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Panel V: Improving Assessment and Selection
Pages 93-102

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From page 93...
... He then introduced Maryellen Kelley, serving as a senior economist for the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology while on leave from her post as associate professor at the Heinz School of Public Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon University.
From page 94...
... Like SBIR, as well as most government agencies that are engaged in R&D, ATP funds activities that are undertaken by private companies; in ATP's case, a cost-sharing requirement is designed to leverage private R&D investment with the goal of achieving public benefits. ATP is intended to support "enabling" technologies, which are characterized by both high technical risk and the potential for substantial, widespread commercial application.
From page 95...
... Kelley provided a description of its evaluation methods: · Keeping a database on projects and applicants "from the very beginning" allows ATP to track the characteristics of the applicants, projects, and types of technologies it funds. · Progress on individual awards is charted in two ways: Participants are required to fill out documents for ATP's internal use; agreeing to provide information and to be studied is, she said, "in some sense the quid pro quo for being an awardee of the ATP." These documents help ATP staff gain knowledge about both the effectiveness of the program and the issues that arise in conducting it that may contribute to the quality of program management.
From page 96...
... The agency has a Fast Track program that is probably somewhat more flexible than the DoD pilot. NIH's Fast Track, while it encourages matching in the amount of a Phase II grant, does not require matching at any specified level and accepts it in the form of resources as well as cash.
From page 97...
... Davis's office at DDR&E found that Phase II awards under DoD's program between 1984 and 1992 yielded average product sales in Phase III of $760,000. That study virtually replicated a 1992 GAO study of commercialization, which had placed average product sales in Phase III at $285,000; the substantial increase presumably stems from the fact
From page 98...
... converted into actual products that were sold to DoD in significant numbers and incorporated into defense systems." Among the reforms put forward by the team to address this problem was the SBIR Fast Track pilot project. Under Fast Track, SBIR projects that attract "a little bit" of matching cash from outside investors toward the end of Phase I gain a significantly higher chance of obtaining a Phase II award; they also receive expedited processing and interim funding that, together, amount to continuous funding between Phase I and Phase II.
From page 99...
... Baron concluded what he characterized as a "very preliminary" report by enumerating other changes enacted as a result of proposals by DoD's SBIR process action team: Phase II declaration: A company submitting an SBIR proposal must now list all Phase II awards it has won, as well as declare the sales revenues stemming
From page 100...
... Pointing out that, according to the study presented by Mr. Tibbetts, award winners are usually located in "places where the money is," he argued that the presence of money aids Phase III commercialization.
From page 101...
... Eskesen advocated moving beyond the outreach effort that she views as having been the program's emphasis since its creation in 1982. Focus on getting the small firms to participate in the program has, to date, overshadowed concern for Phase III, during which it was simply "assumed that something was going to happen." Although "for the really good companies it did happen," the lesson of the past few years is that some companies need support and access to resources rather than just the incentive to be involved.
From page 102...
... Declaring that one size does not fit all in the case either of the agencies or of the companies involved, she urged an examination of how micro-management is to be avoided and individual program managers left with the freedom to experiment. As the program has become institutionalized with age, and as its rising funding level has brought increased visibility, this freedom has diminished.


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