Network-Centric Naval Forces A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities (2000) / Chapter Skim
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3 Integrating Naval Force Elements for Network-Centric Operations -- A Mission-Specific Study
3 Integrating Naval Force Elements for Network-Centric Operations -- A Mission-Specific Study
Pages 88-139
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From page 88... ...
In considering both the components of the system and the challenge of engineering and acquiring subsystems that will interoperate to perform a military mission effectively, the committee chose to focus on the Navy missions of air dominance and power projection, the first because examples of NCO exist, and the second because Navy leadership has given priority to capabilities that decisively influence events ashore.) (The four principal missions of the Navy, iThe committee did not study deterrence, and its examination of sea dominance was cursory.
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From page 89... ...
Further, it focused on the naval forces' assets that interact over significant distances within rapid tactical time lines: the system of commanders and decision aids (tactical information processing) ; sensors and navigation; and forces and weapons.
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From page 90... ...
and a JSTARS aircraft provide continuous ground movingtarget indicator (GMTI) coverage synthesized from all the distributed sensors as a single view, together with large volumes of synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
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From page 91... ...
The need for planning of an entire integrated system is a recurrent theme in this chapter.2 3.1.4 Complexity of the Challenge Enabling NCO requires the integration of existing components into a coherent system, and progress toward NCO will surely involve some evolutionary improvements that integrate legacy components planned and built independently. The committee believes, however, that the full power of NCO will be realized only if the sensors, weapons, and tactical information processing networked for NCO are planned and developed as coherent subsystems.
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From page 92... ...
In considering such questions, the committee found challenges in weapons, sensors and navigation,3 and tactical information processing components of the NCO system on which it focused. Examples of these challenges are listed in Table 3.1.
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From page 93... ...
, synthetic aperture radar Call for fire Cooperative engagement capability Provides shared situational awareness to all participants in the battlespace Where am I? Where are my friends?
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From page 94... ...
ERGM will enable accurate fire to a range of 63 nautical miles. In a remanufacturing program, the Navy is adding GPS to convert existing, obsolete standard missiles (built originally for air defense)
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From page 95... ...
The problem of target identification (whether by cooperative or noncooperative means) has, for rules of engagement reasons, driven air-to-air engagements to ranges that are significantly shorter than the full kinematic range of available weapons.
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From page 96... ...
(See Section 3.2.1.) Finding: Target identification limitations inhibit the use of air-to-air weapons at their full kinematic range.
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From page 97... ...
3.3.1 Sensor Technology Trends and Limitations Sensor capabilities are steadily improving through the use of modern electronic technology and the transition to all-digital and all-solid-state solutions. Distributed implementations are increasingly emphasized both within individual sensors (e.g., radar phased arrays or optical focal plane arrays)
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From page 98... ...
98 TABLE 3.3 Trends in Sensor Technology NETV~ORK-CENTRIC NAVAL FORCES Trends Implications Digital technology Solid-state devices Distributed components Multidimensional signatures Stable, drift-free operation Compact, low-cost implementations Algorithm flexibility Increasing ability to exploit exponential growth of computing capabilities High performance, e.g., sensitivity, power, and efficiency Miniaturization and low power requirements Low-cost integrated circuitry Compact integral packaging Novel microelectromechanical systems devices Phased arrays for radar, electro-optics, and sonar Multiple sensor cooperation and networking, e.g., cooperative engagement capability Data fusion of multiple and diverse sensors for automatic target recognition (ATR) and geolocation Mobile sensors, e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned underwater vehicles, and ground robots Multi spectral Hyperspectral Enhanced ATR and noncooperative target recognition TABLE 3.4 Physics-based Limitations on Sensor Performance Sensor Class Fundamental Obstacles Radar Poor angular resolution with typical wavelengths and practical antenna sizes Absorption by and reflection from solid materials Frequency dilemma in foliage and ground penetration: low frequencies give poor resolution; high frequencies do not penetrate Electro-optics Serious weather scatter and absorption electro-optic sensors require fair weather Resolution vs.
