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18 The Consequences of Nuclear War: An Economic and Social Perspective
Pages 381-410

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From page 381...
... Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado INTRODUCTION The original purpose of this paper was to assess the systemic effects of a limited nuclear war and offer some thoughts regarding the potential health care complications that might result. As work progressed, it became increasingly apparent that research into the direct and immediate impact of war has been, and continues to be, the subject of considerable effort.
From page 382...
... assumes that the Soviet Union would not launch a preemptive strike without first protecting its own citizens (or at least reducing the number of anticipated casualties to tolerable levels) , by evacuating the larger cities and population centers proximate to major industrial plants.
From page 383...
... People respond to situations of impending danger on the basis of their situationally defined perceptions of risk, and what they then believe to be appropriate response to those perceptions. Even without official government evacuation plans or sanctioned warnings of an impending nuclear exchange, news regarding related events could lead some people to perceive risk and evacuate to areas thought to be safe.
From page 384...
... Telecommunications networks, information processing equipment, and highly sophisticated medical technology would be vulnerable and could be irreparably harmed by such a blast. ~ The problems this pulse poses for electronic equipment are twofold.
From page 385...
... The viability of the nation's electronic funds transfer and recordkeeping system turns on the degree of protection afforded by all its participants. The sensitivity of the nation's credit system to computer failure was demonstrated recently when Paul Volcker, Federal Reserve Board Chairman, revealed that "something in the nature of a computer glitch" left the Bank of New York $30 billion overdrawn (November 20, 1985~.
From page 386...
... This is, of course, a rather mild event in contrast to the prospects of disruption due to a nuclear exchange. It does, however, underscore the sensitivity of these financial systems, inviting speculation as to how economic recovery might proceed in the event of a total collapse.
From page 387...
... Potential Vulnerability Affecting National Survival (PVANS) , a study prepared in 1970 for the Office of Civil Defense by the Stanford Research Institute (SRI)
From page 388...
... The destruction of data processing and retrieval facilities would make it difficult to conduct monetary reform or reestablish property rights, both of which have, in past wars, been instrumental preconditions for a rapid recovery. Naturally, there are a large number of other issues which could have been addressed.
From page 389...
... A nuclear exchange of the magnitude reported in these studies would cause a rapid collapse of the nation's social and economic infrastructure. The speed with which a new system could be erected is an open question, and one which may never be answered.
From page 390...
... which focuses human attention on the few acts directed toward the sole values of preserving life and helping others. A disasterinduced shift in social order and behavior triggers a temporary suspension of providing aid and comfort to the disaster victims.
From page 391...
... Application to CRP-2B The finding that disasters experienced see the first order of social life replaced temporarily with a second order that reverts back to the first order when emergency needs are met and after outside assistance converges on the stricken area is not likely to hold given the magnitude of disruption and depravation accompanying a nuclear exchange. In this case the second order would give rise to a new third order rather than revert back to the first order; in other words, nuclear exchange would produce changes leading to a permanent social reorganization rather than a temporary change as characterizes most other disasters.
From page 392...
... It is not likely, therefore, that medical resources would be shared between these community-like "societies." Medical and health care systems would be constrained to function within emerging neighborhood societies until international aid is received and equitably distributed. Critical Industries: Prospects for Recovery Detailed studies of how quickly critical industries might rebound are clearly lacking.
From page 393...
... The extensive and increasing multi national diffusion of individual pharmaceutical firms has rendered "U.S. pharmaceutical industry" a term of unclear meaning.
From page 394...
... In recent years, generic drug producers have posed a growing threat to the industry's profit position since technological advances have made it possible to imitate patented drugs by slightly altering a compound's molecular structure. These so-called multisource drugs accounted for 45 percent of licit drug sales within the United States in 1979, 7 percent of which (or 3 percent of all sales)
From page 395...
... Operations could continue so long as electrical power and raw ingredients of sufficient quality and quantity are available. Energy Industry A secure supply of energy is, without question, one of the two most important ingredients determining the speed with which a viable economy could be reconstituted.
From page 396...
... It is questionable whether the nation's stock of liquid fossil fuels would be sufficient to replace the vast investment in housing, plant, equipment, and the supporting public infrastructure lost due to such a large-scale nuclear exchange. The importance of energy to the economy has already been noted; however, one must also ask whether rebuilding would so deplete the nation's proven oil, gas, and coal reserves that economic recovery would be a painful process drawn out over several decades.
From page 397...
... Products Food and kindred products Apparel Transportation and warehousing Communications and radio Wholesale and retail trade Finance and insurance Medical and educational New construction Residential Nonresidential buildings Public utilities Highways Average of all sectors (approximate) 1.57 1.17 2.64 0.46 0.95 0.61 1.05 0.93 1.61 1.99 3.32 2.00 aGross national product.
From page 398...
... . Unchanging Composition of Fossil Fuel Supplies The composition of fossil fuels consumed during the period of reconstruction, i.e., the percentage provided by oil, gas, and coal, would remain unchanged.
From page 399...
... For example, the reconstruction process would take 8 years to complete if the annual supply of petroleum allocated to activities other than rebuilding was cut to 15 percent of that observed prior to the war. In the event that these petroleum demands can only be reduced to 25 percent of the prewar level, total reconstruction would never occur; slightly more than 40 percent of the capital stock could be replaced.
From page 400...
... ~. ~i: 8 10 o 50 + 65 O 75 ~ 85 x 95 v 100 PERCENT REDUCTION FROM PREWAR LEVELS OF CONSUMPTION FIGURE 2 Percent of capital stock rebuilt as a percentage of prewar oil consumption.
From page 401...
... Money is no longer a tangible commodity but is a complex combination of bits stored in electronic memory banks. Who will step forward to conduct monetary reform, and how it would be accomplished in an equitable fashion, is without question one of the most important aspects of economic recovery.
From page 402...
... In any case, it is clear that the projected period of economic recovery reported in the literature takes no account of this important consideration, and we believe, therefore, that the resultant estimates are overly optimistic. The postwar economy would be more inefficient and grow slower than might appear to be the case given current statistics.
From page 403...
... A recovery period lasting a decade or more contrasts sharply with the recorded postwar economic performance of both Germany and Japan. Each sustained heavy losses but were able to reestablish viable economies within 5 years after the cessation of hostilities.
From page 404...
... No nation would have the resources or possibly the will to come to the aid of a United States devastated by a nuclear exchange. Foodstuffs would be hoarded rather than shared.
From page 405...
... Nor has anyone asked the more general questions regarding information processing failures how records would be recre
From page 406...
... Experience gained from the study of past disasters provides little insight as to how society may cope with the aftermath of nuclear war. Certainly snowstorms, floods, and even earthquakes pose sufficiently different problems than those upon which the papers in this volume have centered, and the social response to natural hazards may be an unsound basis for extrapolation.
From page 407...
... 1984. Medical resources after nuclear war: availability vs.
From page 408...
... 1970. Potential Vulnerability Affecting National Survival.
From page 409...
... 1969. Postwar Monetary Reform in Severely Damaged Economies: Its Role in Recovery from Nuclear Attack.


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