Network-Centric Naval Forces A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities (2000) / Chapter Skim
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7 Adjusting Department of the Navy Organization and Management to Achieve Network-Centric Capabilities
7 Adjusting Department of the Navy Organization and Management to Achieve Network-Centric Capabilities
Pages 289-348
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From page 289... ...
Unfortunately, the committee found that the integrated battle force concept is not reflected in integrated decision making for four key management processes that are basic to better implementing the concept of network-centric naval forces for more effective operations. These four key decision support processes include: 1.
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From page 290... ...
To provide the leadership required for a successful transition to network-centric operations, the Department of the Navy will have to adjust its thinking and key processes from a platform focus to a network-centric orientation. As illustrated in Figure 7.1, each of the three key decision support processes serves different elements of the Navy Department leadership.
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From page 291... ...
7.2 REQUIREMENTS GENERATION: CLEARLY STATING OPERATORS' MISSION NEEDS 7.2.1 The Requirements Generation Process A requirement can be defined as "an established need justifying the timely allocation of resources to achieve a capability to accomplish approved military objectives, missions or tasks.''1 Preparing a requirement that has a reasonable chance of successful development and acquisition depends on the balancing of capability, resources, and timeliness among the operational, technical, and financial communities. An intense and continuing dialogue among the three communities is required to avoid a failed development, i.e., one leading to a system that 1Melich, Michael, and Michael G
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, who uses the Office of Naval Operations (OPNAV) to provide top-down guidance and oversight of what is a very diffuse and diverse requirements generation process.
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From page 294... ...
. 7.2.1.3 The Spiral Process The spiral process, also called evolutionary development of requirements and systems, is an innovative method for fielding a system quickly by using 20perationa1 analysis involves the determination of functions to be performed, and the order and manner in which they should be performed, to carry out military missions or operations.
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From page 295... ...
7.2.2 Requirements for Interoperability in Joint Operations The DOD requirements generation process for joint operations is hampered by Title 10 language that assigns the Services the primary responsibility for equipping, manning, and training the Service component forces. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is responsible for overseeing and prioritizing DOD requirements affecting joint operations and can review any requirement proposed by a Service.
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From page 296... ...
, which has begun to have an impact on the requirements generation process. USJFCOM, with its recently acquired Joint Battle Center and others, now has a significant operational experience base and an intense if not always friendly training relationship with the other regional CINCs.
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From page 297... ...
This effort, which is just beginning, could become an important step in the spiral development of the NCO concept and of requirements for C4ISR systems. In summary, the OSD, the Joint Staff, and defense agencies provide sporadic, conflicting, and sometimes onerous guidance with regard to C4ISR requirements rather than a well-structured, consistent, and testable process for elicitation and validation of cross-Services information needs.
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From page 298... ...
Commercial communications services may take over large parts of the Joint Planning Network, for example, relieving the Navy of operating its own extensive communications utilities and applications. Accomplishing a rapid evolution will place demands for change on all Navy Department processes, including the requirements generation process.
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From page 299... ...
-like setting with the acquisition team. New distributed simulation technology has given the Department of the Navy tools for improving the requirements generation process to respond to rapid technological change.
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Finding: New distributed simulation technology offers the Department of the Navy tools for improving the requirements generation process to respond to rapid technological change in information systems. Finding: Successful development of more effective naval network-centric operations will require that some organization within, or with strong ties to, the operational community be in charge of developing the requirements for the interfaces for different platforms and operational organizations.
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The IWAR process, guided by CNO/4-Stars, is envisioned to do the followAnalyze end-to-end capabilities; Achieve total force capability with synchronized pieces; Accomplish battle force integration across platforms; Improve rigor and discipline; Prioritize capability areas inside the Navy total obligational authority; Tie together program execution, budget, programming, and out-years; and · Provide early vision and stability for sponsors, claimants, program executive officers, and vendors to achieve efficiency. 6DARPA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; DISA, Defense System Information Agency; NIMA, National Imagery and Mapping Agency; NSA, National Security Agency.
