Maximizing U.S. Interests in Science and Technology Relations with Japan: Report of the Defense Task Force (1995) / Chapter Skim
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4 MOTIVATIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION IN DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY
4 MOTIVATIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR COOPERATION IN DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY
Pages 36-55
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From page 36... ...
States, but each also involves barriers and potential pitfalls. The United States and Japan have cooperated in defense technology and defense industrial areas for roughly 40 years.
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For example, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries has transferred data on the FS-X composite wing to Lockheed Martin as flowback. To transfer hard technology effectively, exchanges of technical personnel and other forms of instruction are open required to supplement exchanges of data or drawings.
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Systems: "Off-the-Shelf" and "Blended" Modes While this form of U.S.-lapan interaction by definition does not involve extensive technology transfer in the traditional sense, it serves as a useful baseline to begin evaluating the motivations and benefits on each side for various forms of interaction and emerging trends. Historically, defense technology transfers from the United States to Japan have occurred in the context of Japanese procurement.
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One recent example is the Japanese procurement of Aegis destroyers.7 The overall battle management system was sold to Japan through the Department of Defense's (DoD) foreign military sales (FMS)
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See Michael Green, The Japanese Defense Industry's Views of U.S.-Japan Collaboration: Findings of the MIT Japan Program Survey, 1994, and Matthew Rubiner, U.S.
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technologies accompanying Japanese license(1 production has been a topic of interest, concern, an(l debate for some time, with aircraft Industry and Government Views on Defense Technology Cooperation with Japan. Findings of the MIT Japan Program Survey, 1994.
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In the view of some experts, the experience of the FS-X program, discussed in more detail below, indicates that Japanese industry still had not acquired these skins by the late 198Os.~8 In several specific areas the technological benefits of military licensed production programs for lapan's commercial aircraft industry are clear and compelling. This is particularly true for engines and some subsystems.
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13. 24See Michael Green, The Japanese Defense Industry's Views of U.S.-Japan Defense Technology Collaboration: Findings of the MIT Japan Program Survey, op.
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These pressures will likely be intensified by Japanese defense budget practices which have delayer} payments for current procurements anti led major obligations to arms makers for the out years.26 Japan is currently developing a number of indigenous systems for which there are existing U.S. substitutes.
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focused on R&D programs in the late 1970s and early 19SOs aimed at technologies that the United States did not release to Japan the so-called black boxes in the F-15 licensed production program, the technology demonstrator could be aimed at achieving greater bargaining power if licensed production of the F-22 is judged to be desirable down the line.28 The project also keeps the option of indigenous development open. Finally, some of the technologies reportedly targeted for the demonstrator such as fly-by-light actuation are relevant to future commercial aircraft programs.29 Japanese aircraft makers and government officials are still considering the development of a lOO-seat commercial transport in cooperation with foreign companies.30 The plans for a technology demonstrator indicate that despite the current budget situation and uncertain security environment Japan is determined to maintain its skill and technology base in fighter aircraft, which has allowed it to effectively produce advanced foreign designs and to indigenously develop less capable aircraft.
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Soon after the launch of F-15 licensed production in the late 1970s, the Japan Defense Agency, Air Self-Defense Force, and industry began considering options for replacing the domestically-developed F-1 fighter. Japanese industry and some elements in the government began the process with a presumption in favor of a domestically developed fighter.
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contention surrounding the negotiation and clarification of the development MOU serves as an important warning the exercise strained mutual trust and left significant constituencies on both sides thinking that the agreement represents a "giveaway" to the other side; (2) despite controversial beginnings and delays, outlined above, the industry-toindustry relationships, including the flowback of composite wing technology to Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth division from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, are reported to be working effectively; (3)
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would be a U.S.-led effort in which Japanese companies play the role of key subcontractors, developing and producing subsystems for weapons that would be procure(1 and fielded by both sides.35 This would be analogous to the Private advisory committees to the IDA issued reports recently on defense production and defense technology. Boei Sobihin Chotatsu Kondanlcai (Advisory Committee on Defense Equipment Procurement)
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In this circumstance it would be difficult to avoid the traditional pattern of one-way technology flow. Notwithstanding these sorts of obstacles, one area for U.S.-lapan cooperation in defense technology that has been discussed recently is theater missile defense (TMD)
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Japan's enforcement of its export controls allows for minor modifications on a case-by-case basis.5 However, the Defense Task Force is aware of instances in which American companies have been told by Japanese counterparts that components embodying commercial technology with minor modifications for a defense application would be prohibited. In several cases, the U.S.
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In another case in the early 1980s, General Motors expressed interest in licensing technology used in the production of MHl's 74-type tank, particularly the sophisticated hydraulic suspension systems and transmission, but was also rebuffed.~° In this case, which involved clearly military technologies, MHI was reportedly reluctant to provide a test case for the MOU allowing transfer of military technologies to the United States, which had been concluded a short time before. In any case, a number of cases both those that have been made public and those which the companies involved appear unwilling to disclose-demonstrate a pattern of reluctance on the part of Japanese companies to license military and dual-use technologies to the United States.
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1. Japan aIrea(ly possesses or is procuring some rudimentary elements of a TMD system, but these systems would have to be upgraded to perform TMD functions.40 U.S.-lapan collaboration in the ballistic missile defense area goes back to the late 198Os, when several Japanese companies received contracts from DoD as part of the WESTPAC: project, an initial study of ballistic missile defense requirements in the Western Pacific.4i Last year, U.S.
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44When the possibility of implementing the DoD's TFT initiative through TMD cooperation was raised by the United States early in the discussions of TMD, it was resisted by some on the Japanese side. Partly as a result, the TFT and TMD discussions were "delinlced." See Barbara Wanner, "Washington Pushes for Expanded U.S.-Japan Defense Technology Exchanges," JEI Report, April 8, 1994, p.
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Collaboration between U.S. and Japanese companies in R&D on enabling technologies could prove to be an important mechanism for leveraging scarce resources in the future.
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Primary participants are BMDO, Army Research Laboratory, MITI, and JDA; there are possible private contractors on both sides. NOTE: Status of projects as of July 1995.
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