Improving Surface Transportation Security A Research and Development Strategy (1999) / Chapter Skim
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4 Applying the Methodology: Some Specific Research and Development Topics
4 Applying the Methodology: Some Specific Research and Development Topics
Pages 43-60
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From page 43... ...
Inclusion in this chapter is not intended as a substitute for such evaluation. For example, more work is needed to determine how each potential project would fit into the broader picture of work being done at other agencies.
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From page 44... ...
the value of taking a dual-use approach, in which security objectives are furthered at the same time as other transportation goals the potential for more use of modeling to develop a better understanding of the scope of the security problem the importance of DOT's role in developing and disseminating information about best practices that use existing technologies and processes, including low-technology alternatives the need to consider security as part of a broader picture, not a wholly new and different problem, but one that is similar and closely connected to the transportation community's previous experience in responding to concerns about safety, natural disasters, and hazardous materials The strategy begins with definition of the problem and establishment of objectives. As discussed in Chapter 3, DOT's broad objectives for R&D efforts in surface transportation security should resemble the following:
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From page 45... ...
These other objectives apply in every category, and although this remark will not be repeated in each section of the chapter, it should not be forgotten.) Examples include physical security "guns, guards, and gates" software to detect and prevent unauthorized computer access or the transmission of computer viruses, and sensing equipment to detect bombs or other threats before an
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From page 46... ...
R&D in this area might be similar to the Federal Aviation Administration' s work on detecting chemical traces of explosives on the outside of baggage to prevent explosive devices from being loaded onto aircraft. Detecting unintended traces of biological or chemical agents may be more difficult than detecting explosives, however.
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From page 47... ...
Rather than trying to develop this technology on its own, a more appropriate eventual role for DOT is likely to be evaluating the suitability of technologies developed elsewhere for use in specific surface transportation contexts. Cyber and C3 Attacks R&D topics that could result in improved techniques for resisting cyber and C3 attacks include improved software firewall technologies, hardware and software architectures and associated system designs that could confine the impact of malicious or flawed programs, improved integration of high-performance encryption into networks and systems, and improved security and configuration management tools for distributed computer systems.
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From page 48... ...
are fixed panels that fit along the length of a subway platform and remain closed except when a train is in the station loading or unloading passengers. The presence of such a barrier would greatly decrease the piston effect by which trains force contaminated air through tunnels and ventilation systems.
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From page 49... ...
As discussed below under "Monitoring," the synergy with detection technology means that active measures would be more useful for mitigating chemical attacks than biological ones.
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From page 50... ...
The average specific surface area of an aerosol is hundreds of square meters per gram, which makes aerosol delivery the only flexible way to take rapid remedial action. To provide protection even when the agent used by the attacker is not immediately known, the aerosol chemistry should be designed to counteract a broad spectrum of agents.
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From page 51... ...
High-power interference from a strategically placed source, however, can easily disrupt the reception of a GPS signal. For example, there has been at least one case of a signal from a military air base inadvertently jamming the reception of a GPS signal by a commercial airplane (Brewin, 1998~.
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From page 52... ...
Access to urban transit tunnels is usually difficult for an explosive device large enough to cause major damage. Remote tunnels (e.g., railroad tunnels in the wilderness)
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From page 53... ...
It may be decided that design guidelines for protection against explosions should be kept confidential and not incorporated into building codes. For example, the designs of many blast-resistant and defensive military structures are based on Defense Department technical handbooks rather than civilian building codes.
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From page 54... ...
The problem of false alarms by chemical detectors is a good example. Strategically placed cameras, coupled with event detection and recognition software, might enable a human operator to confirm quickly that a real attack is under way and to initiate evacuation and mitigation procedures.
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From page 55... ...
Automated Field Assays, Stand-Off Sensors, and Rapid Off-Site Identification Although existing biological and chemical analytical assay systems are too slow or not sufficiently automated to operate as detection systems, they can be automated for use in the field. For chemical attacks, there are also stand-off sensing systems for identifying the nature, quantity, and concentration of a chemical agent.
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From page 56... ...
RECOVERY Technologies and processes in the "recovery" category are designed to facilitate rapid reconstitution of services after an attack. Examples include chemical and biological decontamination procedures, backup information systems, plans for rerouting traffic around affected locations, techniques for rapid repair of bridges and roadways, protective clothing and equipment for emergency
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From page 57... ...
Identifying lessons learned from past incidents may be the most suitable subject for DOT's R&D in the investigation category. Some other topics include investigating ways to tag substances that are potential chemical agents or their production precursors; developing forensics teams like those that investigate arsons and bombings; and investigating issues involved in the tagging of
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From page 58... ...
Some similar ideas have already been put in place, under the auspices of the Federal Emergency Management Administration and others, for response to accidental spills of hazardous materials. A system for reporting incidents and possible incidents would also be valuable.
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From page 59... ...
Chemical Attacks A serious system-level concern for responding to chemical attacks is the lack of understanding of how chemical agents would disperse through a facility under attack. R&D could be conducted to model and experimentally verify the behavior of turbulent chemical plumes, in both closed and open spaces, especially the airflow patterns in specific surface transportation situations, taking into account various passenger loads, weather conditions, and so on.
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From page 60... ...
Nevertheless, four themes are sure to remain: the value of taking a dual-use approach, in which security objectives are furthered at the same time as other transportation goals the potential for more use of modeling to improve understanding of the scope of the security problem the importance of DOT's role in developing and disseminating informa tion about best practices that use existing technologies and processes, including low-technology alternatives the need to consider security as part of a broader picture, not a wholly new and different problem, but one that is similar and closely connected to the transportation community's previous experience in responding to concerns about safety, natural disasters, and hazardous materials
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