Network-Centric Naval Forces A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities (2000) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
2 Network-Centric Operations -- Promise and Challenges
2 Network-Centric Operations -- Promise and Challenges
Pages 52-87
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 52... ...
NCO are characterized by the rapid acquisition, processing, and exchange of mission-essential information among decision makers at all command levels, enabling them to operate from the same, verified, situational and targeting knowledge bases at the resolution and the decision cycle time required at each level. When coupled with a clear understanding of the higher commander's intent, this shared awareness will enable naval forces to reach joint action decisions more rapidly than would otherwise be possible and to focus the maneuvers and fire of widely dispersed forces to the greatest effect possible.
|
From page 53... ...
Multiplesensor cooperation in defining target location for precision-guided munitions will be a routine activity in NCO. In a more revolutionary sense, NCO can enable the naval forces, as the first forces on the scene in many cases, to establish the command and control for an entire joint task force with responsibility for air and missile defense, initial land operations, and other support functions.
|
From page 54... ...
Department of the Navy efforts to implement NCO could be greatly improved by identifying output measures directly tied to mission effectiveness. 2.1.3 Evolving in a Changing Context The naval forces i.e., the Navy-Marine team will continue to be a major forward-deployed arm of the United States around the world well into the foreseeable future.
|
From page 55... ...
Because of the dispersed nature of the likely engagement scenarios and the need for speed of action, and in some cases for new CONOPS, naval forces stand to benefit significantly if the move to global network-centric operations currently under way within the Department of the Navy can be planned, led, and executed cohesively. 2.1.3.1 Planning for Collaboration and Interoperability Future naval force operations will require joint-Service collaboration and in most cases coalition involvement.
|
From page 56... ...
2.1.3.2 Providing Comprehensive Support for Decision Making and Action To ensure smooth functioning across joint force operations, the NCII, the hardware and software that integrate seamlessly all the elements of NCOnamely, sensors, information and knowledge bases, logistics and support, commanders, and the forces and weapons and their subsystems (see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1) must be entirely consistent with DOD standards.
|
From page 57... ...
Validated information is presented to commanders so that they can make assessments, estimates, and judgments, i.e., orient themselves to the operational picture. Based on this situational awareness, the constraints presented by the military situation, and the time and resources available, commanders must decide what to do.
|
From page 58... ...
In addition, the type of operations being conducted by decision makers in their OODA loops at any given time will determine further requirements for the NCII. In operations ranging from operations other than war through major theater war, the tempo in each OODA loop and hence the demands on the NCII will increase significantly as tensions escalate.
|
From page 59... ...
Hence in the examples below and in the remainder of the report, major emphasis is given to the land-attack aspect of the network-centric power projection mission. 2.1.4.1 Preparation for Major Theater War When naval forces conduct strike planning for a major theater war during rising tensions and with a time frame of days or months, Navy and Marine commanders and staff are working with information at an intermediate level of detail on the numbers, location, and characteristics of targets.
|
From page 60... ...
Upon firing, the weapons inventory will be decremented automatically and the information automatically presented to the commanders. 2.1.4.2 Long-range Targeting The following scenario, focused on long-range targeting, illustrates the need for joint networked operations in many military situations and highlights the complexity of the technical requirements for success in this mission component.
|
From page 61... ...
61 Satellite intelligence; Precise localization of fixed targets by adding SAR data against NIMA's Precise GPS localization of the aircraft before launch, and download of the data to the missile; . is denied; Self-localization of the JSOW missile using inertial navigation when GPS · MTI radar indications of movement; · Imagery validation of potential moving targets using a UAV; · Ground designation of moving targets; and · Instant information on the situation provided by the NCII to the battle group commander.
|
From page 62... ...
Fully networking the overall expeditionary operations to provide and enable sharing of a comprehensive joint operational picture offers the potential of a very great improvement of efficiency and effectiveness in a joint system-like operation. While the land-attack aspect of the power projection mission is emphasized in the ashore examples and throughout much of this report, it should be emphasized also that expeditionary power projection by the joint task force (JTF)
|
From page 63... ...
, offering the potential for greatly improved efficiency and effectiveness of operations by the JTF. 2.2 BASIC CAPABILITIES REQUIRED IN A COMMON COMMAND AND INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE As the critical core element that integrates the elements of commanders, sensors, information and knowledge bases, forces and weapons, and logistics enabling NCO, the NCII must be designed to meet the following basic requirements: · Provide sufficient capacity, quality of service, and speed to meet operational needs as the level and tempo of conflict vary; .
|
From page 64... ...
Rapidly assess the effects of applying forces and weapons, including bomb damage as well as the effects of all military services' full range of weapons, from information operations to explosive devices.
|
From page 65... ...
If it is not written down, it never happened! Joint Vision 2010 presents an excellent conceptualization of future operations, but detailed plans are needed now for accomplishing the vision.
|
From page 66... ...
, can the naval forces have any confidence in the resulting design and implementation. Future critical missions must be defined, and operational analysts must determine the requirements to accomplish these operations.
|
From page 67... ...
