Improving Surface Transportation Security A Research and Development Strategy (1999) / Chapter Skim
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3 Establishing a Research and Development Strategy
3 Establishing a Research and Development Strategy
Pages 28-42
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From page 28... ...
Rather than choosing among the many promising R&D topics, it describes a process for making those choices how to define DOT's role, how to maintain a balanced and systematic program, how to set priorities, how to make sure that the technologies and processes developed are appropriate for the intended users.
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From page 29... ...
A common error is to pay insufficient attention to this step, or even ignore it completely, and jump directly to the identification of possible solutions. Perhaps thinking up potential solutions gives one a sense that rapid progress is being made and appears to provide more scope for creativity, but making that error can have serious consequences.
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From page 30... ...
Describing this problem will require identifying technological and procedural security needs that are not currently being met. It will also require identifying a variety of other factors: the available funding, the nature of the threat, the relevant R&D already being conducted elsewhere, competing transportation goals such as openness and
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From page 31... ...
A key element should be a clear definition of what DOT seeks to accomplish by its R&D activities in surface transportation security. DOT's answer to this question should include the following system-level goals: a comprehensive understanding of the surface transportation system's point and systemic vulnerabilities to hostile attack a comprehensive understanding of existing security technologies and processes and how to apply them effectively to surface transportation the development of new security technologies and processes in response to specific, clearly identified vulnerabilities that are unique to surface transportation the implementation of effective security technologies and processes by surface transportation owners and operators in such a way that vulnerabilities to attack are reduced without significantly compromising other transportation goals Note that these objectives are likely to lead to a diverse program that includes many types of R&D: hardware, software, and system development; technology evaluation and testing; pilot programs; paper studies; and technology transfer.
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From page 32... ...
Similarly, hardening the structure of railway or bus stations against bomb blasts is probably not very different from hardening the structure of other public buildings, so general R&D on structural hardening may be best left to others. The objectives that DOT establishes, against which potential R&D projects in surface transportation security will be evaluated, must be able to identify such situations, which will not always be as clear cut as these examples.
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From page 33... ...
At the same time, the confined air in an urban subway is likely to be a very difficult background against which to identify hazardous chemicals. Thus perhaps DOT has an important role to play in evaluating the available products for subway use are their false-alarm rates acceptably low despite the heavy chemical and biological background contained in ordinary subway air?
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From page 34... ...
This suggests a bias toward solutions with broad applicability. Yes, it is essential to continue the ongoing efforts by various agencies to develop better threat information, and any threat information that is available would certainly be an important input to the process of R&D prioritization, but other approaches are also needed.
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From page 35... ...
Choices such as these are part of the process of defining the problem and setting objectives. IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES The second step of the recommended strategy is to examine as wide a range of potential solutions as possible.
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From page 36... ...
Evaluation has received more attention in the systems engineering literature than any other step of the recommended strategy, and that attention has generated considerable controversy because sophisticated techniques have often been applied to problems with poorly specified or inconsistent objectives. Sophisticated evaluation techniques do not guarantee good results unless the basic description of the problem is clear, consistent, and complete.
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From page 37... ...
Note that for surface transportation security, implementation means much more than instituting the R&D program. The real goal, of course, is to ensure that security solutions are implemented in the surface transportation system, not just to develop technologies and processes for their own sake.
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From page 38... ...
Potential technology users should be involved in all phases of the program, from the planning and development of fundamental strategy to the selection and continuing oversight of individual projects. This bottom-up approach will help ensure that the projects selected reflect a realistic view of the operational situation in the real world of surface transportation.
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From page 39... ...
Ultimately, travelers and shippers will be the ones who decide whether to pay higher prices so that owners and operators can recover the cost of added security measures. Outreach to users would have to be designed carefully to avoid either undermining public confidence in the safety and security of the current surface transportation system or desensitizing users to security concerns by "crying wolf" when actual incidents are admittedly infrequent.
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From page 40... ...
For example, the Federal Aviation Administration, which has been struggling with security issues for much longer than have DOT's surface transportation components, has recourse to a regulation known as 14 CFR 191, which protects information resulting from R&D on aviation security. Agency officials can disseminate "191" information to appropriate individuals within airlines, airports, security equipment manufacturers, local law enforcement and emergency services organizations, security policy analysts, and so on without rendering it subject to general public disclosure.
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From page 41... ...
One way to help ensure that R&D expenditures ultimately yield real security improvements is to support dual-use technologies that can address both hostile threats against infrastructure and other disruptions, such as robberies, accidents, or natural disasters. An example of this effect is the experience of commercial airlines, for which the expense and complication of security-driven requirements for baggage tracking and passenger identification have resulted in less luggage lost and fewer illegal transfers of nontransferable tickets.
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From page 42... ...
Their serious involvement in all stages of the program will be critical to successful implementation. To meet the growing need to protect information that is sensitive, but not classified, DOT should consider urging the Congress to provide legal authority similar to the regulation 14 CFR 191, which protects information on aviation security.
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