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8The 12 major analytic areas are maritime dominance, deterrence, information superiority and sensors, power projection, air dominance, sustainment, infrastructure, manpower and personnel, readiness, training and education, technology, and force structure (see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1)
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From page 303... ...
However, the IWAR process and supporting operational and systems analyses capabilities do not currently enable continuous assessments from requirements generation through programming, budgeting, and execution. 7.3.1.2 Measures of Effectiveness and Performance A major reason for the lack of depth in the IWAR assessment process (including its supporting elements in the resource sponsor and claimant communities)
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Currently, the Navy lacks good MOEs and MOPs for evaluating networkcentric operational capabilities and the contributions of different components to the larger goal. A means of developing better metrics for battle force mission capabilities lies in the design reference mission (DRM)
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The Navy and Marine Corps can lobby the OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and organizations such as JTAMDO, but in the final analysis, such trade-offs are Service decisions.
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Any oversight in resource allocations for battle forces must be identified based on separate analysis and is handled primarily on a case-by-case basis. Since DRMs are lacking for many mission areas, comprehensive oversight of resource allocation for naval battle forces is spotty at best.
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. These areas involve many parts of the Navy and Marine Corps team that in the resource allocation process are represented by different parts of the OPNAV staff (both in and beyond the N8 organization)
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Finding: Comprehensive oversight of network-centric operations as a whole within the programming, budgeting, and execution processes is needed to ensure an adequate consideration of "seams" and jointness. Finding: Current Navy and DOD resource allocation procedures discourage the good commercial practice of spiral acquisition for systems and applications dominated by rapidly changing technologies.
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From page 309... ...
have shown that joint operations as well as ad hoc assemblages of units from a single Service face serious obstacles in collaborating to achieve a common objective. To avoid such difficulties in the future, system components that will be coupled for NCO must fit into a joint operational architecture.
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From page 310... ...
with the responsibility to oversee all aspects of battle force system interoperability and integration for new programs and to coordinate program execution across the SYSCOMs to ensure synchronization in development, production, and installation of systems important to network-centric operations. This makes it particularly difficult to ensure interoperability of components for major naval force missions that may involve five or more program executive officers (PEOs)
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7.4.3.3 Managing Backward Compatibility versus New Technology Offerings Legacy component constraints have often forced postponement of both potentially important improvements and new capabilities. A possible solution for the Navy and Marine Corps is to develop new capabilities that have two attributes: (1)
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From page 312... ...
Getting the money to integrate across programs is a part, but not all, of the process. 7.4.4 The Acquisition Process The committee believes that the DOD requirements process, including the JROC, and the DOD 5000 series of acquisition directives, offer sufficient flexibility to acquire and upgrade NCO system components.
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Development of information support for network-centric system operations must respect three architectural requirements: · Operational architecture: a model that shows the relationships of all the stimuli flowing into the mission area and all the responses flowing back across the boundary into the outside world; · Systems and technical architectures: the components that provide automation and communication support for an application. Technical architectures employ the set of standard building blocks, hardware, and software involved in an application; and · Legacy component linkages: legacy components' expected contributions to meeting the required objectives, empowerment of the system engineers of all affected legacy components to resolve compatibility and transition issues, and resources for accomplishing these purposes.
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From page 314... ...
An information model provides the detailed foundation for all data design decisions affecting all applications throughout a networked enterprise. Such a model includes entity-relationship diagrams, transaction and static volume estimates, attribute listings and properties, unambiguous definitions, state-transaction diagrams, and entity matrices.
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From page 315... ...
However, the committee believes that more must be done to make the major cultural shift from platform-centric to network-centric naval operations. As a specific example, no office similar to JTAMDO exists to resolve conflicting demands associated with concepts of operations, operational architectures, and other interoperability issues for important operational areas such as land attack within the power projection mission.
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From page 316... ...
Finding: The Department of the Navy has not yet found a mechanism or management team approach for prioritizing the development, procurement, and installation of network-centric elements key to improving interoperability across platforms, or for managing the significant cultural change from platform-centric to network-centric operations. Finding: No office similar to JTAMDO exists to resolve conflicting demands associated with concepts of operations, operational architectures, and other i4The need for system engineering is discussed in section 2.3 of Chapter 2.
