arrangement of physical space, and so forth. Taken together, artifacts are an expression of a shared world-view held by members of a group or an organization.
From page 560...
... adhere to, and they can usually articulate them. For example, a number of key values in Israeli combat units guide behavior.
From page 561...
... To get at a deeper and more systematic level that would allow us to decipher behavioral patterns) and predict future behavior, a third level of group performance must be understood -- that which is guided by "basic assumptions.
From page 562...
... In stable cultures, these basic assumptions underlie the patterns of values and artifacts which are more easily observed. A culture often contains inner contradictions at the basic assumption level, and contradictions often exist among its three levels of artifacts, values, and basic assumptions.
From page 563...
... He states, "The main reason that integration succeeded in the military has to do with the special nature of military life. Orders, once given, must be followed, whatever a soldier's private feelings or misgivings..." But without "orders," the question remains whether these artifacts and espouses values will foster basic assumptions that promote interracial socialization, or even challenge certain racist "basic assumptions." And it is still an open question whether the army can serve as an arbiter of culture or whether it is merely influenced by its external social environment.
From page 564...
... Superficial statements run the risk of losing the very meaning of the concept of culture or trivializing it to the point where the concept becomes no more valuable than the concept of values or norms.5 Schein suggests a number of dimensions along which basic assumptions can be categorized. These are reproduced in Table 1: 1 [Insert table 3 (Schein 1986, p.
From page 565...
... In this paper we will illustrate the importance of introducing the concept of basic assumptions to the analysis of military organization. For this purpose, we will focus on the basic assumptions that address the question of man's social nature and the nature of human relationships, and the group's relationship to the environment.
From page 566...
... accountable for their performance, and minimize group cooperative work because military operations could not, and should not, be democratized. The nature of combat decisions, under the Noncohesive Army assumption, must be fast and accurate and could not tolerate the slow democratic process or the compromise of the "lowest common denominator" that so often marks group solutions.
From page 567...
... First is socialization -- the process whereby new members are introduced to the culture. According to Van Maanen and Schein, socialization is not simply a deterministic factor rooted in the individual's childhood, but a dynamic process that is developed along an individual career.
From page 568...
... LEADERSHIP according to Schein, is probably the most essential variable in developing a culture. Since social learning is fundamentally an anxiety-reduction process, and military units, particularly in combat, are characterized by high levels of anxiety, the role of leadership in the military becomes all the more important.
From page 569...
... But at different levels culture is changeable: while its artifacts and values are much easier to identify and are more malleable, its basic assumptions are much more difficult to change. It is more likely that the artifacts and values are shaped by its basic assumptions.
From page 570...
... Whatever the social grouping, the degree to which it is characterized by shared basic assumptions, i.e., the degree to which it might be said to have a culture -- is an empirical question. In a complex society, members typically have multiple affiliations, and cultures may be seen as either nested within each other, or as intersecting.
From page 571...
... , attribute the US military defeat in Vietnam to Forces internal to the military structure....~7 They insist that tithe strength or weakness of a 7. It is beyond the extent of this paper to explain the US military's disintegration and its performance in Vietnam, or the historical influence of the civil opposition to the war and its results.
From page 572...
... As de Tocqueville put it: "The remedy of the vices of the army is not to be found in the army itself, but in the country.~9 Thus, only a misinterpretation Of what Parsons named the ~valuesystem", or an unawareness of the linkage among the three layers of a culture proposed by Schein can lead to the following cone fusion : _~ ...there is nothing in the nature of American social values or in the application of technology which, 'ate into,' precludes the development of both a military structure in general and an officer corps constituted along traditional line=-~i.e., cohortI. Further, one has only to examine the British, French, and Israeli systems to see that the doctrines accompanying social democracy need not hinder the development of a highly cohesive, traditionally based, disciplined, and effective fighting force.10 rather than culture in here perceived as a major factor in determining military cohesiveness.
From page 573...
... To cluster British, French, Israeli and American patterns of organizational authority in the same category of a democratic society, as Gabriel and Savage do, ignores the reality of national cultural diversification, and the mutual relationship among basic assumptions, values, and artifacts. Democratic values, in our view, are related to one segment of a broader national and organizational culture.
From page 574...
... Such an approach would ~-~~ Il. -Military cohesion is neither a consequence of one variable, such as structure or culture, nor one cultural dimension such as a particular basic assumption.
From page 575...
... not have taken hold had it not been congruent with the broad social and cultural patterns exemplified by Corporate America Hence, structural changes in the US army, such as the COHORT initiative, are not sufficient to heal the "Vietnam Syndromes and replace disintegrated units with desired cohesive ones. This point is made in Moskos's discussion of the US military disintegration in iti etnam: It is suggested that the intense primary-group ties so of ten reported in combat units are best viewed as mandatory necessities arising from immediate life-and-death exigencies.
From page 576...
... The Israeli army operates in a very different cultural environment. This army is traditionally considered apolitical, and is central to the national ideology of independence.
From page 577...
