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Chapter 1: Context
Pages 6-22

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From page 6...
... Minimizing the `dangers to international security posed by these materials is also clearly in the interest of Russia's Western partners, including Germany. This report has a specific goal: to provicle recommendations for Germany's contribution, in cooperation with the United States, to accelerating the process leading to the disposition of excess weapons plutonium in Russia and to enhancing the security of the steps leading to that goal.
From page 7...
... These issues are discussed in detail in a report by a special panel of CISAC. See National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995~.
From page 8...
... consists 2 National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994~. 3 One isotope of plutonium (Puma)
From page 9...
... o ~ ED l ~ o ~ Act ~ c O - (D ~ ~ o ~ cD ! co- loos ~ to p)
From page 10...
... Since all forms of plutonium pose proliferation risks, the NAS study concluded that it would not be sensible to define standards of proliferation resistance for the excess WPu higher than that of the much larger quantities of plutonium in spent fuel. Accordingly, the NAS study recommender!
From page 11...
... o of ~˘ ~- - ~ ^ ·~ =' ^ ~ ~ · o - ^ ~ ~ ~ .= ~ a Z^ -ma ' ~ .s at a :, o o 5 ~ ~ ˘ C'0 o ~ ~.m a i ~ ~ -~ ~ :~ 0 ~ ~ .0 Cat ~1 V, Cal 50 ,~ En ~ O ~ _I V)
From page 12...
... Each side has proposed variants on plans for agreecl, monitored net reductions from their stockpiles of fissile materials, but as yet there is no agreement. Negotiations between the United States and Russia to make formal commitments that specific quantities of fissile material from dismantled weapons will be declared excess and committed to non-weapons disposition are under way, but the amounts of material remain a key open issue.
From page 13...
... Intermediate Storage The security of the third phase, intermediate storage, is of great importance because the implementation of any disposition option will take substantial time at least one and probably several decades. This is much longer than the time for which political developments in Russia, ant!
From page 14...
... An essential feature of intermediate storage should be that material can only be withdrawn for civilian uses with international safeguards, and the NAS report made a number of proposals toward that end.
From page 15...
... It would require substantial physical protection and other security and nonproliferation measures. The NAS study rejects this option as too great a proliferation risk, and as not satisfying the requirement to pose an additional barrier to reuse in weapons.
From page 16...
... . 7 Note that the NAS study concluded that, for the disposition option involving reactors, only existing or modified thermal reactors should be used.
From page 17...
... · Obtain surplus WPu; convert it into oxide and fabricate it into MOX, together with natural, depleted, or very lightly enriched uranium oxide. Reprocess RPu from spent reactor fuel and convert it into MOX fuel elements.
From page 18...
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From page 19...
... The amount of WPu consumed and the amount of RPu remaining in the spent fuel depends on the specific decisions in response to the above questions. However this matter is essentially irrelevant since the RPu in the spent fuel will join the almost 1,000 tons of RPu now residing in the storage facilities adjacent to the world's commercial nuclear plants.
From page 20...
... · The MOX option involves additional costs and proliferation risks because of the physical protection requires! during fabrication, and these must be reflected in any cost estimates.
From page 21...
... for non-nuclear weapons states party to the NET, the term does not include physical protection and is reserved for the verification activities of Euratom and the IAEA at civilian nuclear facilities. In Germany, only the responsibility for physical protection rests with national authorities.
From page 22...
... As a consequence, inside threats stemming from such social problems are becoming real. Although so far none of the known cases of nuclear smuggling involved material directly from the nuclear weapons or reserves, the number of cases of theists from the civilian nuclear complex or from military non-weapons areas (e.g., from naval nuclear power reactors)


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