Better and more timely decision makingone of the significant challenges for improved mission effectiveness requires high-quality information in a form that humans can rapidly recognize and understand. One example is graphical representations in which humans can easily recognize patterns and changes in patterns, as opposed to the textual representations used extensively today.
|
From page 68... ...
on methods to achieve improvement in human decision making because human decision makers are a key element in NCO, and their ability to make faster and better decisions is essential to mission effectiveness. 2.4.2 Leading the Transformation to Network-Centric Operations To succeed, the planned transformation from a platform-centric to a network-centric naval force will require strong support from the top.
|
From page 69... ...
A consensus-building process that brings all the key stakeholders together to define the goals and requirements of network-centric operations is badly needed. Finding: The naval force leadership needs to develop a shared vision of what network-centric operations can accomplish that includes concrete measures of improvements expected in mission effectiveness.
|
From page 70... ...
. Similarly, the influential Marine Corps Combat Development Command is working closely with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who sees himself as the principal engine for change.
|
From page 71... ...
, an element of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) , as a focal point to expedite the evaluation and evolution of critical concepts through experimentation.
|
From page 72... ...
The committee recommends that the CONOPS planning group begin by selecting an initial set of operational concepts that meet the following criteria: . Involve high-priority naval force missions that are difficult enough to demand new concepts of operations and/or capabilities (i.e., stressful operational challenges)
|
From page 73... ...
See also Davis, Gompert, Hillestad, and Johnson, 1998, Transforming the Force: Suggestions for DoD Strategy, RAND, Santa Monica, Calif. 7For discussion of how this challenge can be addressed systematically, see Davis, Bigelow, and McEver, 1999, Analytical Methods for Studies and Experiments on "Transforming the Force," RAND, Santa Monica, Calif.; and Defense Science Board, 1998, Joint Operations Superiority in the 21st Century: Integrating Capabilities Underwriting Joint Vision 2010 and Beyond, Volume 1, Final Report, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.
|
From page 74... ...
Use of the proven "model-test-model" iterative or spiral development approach whereby incremental improvements are added to the design as a result of gaming, testing, simulation, new technology, and so on; and 10. Selection of the preferred operational approach as a result of the above effort.
|
From page 75... ...
After the war game results are analyzed, any necessary modifications to the operational design should be incorporated. The NWDC and the MCCDC should aim for an 1 8-month turnaround for the above spiral development process.
|
From page 76... ...
Finding: There is no effective Navy and Marine Corps process for selecting, developing, and implementing CONOPS in the network-centric paradigm. 2.5.2 Transitioning Through Experimentation To make the transition to network-centric operations as quickly as possible, a recommended strategy is to place key information technologies into the hands of naval warfighters at all echelons in a way that allows them to easily try out new ideas for using those technologies.
|
From page 77... ...
In so doing, the operators may modify their own operational processes and concepts based on use of the emerging capability. The spiral process is more than an acquisition process; it also supports reengineering the operational concepts.
|
From page 78... ...
· An experimentation program provides the framework for the spiral process to evolve new operational concepts and processes in addition to the new system capabilities. 2.5.3.2 Advantages of the Spiral Process The spiral process is a powerful alternative to the traditional acquisition process.
|
From page 79... ...
The Army's use of the spiral process in the migration strategy resulted from its experience with the Task Force XXI, an AWE that culminated in a force-onforce engagement at the National Training Center in March 1997. The preparation began with an operational architecture that described how a digitized brigade would conduct operations if equipped with all the information technology the Army had at the time.
|
From page 80... ...
Today the Army is pursuing a migration strategy that incorporates the spiral process and experimentation as key components. Joint experimentation is being expanded, and an international coalition program for digitization is in the early stages, with specific international partners.
|
From page 81... ...
The result assessment is being used to establish an integrated C2 capability for the field. The EFX98 was so successfully that the Air Force determined that the spiral process for evolutionary acquisition should be adopted Air Force-wide.
|
From page 82... ...
; and Maritime Battle Center, Navy Warfare Development Command, 1998, "The New Naval War College," in Surface Warfare, Vol.
|
From page 83... ...
The objectives were to enhance the ability of naval forces to accomplish simultai9A joint fire coordination network that receives calls for fire, assigns a firing platform using the appropriate ammunition, keeps track of force ammunition inventories, and deconflicts fire in the joint operations arena, as described in Surface Warfare, September/October, 1998, p.
|
From page 84... ...
. 2.5.6 Uniqueness of the Spiral Process The spiral approach to designing network-centric naval forces especially, the integration of major platforms into the information-based fleet network will present many challenges to the current way of doing business.
|
From page 85... ...
Department of the Navy efforts at implementing NCO could be greatly improved by identifying output measures directly tied to mission effectiveness. Recommendation: The Department of the Navy leadership should develop a set of strategic goals and expectations for NCO with accompanying measures of output performance.
|
From page 86... ...
Finding: There is no effective Navy and Manne Corps process for selecting, developing, and implementing CONOPS in the network-centnc paradigm. Recommendation: The Navy Warfare Development Command and the Manne Corps Combat Development Command should work together on a few highpnonty and challenging naval force operations that can be implemented more effectively using NCO.
|
From page 87... ...
1997. Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps: 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st-Century Force, Volume 9, Modeling and Simulation.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.