... Such an artifact reflects strong values and basic assumptions. In a democratic state with open borders it is almost impossible to mobilize an entire society to war without an underlying basic assumption that war is an inevitable result of self-defense.
From page 578...
... The military success registered civilian disillusionment. The result of the Algeria war, in contrast to the US war in ltietnasD, was attributed to the government to setting explicit mili~cary goals, and not to a particular military structure.
From page 579...
... demonstrated in front of the Prime Minister's house in Jerusalem.18 A letter addresed to Menachem Begin, Israel's prime minister, and signed by 35 soldiers of an elite unit, illustrates the tension among these three basic assumptions that was causing internal societal conflict: Not for this purpose did I volunteer for an elite unit! It was always clear to me that should I ever go to war, it would be a just war -- a war necessary for our survival as individuals and as a nation...
From page 580...
... A detailed study of a military culture at the societal level can explain the interdependence of the various levels of culture that is essential for both a nation and its army in shaping and understanding military cohesiveness. A given ~ artifact such as military patterns of authority cannot be understood without examining their underlying layers of values and basic assumptions.
From page 581...
... The next section will elaborate on this argument in the battlefield. we will do so by introducing a combat scenario in which two armies developed different offensive tactics, each rooted in an organizational culture.
From page 582...
... reserves. Syria's aim was to hurl a critical mass at the Israeli forces and to attain a military advantage in a particular theatre of operations.
From page 583...
... relationship between ethnic groups, and a totalitarian regime controlled by a minority group (the Alawites) that is supported by a strong security police force.
From page 584...
... Even units which had not been trained as a cohort could keep their cohesiveness. This fighting spirit was bound tore the r by common values and basic assumptions that are rooted in individual commitment, broad skill definition, and a broad national consensus.
From page 585...
... A typical Syrian tank crew as part of an armored division offensive must follow the leading tank into the front line. The rule is that if the leading tank is destroyed, the remaining tanks must bypass it into the front and keep to the offensive.
From page 586...
... In this system of narrow job definitions, nobody in the tank crew can take over if the commander is injured, and his well-being is necessary for the crew to keep operating. When a commander is disabled the crew loses its ability to function and hence the commander must be protected to the same extent as the crew members.
From page 587...
... The artifacts of a Syrian tank crew would, among other things, consist of strict hierarchical bureaucracy to an inflexible response to changing combat conditions, and restricted predefined individual roles based on narrow job definitions. The tight Syrian hierarchical control is marked by a reluctance to be creative or innovative, and by a desire to follow the path of least resistance.
From page 588...
... In this case the tank crew are listening to the entire divisions or battalion's radio channels.
From page 589...
... In sum, we can confidently assume that further examination of a military unit's basic assumption that would reveal related behavioral and performance variables. Social cohesion, based on common values and basic assumptions, rather on a particular structure in such a unit is fundamental for implementing the mission.
From page 590...
... The purpose of this paper was to introduce and examine the contribution of the relatively neglected dimension of organizational culture to the analysis of military performance. The paper challenges some of the structural-functionalist assumptions that have guided much of the research on organizational performance.
From page 591...
... of the causes of a particular social action is analogous to designing a military uni t for an environment characterized by a lack of ambiguity, "plain,n nclean" and specific combat. Such an approach suffers from an overdeterministic view of human behavior.
From page 592...
... Second, Schein's model explains cultural constraints on organizational performance in situations where pure structural and functional considerations would suggest successful outcomes. In Schein's view, basic assumptions -- learned ways of viewing the world -- often constrain or enhance organizational performance independently of other variables.
From page 593...
... In sum, the organizational culture framework suggest that organizational structure is not only a result of external forces, or inherent in the nature of the organizational goals, function, task or technology, but a consequence as well as a symbol of the most fundamental cultural factors that develop within the organization. Namely, while the structuralist argument emphasizes top down causal links, and in fact presents a highly constrained and deterministic image of individual choice and behavior, the cultural argument adds a perspective that is derived from the bottom up and thus emphasizes variables that are potentially controllable by individual decision makers as well as other participants.
From page 594...
... The relations between structure and performance COHORT is necessary but not sufficient condition for attaining military horizontal-cohesion. Thus, cohesion might disrupted by contradictory basic assumptions.
From page 595...
... Socialization in a Cohort unit is designed in an attempt to "breaks the individual as a private citizen, and remold him as a member of a cohesive unit. A conflict between the values of a person as a citizen and as a soldier could be developed.
From page 596...
... Finally, interpreting basic assumptions requires that the researcher be in a position to interpret matters that are not easily accessible to most member -- they are unconscious, tacit, or unarticulated. All require context sensitive first hand involvement.
From page 597...
... by Schein (1985~. Ethnographic study has a different emphasis.
From page 598...
... (1985) Organizational Culture and Leadership, Jossey-8ass Publication.
From page 599...
... (1977) "Toward a Theory of Career" in Van Maanen, ed.
From page 600...
... I Table ~ Insert in p. :,0 Table 1.


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