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Executive Summary
Pages 1-9

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From page 1...
... At that time, President Yeltsin declared that illegal activities had ceased and future work in violation of the BWC was prohibited, but the Russian government has been unable to convince the United States that Russia is now in complete compliance with its treaty obligations. Adding to these uncertainties is the sheer size of the former Soviet BW complex, which Russia is finding difficult to maintain financially, whatever the intended purpose of the facilities may now be.
From page 2...
... Such cooperation could contribute significantly to the following objectives: ~ . National security benefits · Providing greater mutual confidence about compliance with the BWC than would otherwise be possible Reducing proliferation incentives Serving as a stepping stone to dismantlement opportunities Reconfiguring former Soviet BW-related activities Enhancing capabilities to combat bioterrorism Public health benefits · Improving understanding of the prevalence and characteristics of pathogens that pose threats to public health · Strengthening capabilities to prevent, diagnose, and treat outbreaks of infectious diseases · Enhancing international communications concerning disease trends and outbreaks 3.
From page 3...
... This private foundation, established by Congress in 1992 and set up by the National Science Foundation in 1995, has solicited basic research proposals from interested Russian investigators in the biomedical field. CRDF currently supports eight projects at institutes that were part of the former Soviet BW complex.
From page 4...
... Consultations included scientific visits to Russian research institutes in Koltsovo and Obolensk, where pilot projects were later established, one round of consultations and two joint planning meetings in Moscow; and an international symposium in the Kirov region involving 30 Russian specialists, sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
From page 5...
... The pilot projects were limited efforts, and the committee concluded that the following additional criteria should be considered in the selection of projects within the larger program recommended in this report: · L,ikelihood of sustaining the research by attracting the interest of other organizations with financial capabilities to continue work in the general field after completion of the project and · Promotion of linkages between Russian scientists working in institutions that had been involved in BW activities and those that were not involved in such activities.
From page 6...
... As cooperation becomes more ingrained in the Russian scientific community, joint efforts are more likely to survive political shocks, thus underscoring the importance of establishing and broadening cooperation while the window of opportunity is open. The core of a Pathogens Initiative should be joint research projects directed to the epidemiology, prophylaxis, diagnosis, and therapy of diseases associated with dangerous pathogens as well as related fi~ndamental research.
From page 7...
... Two additional program areas will provide opportunities to address other pathogens or diseases of public health concern and to carry out related fundamental research. These two categories are particularly important in both providing support for key Russian scientists who are interested in pursuing careers not tied directly to potential BW agents and expanding the pool of potential collaborators in the United States.
From page 8...
... . In addition, the promotion of effective national regulator approaches to controlling dangerous pathogens appears to be essential to ensure responsible handling of these pathogens on a broad front.
From page 9...
... To the extent that other institutions remain viable, they should be motivated to find work outside the area of dangerous pathogens. Thus, there is a high probability this program will help achieve DOD objectives of nonproliferation and reconfiguration of the former Soviet BW complex into a less diffuse, less uncertain, and more public health oriented establishment.


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