Controlling Dangerous Pathogens A Blueprint for U.S.-Russian Cooperation: A Report to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program of the U.S. Department of Defense (1997) / Chapter Skim
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1 The Context for a Program of Bilateral Cooperation
1 The Context for a Program of Bilateral Cooperation
Pages 10-22
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Holum, Director, Remarks to Me Fourth Review Conference of He Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, Switzerland, November 26.
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(The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention also contain provisions recognizing that nonproliferation measures should not deny parties to the treaty access to the peaceful benefits of technology.) Article X further declares that states parties "in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other states or international organizations to the fiercer development and application of 6 U.S.
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The Third Review Conference also created all international group of technical experts to examine Me scientific and technical possibilities for BWC verification.'3 As of mid1997, an ad hoc group, in which all states parties to the treaty could participate' had begun negotiation of a legally binding verification protocol. Achieving a broad consensus on strengthening the international regime in this critical area is impeded by a number of factors, not least of which is a deep-seated lack of trust between the Western countries and Russia about BW-related activities.
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activities, States Parties are encouraged to provide information, to the extent possible, on planned international conferences, seminars, symposia, and similar events dealing with biological research directly related to the Convention and on other opportunities for exchange of scientists, joint research, or other measures to promote contacts between scientists engaged in biological research directly related tn rho Convention (1991~.
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, was designed to limit the proliferation potential of both weapons and technical experts. Thus, in addition to programs to secure weapons and material, the CTR program provided initial funding for the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
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Biopreparat officials informed the committee in June 1997 that there are 47 facilities within its complex, including 1 1 research institutes. Many facilities not listed above are undoubtedly interested in international cooperation, but their capabilities related to dangerous pathogens are unknown to the committee.
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hn September ~992 the United States, Me United Kingdom, and Russia signed a joint statement to create a mechanism for resolving lingering concerns arid demonstrating the defensive nature of remaining Russian military capabilities in We BW area.2~ After initial reciprocal visits to selected facilities in each of We Free countries, We governments were unable to agree on satisfactory arrangements for more extensive mutual visits or inspections. The Russian government has argued that the process also should serve to verify the legitimacy of U.S.
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Holum, Director, Remarks to the Fourth Review Conference of We Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva, Switzerland, November 26. The head of the Russian delegation, Grigory Berdemikov, told the conference that the Russian Federation "adheres to all clauses of the convention and has never developed, produced, accumulated, or stored biological weapons" (Parrish, S
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The committee has concluded that under the transparency arrangements `described below, expanded cooperative activities can be carried out in a manner that ensures the risk of abuse of such a program is reduced to an acceptable level. The expanded arrangements to enhance transparency envisioned for the Pathogens Initiative and its subsequent phase should include mutual agreement, on a proiect-by-oroiect basis.
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The outcome of current negotiations to strengthen the BWC with a legally binding verification protocol could also influence the potential effectiveness of bilateral transparency arrangements. The current BWC confidence-building measures represent voluntary commitments that only a few countries regularly fulfill (see Box 1-1)
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A substantial collaborative research program would provide new employment opportunities for many key scientists, thereby reducing pressures on the Russian government to invest in maintaining unnecessary facilities. Also, if such a collaborative program is designed to concentrate financial support at a limited number of the best Russian facilities, any weaker facilities-to the extent they remain viable-will have incentives to find work outside the area of dangerous pathogens, particularly in the private sector.
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business and marketing skills in these and other areas. Leveraging limited national financial and human resources to serve national security and public health interests: Coordinated research activities in both countries on dangerous pathogens that pose current and potential health risks to the worId's populations offer opportunities to combine limited financial and human resources in combatting dangerous infectious diseases.
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As other programs undertake research activities with former BW scientists, systematic coordination among related programs is exceedingly important so that national security objectives are considered fully and that tax and customs exemptions with the Russian government are utilized whenever possible.30 President Clinton created a special position, at the rank of ambassador, with the responsibility of coordinating these cooperation or assistance efforts.3' Effective use of this or an alternative coordination mechanism is essential to ensure that the substantial potential benefits of cooperation with the former Soviet BW complex are realized and the risks that collaborative research efforts could contribute to illegal activities are minimized. THE: BLUEPRINT FOR COOPERATION This chapter has provided the context and rationale for U.S.-Russian cooperation involving specialists and facilities of the former Soviet BW complex.
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