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From page 317... ...
will be needed to design architectures and networks to meet operational needs and to ensure that information dissemination equipment can be adequately installed and maintained. And future Navy, Marine Corps, and civilian personnel at all levels should have, and will need to maintain, computer skills sufficient to plug and play equipment components (e.g., sufficient skills to operate versus design and maintain essential terminals)
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The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is updating the civil service codes, but it may be years before they are officially implemented.
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In addition, 50 percent of federal civil service 15Data supplied by Defense Manpower Data Center, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) , Arlington, Va., November 1999.
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Most important, all future Navy Department personnel will need some level of information technology knowledge. 7.5.4 Links and Interdependencies Among People, Technology, and Information The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 established a Chief Information Officer (CIO)
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Understanding who can and should do the IT work military active duty, reserve, civil service, and/or contractor; date on IT; . Developing career paths for personnel with significant IT capabilities; Developing the training plans to keep the Department of the Navy up-toUnderstanding the content of IT work and defining codes to keep classifications up-to-date in a rapidly changing world; and · Integrating IT workforce considerations for both military and civil service personnel.
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training to support C4ISR information operations (IO)
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The national IT worker shortage could become a serious problem for the Navy. While the technical work to provide the Navy/Marine Corps intranet is projected to be provided by contractors, the application of this type of solution to other IT areas could present a problem with respect to sea/shore rotation assignments for experienced IT enlisted personnel.
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From page 324... ...
Historically the functions have been carried out more or less sequentially, although there have been exceptions when threat or other circumstances were sufficient to cause some acceleration of events. Within the Department of the Navy, the lead responsibilities (oversimplified with emphasis on the Navy versus the Marine Corps)
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FIGURE 7.2 Functions involved in network-centric operations integration. TABLE 7.2 Lead Responsibilities for Selected Navy and Marine Corps Functions Function Lead Responsibility Concept development, experimentation, and requirements generation Assessments and resource allocation Acquisition including new technology development Personnel, training, logistics, and other infrastructure management Forces management and operations CNO through NWDC and CMC through MCCDC CNO, CMC, and SECNAV with N8 staff lead ASN (RDA)
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From page 326... ...
These organizational relationships allow for a continuous focused flow of information between the principal players throughout the requirements generation, allocation of resources, acquisition, in-service engineering, and execution processes. However,
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This lack of a formal, institutionalized operational focus makes the integration of C4I (and network-centric operations) difficult across the entire spectrum of requirements generation, resource allocation, acquisition, and in-service engineering for the battle force.
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Acronyms are defined in Appendix H various offices in OPNAV and their counterparts in the SYSCOMs that are responsible for engineering support and portions of the acquisition function, as depicted in Figure 7.7 (the Secretariat and the Marine Corps are also shown in simplified form)
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. For example, the committee observed the following for the power projection mission (one of the four major missions of the Navy/Marine Corps team)
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During the committee' s extensive discussion of the organization of the Navy structure for coordinating NCO system requirements, some members of the committee expressed the belief that, owing to the legacy of earlier maritime strategies, the Navy has not put sufficient emphasis on the power projection mission in the N8 organization and in the PEO structure. The N8 organization reflects submarine warfare, surface warfare, and air warfare, with power projection a part of each office but not the focus of any.
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From page 331... ...
Given these divergent views and the uncertainty they reflect about the true management situation applicable to overall network-centric operations system planning and acquisition, the committee concluded that recommendations to the Navy Department and the CNO would be in order, to review the N8 and the PEO structures and adjust them if necessary and as appropriate to accommodate end-to-end system designs for NCO subsystems, including especially those relevant to the power projection mission. These recommendations are included with the others that follow.
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From page 334... ...
The difficulty with even attempting to create a new entity to be responsible for all or a major portion of network-centric operations is that such operations span almost all Navy and Marine Corps activities. Therefore, the committee strove to develop a pragmatic approach, taking into consideration the restrictions that exist within the DOD and the Department of the Navy as a result of laws and culture developed over many decades.