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From page 99... ...
3.3.2 Current Naval Organic and ,Ioint Sensors Today on its weapons' platforms the Navy employs many different local organic sensors radar, EO, sonar, and electronic warfare (EW) , as well as GPS and perhaps environmental and chemical and/or biological sensors (Appendix B lists representative naval organic and joint and National radar and EO sensors
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From page 100... ...
3.3.3 Using Sensors in Network-Centric Operations 3.3.3.1 Targeting Ground-Attack Weapons The current vision of decisively influencing events ashore includes a strong emphasis on force projection onto the land and to the purchase of the many landattack, largely GPS-guided, long-range weapons. However, most of the highperformance radar and LO sensors deployed today throughout the surface Navy provide little or no capability to detect and localize targets on the land, even at short distances inland.
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From page 101... ...
The Navy does not now possess any organic airborne sensors capable of providing targets for naval GPS-guided land-attack weapons, and although initiatives to provide this capability for example, SAR options for a vertical-takeoff UAV platform to be developedare commendable, the Navy can greatly improve its capability by investing in connectivity to the joint and National sensors. 3.3.3.2 Sensor Synergy In spite of the current limited availability of appropriate land-targeting sensors, the Navy still possesses a large inventory of deployed, highly capable sensors, which have been persistently underutilized.
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From page 102... ...
for initial target detection and
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From page 103... ...
CEC does this for air defense, and NCO should be extended to other missions as well. Achieving sensor synergy requires that sensors are suitably designed for example, reporting confidence data to aid the fusion process.
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From page 104... ...
The contribution of ATR in attacking moving targets is discussed in Section 3.6.1, and its role as a hedge against GPS jamming is discussed in Section 3.3.4. Without ATR, the large amount of data produced by sensors can overload communications channels and human analysts.
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From page 105... ...
MBV techniques are then used to reason about target component articulation, obscuration, and other real-world effects that cannot be handled using template-based approaches. Companng the results of raw, single-look ATR performance as indicated by the operating characteristic for the MSTAR Version 7.1 (March 1999)
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From page 106... ...
Also shown is the field test performance of the current baseline. The relatively poor field test results are due in part to variations in target configuration, target component articulation, and imaging geometry.
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From page 107... ...
Finding: Automatic target recognition avoids overload of communications and of image analysts, may be necessary for remote attack of moving targets, and provides a hedge against GPS jamming. Model-based vision may overcome the limitations of template matching.
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From page 108... ...
However, the cost and complexity of IMUs capable of navigating long distances with low error are daunting. Intercontinental ballistic missiles used very expensive IMUs, despite the fact that the destructive range of their thermonuclear warheads reduced the requirement for accuracy of delivery.
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From page 109... ...
At the time of this writing the committee knew neither the contents nor the probable fate of that ORD, so it examined jam resistance from physics and engineering standpoints. Table 3.7 compares various methods of increasing the resistance of GPSguided weapons and platforms to GPS jamming.
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From page 110... ...
and the immaturity of most ATR, alternatives to ATR for hitting moving targets are hard to attain. Signal processing alone cannot overcome serious GPS jamming but can contribute to jam resistance.
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From page 111... ...
In principle, the civilian code can be spoofed under some circumstances, although measurements of received power greater than that expected from the GPS satellites would be a good indication that spoofing was being attempted. Most military GPS receivers first synchronize to the less robust civilian code before acquiring the military codes.
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From page 112... ...
The large number would overcome spatial processing, and their low individual cost would make them unappealing targets for HARMs. It is the committee's impression that although a few jammers might be attacked by HARMs, and although the existence of this weapon might demoralize crews that operate or maintain GPS jammers, antiradiation missiles cannot
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From page 113... ...
