Network-Centric Naval Forces A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities (2000) / Chapter Skim
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1 Overview of Study Results
1 Overview of Study Results
Pages 11-51
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From page 11... ...
The Navy and Marine Corps have also developed conceptual descriptions of their own future warfighting strategies "Forward...From the Sea"2 and "Operational Maneuver From the Sea"3 that have themes in common with Joint Vision 2010. Most importantly, all of these concepts have recognized 1Shalikashvili, GEN John M., USA.
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From page 12... ...
Forward deployment of naval forces that may be widely dispersed geographically, the use of fire and forces massed rapidly from great distances at decisive locations and times, and the dispersed, highly mobile operations of Marine Corps units are examples of future tasks that will place significant demands on networked forces and information superiority. Future naval forces must be supported by a shared, consolidated picture of the situation, distributed collaborative planning, and battle-space control capabilities.
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From page 13... ...
Only a force that is attuned to and capable of harnessing the power of the information technology that drives modern society will be able to operate effectively to protect that society. The naval forces are already moving toward network-centric operations.
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From page 16... ...
Both aspects of network-centric operations are treated in this report. 1.1.3 Approach and Emphasis in This Report This report describes the operational concepts, command and control relationships, and information systems architecture necessary to support the networked naval forces.
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From page 17... ...
As a consequence, attention is devoted in several parts of this report to the power projection mission, and network-centric operations are discussed in terms of the subsystems and components that will enable the naval force network to succeed in that mission. Finally, as requested in the terms of reference, attention is also given to the demands that the move to network-centric operations will make on the business practices and organization of the Department of the Navy, including the problems associated with the training, retention, and promotion of naval personnel in the developing network-centric operations environment, as well as the unprecedented opportunities offered by the new information and networking technologies.
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From page 19... ...
Rather, the platforms, Marine units, and weapons will be part of a network integrated into a system to carry out a mission, supported by a common command and information infrastructure. All the naval forces, at all command levels, will be involved in and affected by this change.
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From page 20... ...
1.2.2 Creating Network-Centric Operations Systems Transforming the naval forces from platform-centric to network-centric design and operations will require a disciplined approach to developing verylarge-scale integrated systems. New concepts of operation embodying new technical capabilities will have to be developed and then tested in the field, with the test results used to refine the concepts continually and adapt them to changing conditions of threat, environment, and technological advance.
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From page 21... ...
These concepts will form the starting point for the spiral development process described below. Within the naval forces, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
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From page 22... ...
Also, it will help to identify and resolve interoperability problems in time to avoid large and expensive retrofit programs. The shift from platform-centric to network-centric thinking and operation of naval forces will require a shift in the mind-sets, culture, and ways of doing business of all the naval forces (and, indeed, in their connections to other Services and National agencies)
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From page 23... ...
3. The CNO and the CMC should give the Navy Warfare Development Command and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command the responsibility of working together to devise joint concepts and doctrine for networkcentric operations for the naval forces as a whole, and to incorporate joint and coalition aspects of such operations in their concepts.
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From page 24... ...
emphasis on the power projection mission described in the introduction to this overview and integrated into the detailed discussion in Chapter 3. 1.3.2 Critical System Needs Developing the capability for effective power projection by the Navy and Marine Corps requires that the mission-specific networked operations that have already been developed must be integrated into a comprehensive NCO system structure (see Figure 1.1~.
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From page 25... ...
; and handing off to follow-on forces and debarking the Marines who were the landing force. Moreover, since naval force operations involve the simultaneous execution of many activities in many mission areas, networked capabilities in other areas, such as ASW and CEC, must be integrated with those for power projection to achieve network-centric operations for an entire force in a total operational context.
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From page 26... ...
\ Single Radar Uncertainty Radar 1 / Radar 1 , Target Dual Radar Uncertainty Region /Single \ / Radar Uncertainty Radar 2 Radar 2 FIGURE 1.4 Reducing target location error with linked cooperating sensors in common coordinates.
