Balancing the National Interest U.S. National Security Export Controls and Global Economic Competition (1987) / Chapter Skim
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6. An Assessment of the Multilateral Export Control System
6. An Assessment of the Multilateral Export Control System
Pages 135-149
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From page 135... ...
economic and Western security interests, that the United States ought now to pursue the objective of developing a community of common controls in dual use technology among cooperating Western countries. This concept implies the construction of a common external "wall" of export controls to the East accompanied by a significant liberalization of controls within the 135
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From page 136... ...
Nevertheless, recent improvements in CoCom and moderately successful diplomatic initiatives with certain neutral European countries have made the concept of a community of common controls in dual use technology a realistic objective for U.S. export control policy.
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The 1985 meeting ratified the outcome of the list review process; adopted a new procedure of continuous reviews; called attention to the diversion of goods in transit; approved expedited processing of exception requests for the People's Republic of China; and endorsed work on the means of dealing with the export of intangible technical know-how. As a consequence of these agreements, CoCom members have tightened some of their licensing and enforcement procedures; admitted Spain to membership; upgraded Paris headquarters operations; launched a diplomatic effort to obtain the cooperation of nonmember countries; created a group of advisers with military expertise, most of them representing defense ministries; and added to the control list certain types of machine tools, dry docks, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, robotics, superalloy technology, telecommunications switching equipment, and software.
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From page 138... ...
This is particularly likely to occur in countries whose governments have not allocated adequate resources to enforcement of export controls and have not otherwise stressed the importance of compliance with export controls to their domestic producers. Correcting such deficiencies and reconciling interpretations of the International List have been principal objectives of the United Statesnot only in CoCom negotiations but also in dealings with individual governments.
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From page 139... ...
All CoCom members request import certificate and delivery verification documents from only a handful of nonmember countries (see Table 6-11. Because efforts to improve CoCom surveillance of exports to third countries have been only marginally successful, such surveillance remains the weakest link in the multilateral system.
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140 Cal o ._ Ct .
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The CoCom List Review Process Because of its investment in strategic technologies, its leadership role in the alliance, and its global security interests outside the alliance, the United States has typically advocated more extensive controls than its CoCom partners at every list review. The existence of a much larger export control bureaucracy in the United States may also account for the greater number of U.S.
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From page 142... ...
This could be facilitated by adding a "sunset" provision, perhaps limited to administrative exception note items, that would cause these items to be removed automatically during the next regular CoCom list review unless their continued inclusion was rejustified and agreed upon. The CoCom Exceptions Process If an exporter wishes to ship goods or technologies on the International List to a Soviet bloc destination for civilian use, he must apply to his own government for permission.
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From page 143... ...
Even though the data are "sanitized" to protect proprietary information, such reviews by industry have fostered the suspicion that these governments may be seeking to promote commercial interests by providing their producers with access to valuable commercial intelligence. The reliance of some member governments on private technical advice has been an argument for enlarging the role of defense ministries in national export control processes generally and in CoCom deliberations specifically.
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From page 144... ...
U.S. POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Through foreign policy and economic cycles, the premise that Soviet acquisitions of leading Western dual use technologies represent a significant military threat has not been seriously challenged anywhere in the Western alliance.
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Extraterritorial Controls In some circumstances the United States attempts to exercise licensing control over reexports of U.S.-origin products from one foreign country to another. The objective of such controls is understandable: The United States seeks to ensure through the controls that products that were licensed for export from the United States to a particular foreign country do not find their way to proscribed destinations.
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In every country visited by the panel on its European and Asian fact-finding missions, foreign businessmen and government officials expressed strong opposition to the U.S. system of reexport controls.
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National security export controls are only one of many prevailing irritants including traditional trade protection and subsidy issues, difficulties in coordinating macroeconomic policies, unilateral U.S. foreign policy controls, and obstacles (of which technology transfer policy is only one)
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From page 148... ...
These groups include: · nations sharing CoCom objectives such as New Zealand and Australia; · nations sharing CoCom objectives but lacking adequate controls such as South Korea and South Africa; · neutral nations that do not share CoCom objectives but apply some controls such as Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, and Ireland; · nations that do not share CoCom objectives and apply few if any controls such as Singapore, Malaysia, and India; · nations on which information is inadequate such as Hong Kong; and · nations that have a special ideological attachment to proscribed nations. The subcommittee also has set common objectives for member countries to guide their individual bilateral approaches to these nations.
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From page 149... ...
In the U.S. view, third countries should be asked to: · assume responsibility for preventing reexports to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries of imported CoCom-controlled items that do not have reexport authorization from the originating CoCom countries; · monitor use of CoCom items in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries after obtaining reexport approval; · control the export to proscribed destinations of indigenously produced products that are functionally equivalent to CoCom-controlled items; and · cooperate in enforcement measures.
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