Development costs for the pseudolites and new navigation receivers would be expected to be high. The original Link 16 of the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS)
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From page 114... ...
navigation system and of Doppler navigation techniques such as were used with the Navy satellite navigation system TRANSIT.6 Ab6TRANSIT, the world's first operational satellite navigation system, was conceived in the early 1960s to support the precise navigation requirements of the Navy's fleet ballistic missile submarines.
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From page 115... ...
3.4.3 Findings Finding: No single technique will make GPS-aided weapon navigation invulnerable to GPS jamming. Practical solutions are likely to involve a combination of cheaper, precise IMUs, better ALR and ATR, improved satellite signals and
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From page 116... ...
Finding: Available antiradiation weapons do not solve the GPS jamming problem because the jammers can be easily replicated and the weapons cost many times more than the jammer. Suitably modified HARMs could be used to attack aircraft carrying high-power jammers, and the presence of such HARMs in inventory might demoralize crews operating GPS jammers.
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From page 117... ...
Links 16 and 11 are currently employed to distribute platform-derived tracks to develop a common tactical picture. The Navy is currently deploying CEC, which distributes radar returns to provide a common, low-latency track that can be used for fire control in air defense NCO.
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From page 118... ...
Sensor management and control is the allocation of limited sensor resources for target detection, tracking, classification, and identification; kill and battle damage assessment; and weapons support. With the development of longerrange, multimode sensors capable of supporting multiple missions and functions, sensor management and control is becoming an increasingly complex and important function.
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From page 119... ...
to perform communications network planning, management, and control for the tactical data links associated with developing the CTP. The generic tactical processing functions depicted in Figure 3.5 are equally applicable to a platform-centric system, such as the combat direction system of a single ship, or to a network-centric system such as CEC.
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From page 120... ...
. In other cases, the human role may be to monitor and supervise a highly automated system (e.g., Aegis air defense)
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From page 121... ...
The Navy and Marine Corps use different radios and radio frequencies. The Navy is converging its data link activities to Link 16, whereas the Marine Corps plans little procurement of Link 16.
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From page 122... ...
, and other sensing modalities can play important roles, only radar has the combination of high area rate, all-weather coverage required to provide surveillance, and fire control support for long-range targeting of mobile and moving targets. Although the Navy has a very limited organic capability for long-range, stand-off tracking, classification, and kill assessment of land targets, DOD is investing significant resources in the development of manned airborne radar platforms (e.g., JSTARS, U-2)
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From page 123... ...
The assumed classification and tracking performance is aggressive but is potentially attainable with advanced processing technology. Note that the current Global Hawk radar does not include an HRMTI mode, but the development of such a mode for both the Global Hawk and U-2 radars is planned by the Air Force under the Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System (ASARS)
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From page 124... ...
Thus improved sensor and processing technology, multiple sensors, and/or fusion of additional sensor types are needed. For example, the expected number of false target nominations for MTI can be reduced using MTIm and two-dimensional ATR, albeit at the expense of an increase in the expected time to detect a
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From page 125... ...
Algorithms and decision aids are needed to assist operators in selecting the optimal weapon, and to ensure that adequate sensor coverage is available during weapon fly-out and that communications links are available to provide in-flight target updates to the weapon, if required. Successfully engaging mobile and moving targets requires that decisions be made in seconds to minutes rather than the hours to days acceptable for fixed targets.
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From page 126... ...
and supporting naval organizations should serve as agents for DARPA programs. ONR should establish appropriate 6.2 programs in NCO tactical information processing and in human-machine interfaces and interactions.
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From page 127... ...
Mature versions of tactical NCO information processing prototypes should be used in sensor and weapon system operational evaluations. For deployment of NCO tactical information processing components, the most pressing need is the ability to exploit current and emerging nonorganic sensors to support land-attack missions.
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From page 128... ...
