Protection of Federal Office Buildings Against Terrorism (1988) / Chapter Skim
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4 Security Guidelines for Sites and Buildings
4 Security Guidelines for Sites and Buildings
Pages 27-42
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From page 27... ...
Temporary security measures or other modifications made in response to passing threats should be systematically evaluated for permanent continuation, reduction to some intermediate level, 27
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From page 28... ...
Table 4-1 shows an example of what could be considered a typical federal office building threat response matrix that could be used in cases of advance notice of different levels of threat. In this example, as the level of threat increases, the security measures increase.
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From page 29... ...
It is the concept of privacy that draws the First and Fourth Amendments into a partnership that defines the limits of constitutionally permissible security practices. The security practices that most frequently give rise to potential privacy intrusions are electronic surveillance including eavesdropping and monitoring via closed-circuit television, parcel or personal inspections at building entrances and exits, and evidence gathering activities such as searching employees' desks or lockers.
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From page 30... ...
, the use of t~vo-way mirrors, entrance inspection policies, desk or locker search policies, and all security practices used In locations where expectations of privacy might exist (such as restrooms) should be reviewed by counsel periodically to assure compatibility with current statutes and recent judicial interpretations of the Constitution.
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From page 31... ...
3. Where vehicular entrances are located directly opposite an intersecting street, alley, or curb cut, or at the terminus of a street where a vehicle might be capable of a high-speed approach to
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From page 32... ...
4. To facilitate early detection of a hostile attack, site entrances can be designed so that all exiting vehicles have a clear field of vision as they approach the roadway.
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From page 33... ...
should be considered temporary measures to be used only until the threat level subsides or permanent solutions can be constructed. Site perimeter security guidelines follow: 1.
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From page 34... ...
Vehicle Barriers The following guidelines are security design assumptions for vehicle barriers when such barriers are appropriate for use:
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From page 35... ...
4. Active barriers may be used and include the following: crash beams, cable barriers, tire shredders, steel gates, ramp barricades, operable bollards, pits, pop-up barricades, blades, plow barricades,
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From page 36... ...
3. Wherever possible, plant materials should screen the site entry, on-site parking areas, building entrances, outdoor activity areas, mechanical and electrical equipment areas, or any other vulnerable site areas from off-site observers.
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From page 37... ...
In no event should waiting rooms and restrooms be located adjacent to sensitive installations, such as electronic equipment rooms, guard rooms, and mechanical support equipment. In buildings housing high-risk tenants, incoming mail and other parcel traffic should be screened in an area outside of the main facility.
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From page 38... ...
Guidelines include: t. Functions that require controlled access to high-risk areas should be identified in the building security program and should consider the need and location for measures such as: assignment of security force personnel, metal detectors, closed-circuit television monitors, card entry access, locking devices, and one-way glass panels.
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From page 39... ...
Building Exterior Envelope The building exterior envelope represents one of the most challenging areas of consideration because of the variety of threats involved against the exterior and because so many interrelated elements are involved. The security management team must account for the response of exterior building surfaces and functional elements such as walls, roofs, doors, and windows to hostile actions.
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From page 40... ...
6. Windows and other exterior openings should be evaluated for aesthetic value and functional requirements, and consideration should be given to possible security modifications, as warranted, such as: ~ Ventilation: Operational windows could be replaced by smaller and more Emily protected openings in exterior wall, or by internal mechanical ventilation system.
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From page 41... ...
~ Access is restricted to key supporting members where the system cannot be strengthened to resist progressive collapse.
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From page 42... ...
6. Building signage requirements should be reviewed and modified as needed to facilitate an effective evacuation of all permanent and temporary building occupants, including handicapped and other special need users.
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