Strategies to Protect the Health of Deployed U.S. Forces Force Protection and Decontamination (1999) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
3 Philosophy, Doctrine, and Training for Chemical and Biological Warfare
3 Philosophy, Doctrine, and Training for Chemical and Biological Warfare
Pages 58-66
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 58... ...
Contamination avoidance includes sensors for joint task forces, mobile CB reconnaissance, and systems capable of detecting multiple CB agents and characterizing new agents. Technological advances to support this policy include remote detectors, miniaturization, lower detection limits, logistics support, and biological detection capability.
|
From page 59... ...
are relatively stable. Based on these figures and the funds for individual protection, collective protection, and decontamination technologies (see Appendix A for a detailed breakout of the funds)
|
From page 60... ...
DoD also established the Counterproliferation Support Program specifically to address shortfalls in operational capabilities. The Counterproliferation Support Program supports the following existing programs to accelerate the deployment of essential military counterproliferation technologies and capabilities: (1)
|
From page 61... ...
Current Doctrine: Contamination Avoidance As technologies have advanced, especially detection technologies, and as new, more capable detection equipment has been fielded (e.g., the automatic chemical agent detection alarm) , the doctrine has shifted to "contamination avoidance." The basis of this doctrine is that U.S.
|
From page 62... ...
have been fully implemented in war games; and few analytical models have been used for training (DoD, 1999; Joseph, 1996~. There is inadequate guidance within the services or from operational chains of command that defines tasks, conditions, or standards for more complex CBW activities such as operational planning to minimize the potential effects of enemy NBC use...the commanders of units
|
From page 63... ...
Protective equipment has been designed to meet CB challenges that are far greater than realistic battlefield threats. For example, many countries believed to possess CB capabilities may not have suitable delivery systems to create a sustainable threat of the magnitude against which the United States is currently defending (see Table 3-1 for service-specific requirements for liquid and vapor contamination levels)
|
From page 64... ...
rounds may have as much as 30 percent of the ballistics effects of a comparable high-explosive MLRS round (Battelle Memorial Institute and Charles Williams, Inc., 1999~. This means that significant portions of those areas with 10 g/m2 or greater liquid agent contamination densities would also be subject to lethal shell-fragment effects (Institute for Defense Analyses, 1999~.
|
From page 65... ...
Studies have been under way since the first quarter of 1997 to develop highly specific and sensitive assay equipment that can be used in forward areas to detect and potentially quantify low-level exposures to chemical agents. According to the Executive Summary of the Persian Gulf Veterans Coordinating Board Action Plan with Respect to the Findings and Recommendations of the Presidential Advisory Committee (1997, p.
|
From page 66... ...
The Department of Defense should reevaluate liquid and vapor challenge levels based on the most current threat information and use the results in the materiel requirements process and, subsequently, in the development of training programs and doctrine. Finding.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.