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BF, battle force; DEP, distributed engineering plant; DRM, design reference mission; FMF, fleet Marine force; ISR, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; IWAR, integrated warfare architecture; MOE, measure of effectiveness; MOP, measure of performance; PE, program element; POM, program objective memorandum; TYPE CDR, functional type commander. In reviewing these recommendations, note that only one new position is recommended: the creation of a functional type commander for Operations Information and Space (shown in Figure 7.9 under the requirements and operations functions)
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and for the Marine Corps fleet Marine force into the battle group or battle force. Information assurance, vulnerability management, and computer network defense have no coherent visibility at the fleet level.
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Creating a new organization, a functional type commander for Information Operations and Space, reporting to all fleet commanders, would provide the integrating mechanism to enable the proper fielding and testing of new network-centric systems, hardware, and TTPs. In arriving at this recommendation, the committee considered various alternate approaches to carrying out the necessary functions, and the likely problems and benefits that would attend the creation of the new position.
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From page 338... ...
Computer technology and related processes can become outmoded before the POM process can even react to the fielding of the results of the prior requirements generation process. In addition, multiple organizations have uncoordinated responsibilities for operations and fleet support, requirements generation, manpower planning, and budgeting.
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From page 339... ...
Rank emerging NCO requirements based on fleet commanders' recommendations and the results of fleet experimentation. The requirements board should be chaired by the VCNO and have the N6 as the executive director (until the recommended Information Operations and Space Command is established)
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From page 340... ...
for Plans, Policy, and Operations and the ACOS for Programs and Resources of the Marine Corps staffs, should also be members. Requirements sponsors (N2, N4, N6, N85, N86, N87, and N88)
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Provide the resources for and expand the role of the Navy Warfare Development Command in generating concepts of operations and operational architectures, and designing and analyzing the results of operational experiments. NWDC and MCCDC should coordinate Navy and Marine Corps experimentation efforts.
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Create a board of directors to add comprehensive oversight of networkcentric operations as a whole to all three major decision support processes (requirements generation, resource allocation, and acquisition and program execution)
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From page 343... ...
The organization of the Navy's N8 office should be reviewed and adjusted as appropriate and necessary to increase emphasis on all aspects of the power projection mission, including strike and countermine warfare, amphibious and airborne assault, and fire support and logistics support of Marine Corps forces from the sea. follows: 7.7.2.4 Acquisition and Systems Engineering Recommendations The committee's recommendations in the acquisition and systems area are as 1.
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From page 344... ...
should look at the best means to address system engineering for the entire system and not just the functional parts. (This latter portion of the recommendation applies to all naval missions and particularly to the power projection mission, which affects so many elements of the Navy/Marine Corps team.
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7.7.2.5 Personnel Management Recommendations The committee's recommendations in the personnel and career management area are as follows: 1. Institute network-centric operations education and training for all naval personnel at all levels within the Navy and Marine Corps.
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7.7.3 Recommendations Summary This chapter sets forth the collective judgment of the committee on the keys to implementing improved network-centric capabilities. The chapter shows how to modify the decision support and personnel management processes to achieve network-centric capabilities as major enablers in the conduct of naval operations.
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From page 347... ...
, Spiral Process ~ Rae ~ for applications a/ ~~ ' Oversight ~ Requirements Board ~ Board of Directors TYPE CDR Expanded IWAR Designated SYSCOM Related NAVSEA 05 Comprehensive DRMs Added CHENG NWDC Improved MOEs/MOPs Responsibility FIGURE 7.10 Functions for effective integration of network-centric operations shown in relation to major recommendations made in this report. CHENG, Chief Engineer of the Navy; DRM, design reference mission; IWAR, integrated warfare architecture; MOE, measure of effectiveness; MOP, measure of performance; NAVSEA, Naval Sea Systems Command; NWDC, Navy Warfare Development Command; SYSCOM, Systems Command; TYPE CDR, functional type commander.
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