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From page 27... ...
The challenge in network-centric operations is to enable OODA loops that span space and time as effectively and as rapidly for dispersed force elements as for a single platform, particularly when some sensors may be involved in multiple loops. Any sensor and processor with useful data or information will provide it for anyone who can use it, and the provider may not know who the user is nor the user who the provider is.
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From page 28... ...
Also, targeting and weapon delivery must be locked in the same reference grid to minimize the error due to target location inaccuracies. 1.3.2.3 Weapons Naval force weapons are being made more accurate to reduce the need to reattack targets and to reduce collateral damage.
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From page 29... ...
There must be an overall infrastructure the NCII with joint and coalition connections, to ensure consistency and interoperability among such far-flung assets, from local tactical networks to major commands, in a global naval force network. 1.3.3 Recommendations Regarding the Integration of Force Elements for the Power Projection Mission 1.
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4. A number of technology directions should be pursued in furtherance of the power projection mission: a.
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From page 31... ...
Is responsive and assured Enables information management · Is dynamic and self-organizing · Has location independence Is freely scaled and evolved · Is connected seamlessly with joint, ( National' and coalition networks , Forces ~ it, and weapons; Logistics, -> Support J FIGURE 1.6 Attributes of the Naval Command and Information Infrastructure.
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From page 32... ...
Purely military functions will appear more in the information processing and command parts of the NCII, where security and the special characteristics of military operations are driving factors, although purely military functional capabilities will be built in good measure from commercial sources and technology. The NCII should be recognized as the naval force portion of an information infrastructure that is interwoven with, shares common components with, and adheres to the same set of standards as other Service, National, and, when appropriate coalition networks, such that all function as a global whole.
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From page 33... ...
Such outlying tactical networks can be connected into the Internet-based NCII via IP-capable 71 Furthermore, as far as the committee can tell, this focus on the Joint Data and Joint Composite Tracking networks omits consideration of all other tactical communications networks currently employed by the Navy that are part of the overall information transfer capability. These include various sensor links e.g., for MTI and synthetic aperture radar data and links to weapons control systems e.g., ultrahigh frequency satellite communications target location updates for Tomahawk.
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From page 34... ...
Information presentation and decision support includes the graphical means for displaying information to users and the set of automated Information Gathering and Generation/Command Dissemination Requests/Control al I | | | Intormettion | ~\\~ Collection Information _| Request & ~ Presentation / Warfighter \+ Execution _/~ ~ Exploitation _ Dissemination _ & Decision ~ Decisions / Management _ Weapons Data Input | I & Integration ~ Mctncigement | I Suppor ~ \~ I Tlnformation Feedback Supporting Resource Base System Resource Management Information Assurance Communications and Networking FIGURE 1.7 Functional architecture of the Naval Command and Information Infrastructure.
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From page 35... ...
The key strength of the NCII in allowing the connection of disparate networks and functions is also, however, a source of risk. Among these connections is that linking the fleets' operational networks, in which a degree of secrecy and control can be maintained, with the naval force business networks that are essential for the logistic support of the fleet and that must be open to both the naval forces at sea and their shoreside commercial connections.
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From page 36... ...
There is no single individual in the Department of the Navy charged with the responsibility for information assurance. Further, the Navy Department has no overall plan for information network security in its tactical networks.
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From page 37... ...
global responsibilities are such that network-centric operations offer the only means of achieving the necessary mission effectiveness of U.S. naval forces.
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From page 38... ...
NCII. Sufficient information was not available to the committee to resolve the matter of communications capacity requirements, but it appears that stated future Navy communications requirements could be unrealistically low, even though the available military and commercial satellite communications (SATCOM)
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From page 39... ...
1.4.4 Recommendations Regarding the Design and Construction of the Naval Command and Information Infrastructure 1. The Department of the Navy should develop and enforce a uniform NCII architecture across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of naval forces.
