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Chapter 4: Recommendations for German Participation
Pages 36-40

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From page 36...
... The United States has considerable experience in this area, and its laboratories carry out R&D to continually improve MPC&A technologies. This experience is only partially applicable to future German activities.
From page 37...
... The United States has allocated a total of $90 million for design and equipment, but more effort is required before further progress can be made. Since the secure intermediate storage is of pivotal importance, the Steering Committee recommencis German support.
From page 38...
... The Steering Committee recommends pursuing this option only if it becomes clear that the various obstacles to its success stand a reasonable chance of being overcome. To assess the viability of this option, it recommends sounding out the Russian government, the German federal government, the Hesse government, and the German political parties about whether a broad consensus on the principle of the Hanau option coup!
From page 39...
... on a relatively rapid time scale. The Steering Committee recommends pursuing this option only if it became clear that the various obstacles to its success stanc!
From page 40...
... But since this is one of the two principal disposition options under consideration in the United States, the Committee believes the option should be left open. In addition to the plutonium that will be withdrawn from warheads, there is also a substantial amount of residual WPu (e.g., non-metal scrap and waste plutonium)

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