3.6.1 System Requirements to Hit Moving Targets Presented here is an example of the recommended system engineering approach that focuses on solving the war-fighter's problems and thereby derives the characteristics of the component systems instead of starting with these characteristics as a "requirement." An acute problem at present is that of hitting moving targets on Earth's surface. Surveys show that moving targets normally constitute a high percentage of the targets in theater; tanks, armored personnel carriers, and patrol boats are examples.
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From page 129... ...
To summarize, hitting moving targets will require a tight network of distributed sensors, processing facilities, command and control facilities, weapon launch platforms, and weapons. In many circumstances, weapons with simple, inexpensive seekers and links for in-flight targeting updates may provide the best balance in distributing the burden of performance between targeting and weapon components.
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From page 130... ...
However, for an ephemeral target, that is, one that is detectable and stationary for only a limited time, the weapon must arrive before the target moves. The sum of the delays in sensing, decision making, and weapon time of flight must be smaller than the —Moving targets | Sensory latency ~ Decision time | Time of flight r | Target velocity uncertainty | Postjamming I IMU performance Range at which GPS is jammed , I Initial target I location error ` Target displacement uncertainty Finaltarget L location error | Navigation uncertainty ~1 | ATR performance t~ FIGURE 3.9 Component performance interactions (no external guidance after launch)
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From page 131... ...
Figure 3.10 displays these interactions. Absent a breakthrough in ATR, the committee believes that closed-loop control will usually be required to hit moving targets.
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From page 132... ...
, and authority are needed. Among the problems the committee found in strike and over-the-horizon naval fire support were the following: · Need for responsive, long-range, low-cost, high-volume weapons for compatibility with stand-off distances imposed on naval platforms by antiship missile or other threats, and for Marine Corps plans for ship-to-objective maneuver; · Inadequate targeting for naval surface fire, including lack of an agreedupon method, backed by program actions, for transmitting target coordinates from a deep inland forward observer to an over-the-horizon firing ship; and .
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From page 133... ...
The development of new warfighting concepts and doctrine and the rebalancing of the materiel components must coordinate throughout the evolution of the system. 3.6.3 Finding Finding: Hitting ephemeral, relocatable, and moving targets is a vital capability that will require improvements in sensors (e.g., platforms for surveillance in high-threat areas)
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From page 134... ...
Consideration of what is needed for effective power projection in terms of weapons, sensors and navigation, and tactical information processing revealed a number of potential trade-offs across elements for effective operations, for example, GPS jam resistance against ATR performance, guidance accuracy against warhead lethality, and sensor latency against weapon time of flight. The complexity of the interactions led to the committee's conclusion that the design and development of new subsystem components must be coherently managed so that the trade-offs can be continually reexamined to account for developmental difficulties and breakthroughs.
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From page 135... ...
Recommendation: While participating in endeavors to increase the jam resistance of Global Positioning System receivers in naval platforms, the Department of the Navy should continue to seek technology for better long-range target identification (including ATR) and should interact more strongly with the relevant DARPA programs.
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From page 136... ...
Consider the acquisition of a Navy synthetic aperture radar/ ground moving-target indicator sensor for unmanned aerial vehicles. Finding: Multisensor cooperation offers significant performance advantages.
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From page 137... ...
Recommendation: Develop protection for and alternatives to the Global Positioning System. Finding: Automatic target recognition avoids overload of communications and of image analysts, may be necessary for remote attack of moving targets, and provides a hedge against GPS jamming.
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From page 138... ...
Recommendation: Design weapons and sensor platforms so as not to foreclose the possibility of endgame control of the weapon directly from the sensor. 3.7.2.4 Tactical Information Processing Finding: There is no mechanism to coordinate the development of Navy and Marine Corps doctrine and apparatus for littoral operations, or to coordinate such functions as tracking and network control.
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From page 139... ...
Recommendation: Maintain Navy Department technology programs underlying tactical information processing. Finding: The Navy needs to position itself to exploit the fruits of DARPA investment in technology that can provide tactical information processing capabilities.
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