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From page 40... ...
) , in conjunction with other interested Navy and Marine Corps elements, should join with the other components of DOD to sponsor a vigorous, continuing R&D program aimed at meeting the challenges of creating an advanced NCII.
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From page 41... ...
e. Naval force information assurance efforts should include preparation and training for operations with impaired NCII functionality, including provisions for redundancy in appropriate places and fallback modes of operation.
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In addition, it found that the current requirements generation process is not sufficiently responsive to the demands imposed by the pace of information technology development to keep deploying naval forces at the leading edge of commercial practices. The committee also found that there is no one organization within the Navy operational community that has the credibility and authority to prepare requirements for the seams among subsystems and components supporting network-centric opera~\ FIGURE 1.8 Major decision-making support processes in the Department of the Navy.
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From page 43... ...
Finally, some members of the committee believe that, due to the legacy of earlier maritime strategies, the Navy places insufficient emphasis on the power projection mission in the N8 organization and in the program executive office (PEO) structure.
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From page 44... ...
developing improved output measures and mission/ system component trade-off analyses and assessments. Given these divergent views and the uncertainty they reflect about the true management situation applicable to overall network-centric operations system planning and acquisition, the committee concluded that recommendations to the Navy Department and the CNO would be in order, to review the N8 and the PEO structures and adjust them if necessary and as appropriate to accommodate end-to-end system designs for NCO subsystems, including especially those relevant to the power projection mission.
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From page 45... ...
CHENG, Chief Engineer of the Navy; DRM, design reference mission; IWAR, integrated warfare architecture; MOE, measure of effectiveness; MOP, measure of performance; NAVSEA, Naval Sea Systems Command; NWDC, Navy Warfare Development Command; SYSCOM, Systems Command; TYPE CDR, functional type commander. complexities that will attend the evolution of the naval forces into the networkcentric operations mode.
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From page 46... ...
This new functional type commander should report to only the three fleet commanders, in the same manner as the current platform type commanders report to individual fleet commanders. In addition to assigned operational responsibilities, including management of the fleet portions of the NCII and space assets, this new functional type commander should be the single point of information support to all the fleets, and should represent the fleet commanders' network-centric information operations needs and priorities in the program objective memorandum (POM)
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From page 47... ...
He or she should oversee all aspects of Navy system interoperability and integration and execution of NCO programs, including the NCII in Navy areas of responsibility. This also includes oversight of the activities of the Navy Chief Engineer and the NAVSEA battle force interoperability engineering function and working with the Commander, Marine Corps System Command, to ensure effective, coor
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From page 48... ...
8. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps should review how system trade-offs and resource allocation balances are addressed in the Navy/Marine Corps staffs for all naval force missions, and particularly for the power projection mission, with a view toward orienting the process to the overall network-centric operations system concept.
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From page 49... ...
11. The organization of the Navy's N8 office should be reviewed and adjusted as appropriate and necessary to increase emphasis on all aspects of the power projection mission, including strike and countermine warfare, amphibious and airborne assault.
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From page 50... ...
Board of Directors 3-Star Designated SYSCOM Commander · Oversee BF Interoperability · Coordination of NCO Program Execution · Oversee Chief Engineer NCO activities Chief Engineer responsible for system and technical architecture Institutionalize: · Spiral process · System engineering Partition new open systems into utilities and domainspecific applications Navy/MC recommend J8 establish JTAMDO-type process for land attack FIGURE 1.10 Key recommendations for managing network-centric operations. BF, battle force; DEP, distributed engineering plant; DRM, design reference mission; FMF, fleet Marine force; ISR, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; IWAR, integrated warfare architecture; MOE, measure of effectiveness; MOP, measure of performance; PE, program element; POM, program objective memorandum; TYPE CDR, functional type commander.
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From page 51... ...
The Department of the Navy and the naval forces should institute networkcentric operations education and training at all levels across the Navy and the Marine Corps.
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